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Can nuclear weapons be uninvented? This thesis provides new insights into how this was a 
longstanding worry for the British nuclear weapons establishment and how it understood and 
responded to its knowledge management concerns. This thesis demonstrates how, from a sense of 
its own fragility, the British nuclear weapons establishment developed an understanding of the 
importance of personally embodied skills. Process tracing is used to highlight a cyclical pattern of the 
establishment believing itself to be in a morale crisis where it needed extra measures to retain tacit 
knowledge. In response, Aldermaston repeatedly promoted its institutional interests by raising the 
risk of nuclear weapons ‘uninvention’ through the loss of its skilled workforce unless more work 
could be obtained. Although not always successful, this argument was first deployed in 1954 and 
used as late as 1993. These efforts had a direct impact on nuclear policy; the Polaris Improvement 
Programme was initially justified based on maintaining the research momentum at Aldermaston. 
The inability to contest arguments premised on secret and incommunicable skills meant that 
successive governments were faced with the principal-agent problem of imposing enough oversight 
to ascertain Aldermaston’s minimum manpower requirements yet also affording enough autonomy 
for the weapons establishment to manage its own workforce freely. To find an optimal balance, 
multiple different management models have been imposed upon Aldermaston. Nonetheless, this 
thesis demonstrates that claims relating to nuclear skill loss have and continue to serve as a driver 
for vertical nuclear weapons proliferation and may prove particularly influential in states less able to 
provide effective oversight. 
10 
Chapter 1: Research Question & Theoretical Framework 
Introduction 
How have nuclear weapons establishments responded to concerns over the loss of skill 
necessary for their function? This chapter will present the research problem and question of this 
thesis and establish why it is important for it to be examined. It will be argued that the difficulties in 
establishing and conveying the extent of a nuclear weapons establishment’s knowledge 
management needs can serve as a driver for vertical proliferation. It will then be argued that Britain 
presents an ideal case study and an analysis of its historical experience from a knowledge 
management perspective can provide new insights. This chapter will then construct a theoretical 
framework through reviewing the relevant literature on knowledge management and nuclear 
weapons programmes, demonstrating the importance of sustaining skills and how this pressure 
complicates communication between policy makers and managers of the nuclear weapons 
establishment. The thesis will then proceed to apply these concepts to the history of the British 
nuclear weapons programme.  
Problem Statement 
MacKenzie and Spinardi demonstrated in 1995 that producing nuclear weapons was 
dependent upon an array of “tacit knowledge” based skills that required interpersonal transmission, 
if these were lost then nuclear weapons ‘uninvention’ could potentially occur. 1 This reflected the 
contemporary concerns of the US and UK weapons establishments at the end of the Cold War and 
underground nuclear testing moratoriums.2 The possibility of nuclear weapons uninvention 
continued to be explored by numerous practitioners, academics and policy makers; the issue of 
‘uninvention’ continues to be highly contentious given the possible policy implications for nuclear 
non-proliferation and stockpile maintenance.3 A typical arrangement of the nuclear uninvention 
argument is that as nuclear weapons stored in arsenals need repair and maintenance to function 
1 MacKenzie and Spinardi, (1995), p.47 
2 Ibid., p.91 




properly, this introduces a classic ‘Ship of Theseus’ problem, wherein engineers and designers 
attempt to restore devices to as close to the original specification as possible to guarantee their 
reliability.4 The problem with this approach, as recognised by the British nuclear weapons 
establishment by the 1970s was that “the copy will not be exact in a perfectionist sense. No 




The above problem raises the question – how have nuclear weapons institutions been 
affected by and responded to the problem of retaining skills to ensure their nuclear weapons 
continue to function? It also gives rise to a further problem – who other than those already within 
the weapons establishment are qualified to determine the level of skills needed? The overall 
objective of this thesis is to further understand how establishments have assessed and responded to 
concerns over nuclear weapons knowledge management. By studying the British historical 
experience, this thesis identifies a cyclical process of how Britain’s nuclear weapons establishment 
experienced repeated morale and associated personnel crises. To avert the loss of the skilled 
workforce, administrators promoted the potential for nuclear weapons ‘uninvention’ to policy 
makers as identified by MacKenzie and Spinardi in 1995.6 This argument, based on retaining tacit 
knowledge through continuing research and development, as well as improved conditions for 
personnel at the establishment was used to advance institutional interests repeatedly between 1947 
and 1993.7 This involved sequential steps of identifying knowledge management deficiencies 
internally, communicating them to policy makers, requesting action be taken and then policy 
implementation. This thesis highlights the repeating processes that led successive governments to 
face the dilemma over whether to provide autonomy to or centralise oversight over the weapons 
establishment and whether to provide further development programmes. Although potent, the 
‘uninvention’ argument was rarely singularly successful. The case for further programmes premised 
on knowledge management grounds were most effective when governments lacked political 
consensus and delegated decision making to a limited nuclear bureaucracy. 
 
4 MacKenzie and Spinardi, (1995), p.92 - MacKenzie and Spinardi describe the ‘Ship of Theseus’ problem as one 
of retaining “the sameness of artifacts.” 
5 TNA, DEFE19/240, UK Stockpile Reliability in the Absence of Nuclear Experiments, 01/02/1978 
6 MacKenzie and Spinardi, (1995) 





Why Does It Matter? 
 
This thesis primarily contributes to understanding nuclear weapons establishments’ 
responses to knowledge management challenges, exploring how and why this can serve as a driver 
for vertical proliferation. In terms of domestic drivers of proliferation, Sagan notes that “state-run 
[nuclear] laboratories” play a role in “[serving their own] parochial bureaucratic or political 
interests,” but recognises that “no well-developed… theory” exists in this regard.8 Good case studies 
examining domestic drivers do exist for particular states. For example, Schilling and Young study the 
bureaucratic politics behind the US progression towards the hydrogen bomb and Kampani has 
investigated the role of institutions in India’s nuclear decision making.9 The role of the British 
weapons establishment in influencing nuclear decisions has also been highlighted before by Ritchie, 
Zuckerman, Spinardi and McLean & Beyer.10 However, this thesis is distinct from these studies by 
examining these issues through the lens of knowledge management, applying this to the British 
nuclear weapons programme. Drawing on theories from the Science and Technology Studies field, 
this work constructs a conceptual framework for nuclear weapons knowledge management and 
demonstrates why it is an intrinsic aspect of development and maintenance. This framework is then 
applied to the British nuclear weapons programme, through the analysis of archival sources that 
were previously unavailable to the above studies. This thesis finds a consistent and repeated 
concern over retaining and transmitting skills that was established early on in Britain’s nuclear 
weapons history that acted as a drive towards heterogenous engineering and the struggle 
governments had in attempting to acquire oversight over these efforts. This perspective provides an 
explanation of a drive towards promoting institutional interests by weapons laboratories that stems 
from apparent socio-technical necessity, rather than self-interest.  
By demonstrating knowledge management challenges and how nuclear weapons institutions 
and policy makers have responded, this thesis has clear theoretical and policy implications. 
Academics such as Dennis, Carrigan and Kemp have recently argued that institutional knowledge 
requirements for nuclear proliferation are one of the only remaining barriers due to the diffusion of 
dual use relevant material and technology.11 Correspondingly, Vogel, Hymans and Ouagrham-
 
8 Sagan, (1996), p.63-65. See Palamar, (2016) for a recent thesis examining bureaucratic imperatives towards 
denuclearization. 
9 Young & Schilling, (2020) and Kampani, (2014) 
10 Ritchie, (2009), Zuckerman, (1989), Spinardi, (1997) and McLean & Beyer, (1987) 




Gormley have advocated for non-proliferation policies focused on assessing intangible, social aspects 
of weapons programmes.12 In terms of examining the influence and challenges of managing a 
nuclear weapons effort, Hymans and Braut-Hegghammer have examined several cases but their 
studies focus on authoritarian regimes conducting initial proliferation campaigns.13  
While Hymans argues that severe knowledge management problems for nuclear weapons 
programmes occur most prominently in authoritarian regimes, this has been undermined by North 
Korea’s recent advancements.14 In response, Saunders has attempted to synthesise the existing 
scholarship on nuclear choices and domestic politics of nuclear states by comparing the degree of 
nuclear threat certainty against the expansion or contraction of nuclear policy making circles.15 
Within this framework, nuclear weapons scientists are necessary elite actors that can be delegated 
autonomy to “facilitate innovation” at the risk of exacerbating bureaucratic politics.16 Alternatively, 
leaders may also “restrict the domestic circle for nuclear choices to exclude those who have 
different nuclear policy preferences.”17 Saunders cites India as an example of when leaders adopted 
the latter approach; Kampani concurs, making the case that India’s nuclear decisions were driven by 
“[a] classic principal-agent problem. The principals, the political class in this case, lack[ed] the 
knowledge and expertise to effectively monitor their agents, both the scientific and military 
agencies.”18 Braut-Hegghammer also identifies that principal-agent problems limited Iraq’s 
proliferation efforts as the state was unable to assess its scientists’ work.19 
In advancing this work, the problems encountered in Britain’s nuclear programme highlight 
the inherent difficulties of managing a nuclear weapons programme as information asymmetries 
(relating to levels of ‘skills’ required to sustain the effort) mean the principal (UK government) was 
repeatedly forced to decide on its response to a perceived threat (possibility of nuclear weapons 
uninvention) near solely on information provided by the agent (the nuclear weapons establishment), 
with the agent being the only competent body able to authoritatively judge a proposed settlement.20  
How Britain has responded to this central dilemma, by either delegating autonomy to or 
further centralising authority over the nuclear weapons establishment is an area of ongoing policy 
 
12 Hymans, (2012), p.269-273, Ouagrham-Gormley, (2014) and Vogel, (2013), p.275-276 
13 Braut-Hegghammer, (2016) and Hymans, (2012) 
14 Narang and Miller, (2018), p.71-72 
15 Saunders, (2019) 
16 Ibid., p.167 
17 Ibid., p.167 
18 Kampani, (2014), p.219 
19 Braut-Hegghammer, (2016), p.6-13 




concern.21 Different approaches intended either to improve the ability of the weapons 
establishment to retain knowledge or increase oversight have persistently faced criticism. Multiple 
institutional developments made in attempts to resolve these perceived problems were significantly 
varied, providing the basis for this thesis’ empirical research. As is highlighted in the theoretical 
framework, knowledge management for both an initial proliferation effort and then maintaining a 
nuclear arsenal has proven near universally challenging. Therefore, the UK case provides varied 
responses to the same consistent challenges. How states and institutions have responded to the 
possibility of nuclear uninvention and providing oversight over the nuclear weapons establishment 
will provide further policy tools to disarmament and non-proliferation efforts. 
By producing a knowledge management framework and applying it to the history of a 
nuclear weapons programme, this thesis contributes to the literature that developed following the 
end of the Cold War and concerns over possible nuclear weapons ‘uninvention’. As already cited, 
this most prominently consists of MacKenzie and Spinardi, but associated sociological studies include 
Nuclear Rites by Hugh Gusterson and McNamara’s thesis on Los Alamos.22 More recent studies 
include Sims and Henke’s analysis of ‘socio-technical repair’ and Bourne’s acknowledgement of the 
inherent politics of discussing the invention and uninvention of nuclear weapons.23 While these 
studies have tended to focus on the ramifications of the end of nuclear weapons testing, this thesis 
highlights the continuities and dissimilarities between debates over nuclear weapons uninvention 
before and after the majority of states ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Firstly, 
that the idea that nuclear weapons could be uninvented due to knowledge loss was not new and had 
been used to promote the institutional interests of Britain’s nuclear weapons establishment as early 
as the 1950s. Secondly, this thesis underlines that the need to retain the ability to construct and 
maintain nuclear weapons reliability has long been understood as a social process that involved 
transmitting information between people through new research and development programmes. This 
is where a driver of vertical proliferation emanates from. However, it will be noted that this driver 
has been lessened in recent years due to a process of ‘black boxing,’ where reliance on previously 
individually embodied knowledge is transferred to an impersonal scientific process utilising 
computerised simulations.24 While this is not an entirely new process, reliance on simulations has 
considerably increased and the conclusion to this thesis will demonstrate how this has occurred 
within the British nuclear weapons programme.25 This may mean the significance of the driver 
 
21 See Plant, (2020) 
22 MacKenzie & Spinardi, (1995), Gusterson, (1998) and McNamara, (2001) 
23 Sims & Henke, (2012) and Bourne, (2016) 
24 MacKenzie & Spinardi, (1995), p.91-92 




identified by this thesis is diminishing over time, but likely only in established nuclear programmes 
who have confidence in their data acquired in nuclear testing and ability to simulate nuclear 
weapons conditions. 
While leveraging the existing literature on the UK’s nuclear weapons programme as source 
material, this thesis will also make a significant contribution to the history of the British weapons 
establishment. Other than a brief history offered by AWE, no other work provides an in-depth 
examination of how the weapons establishment undertook institutional development from its 
foundation to the present. 26 As will be seen, these adaptations were often in response to perceived 
needs of acquiring and retaining skills. When expressed by contemporaries, their language may not 
directly match the terms detailed in the framework, but it is argued that the concepts involved do 
due to their ongoing need for interpersonal transmission and fear of permanent loss. By utilising 
new archival material and official histories that have been released in the past 20 years, each 
chapter will provide fresh insights into how knowledge management was handled, and how these 




Britain provides arguably the best-case study as to how variations in autonomy and 
centralisation were provided to the nuclear weapons establishment in attempts to resolve 
knowledge management issues.27 This stems not only from the availability of primary source 
material, but the observable cyclical nature of how institutional development was undertaken in an 
effort to ameliorate knowledge management concerns or attempts to balance institutional 
autonomy, oversight and control over its nuclear weapons programme. When nuclear weapons 
development within the UK resumed after WW2, it initially came under the auspices of the Ministry 
of Supply. In 1950, development was centralised at Aldermaston as the Atomic Weapons Research 
Establishment (AWRE) and under the supervision of the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority 
(UKAEA) after 1954. During the 1960s, the UKAEA was subordinated under the Ministry of 
Technology. This was changed again in 1973 when the AWRE was subordinated directly to the 
Ministry of Defence (MoD). Finally, during the Thatcher government, AWRE was reformed into the 
Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) and transferred to privatised management between 1987 
 
26 See Hawkings, (2000). More broad ranging official histories exist, but they do not highlight the commonality 
of problems encountered across time.  




and 1993. The management of the UK’s nuclear establishment has therefore transitioned from a 
fully government directed initiative to a privately managed one and as a result, the UK provides a 
series of case studies that highlight alternating outcomes within a repeating process of attempts to 
autonomies or centralise the nuclear weapons establishment.  
There are also still open questions with regards to Britain’s nuclear weapons development 
and the influence of its weapons laboratory on its technical direction. For example, a puzzling 
outcome identified in the literature has been the variable ability of Britain’s weapons laboratory to 
influence the technical direction of Britain’s nuclear weapons programme. Zuckerman (Government 
Chief Scientific Adviser 1964-1971) believed that the weapons establishment’s drive for technical 
improvements led the nuclear arms race, whereas Spinardi thought this may have only been the 
case for the Polaris Improvement Programme.28 If Spinardi is correct, why was institutional pressure 
in this case successful but not in others? Spinardi identified the role of heterogeneous engineering 
and its relationship to the relative influence of the weapons establishment, but he was not able to 
fully explore the reasons for this variation due to source limitations.29 This thesis identifies a cyclical 
process wherein the weapons establishment believed its inability to retain vital skills posed an 
existential risk to the programme unless new work was provided. It is argued that when 
governments delegate questions of nuclear ‘uninvention’ to their defence bureaucracies, retention 
of skill-based arguments will be most influential. Each case study chapter will demonstrate how this 
process unfolded, how it was attempted to be handled internally, how these concerns were 
communicated to policy advisors and what solutions were offered (if any) and how these were 
implemented. 
The UK rests as perhaps one of the best documented weapons programmes compared to its 
contemporary proliferants like France or the Soviet Union, even before taking language barriers into 
consideration. Selecting the United Kingdom means access to a range of primary sources at the 
National Archives. The United States offers comparable levels of access but is different as it was the 
first to develop fission and fusion capabilities, thus presenting a different type of case as other 
countries were attempting to replicate technologies that had already proven to be physically 
feasible.30 Collections of interest include those from the weapons establishment itself, the Ministry 
of Defence (MoD) and the UK Atomic Energy Authority, whereas comparable collections would still 
be highly restricted for the Soviet Union and France. However, there are some restrictions to access; 
for example, some senior figures’ contemporary correspondence (such as William Penney’s) are 
 
28 Spinardi, (1997), p.551-552 
29 Ibid., p.572-575 




retained without public access by the MoD.31 In addition, this thesis was affected by an ongoing 
review of files held at the National Archives that was initiated in mid-2018. Files relating to the 
weapons establishment and Atomic Energy Authority were unexpectedly withdrawn and are still 
unavailable for access as of 2020.32 While this has diminished the quantity of source material 
available for the latter chapters (with research material for earlier chapters having been mostly 
collected prior to the initiation of the review), enough material was available in the British case to 
make a detailed examination still viable.33 For more recent developments, information from the 
Defence Select Committee and compiled by the Nuclear Information Service is used.  
There also exist numerous well researched secondary works that consider the technical 
development of the UK’s nuclear programme and can be used as sources. These include but are not 
limited to Matthew Jones’ official histories, Kristan Stoddart’s Palgrave series, Britain and the H-
Bomb by Arnold and Pyne, Independence and Deterrence by Gowing, The Independent Nuclear 
State by Simpson and Test of Greatness by Cathcart.34 Various articles were of assistance, including 
those by Baylis, Aylen’s recent First Waltz and Moore’s British Nuclear Warhead Design 1958–66. In 
short, there is no shortage of secondary source material on Britain’s proliferation project except for 
the establishment’s more recent history.35  
A valid approach to researching British nuclear weapons history not undertaken by this 
thesis was the use of interviews. Previous ethnographic studies examining practices at US nuclear 
weapons establishments have made extensive use of interviews as the basis for their conclusions.36 
Interviews can also enrich a bureaucratic narrative: Cathcart’s partially oral history of the early 
British nuclear weapons programme shows the merits of this approach.37 However, the use of 
interviews for this study was limited by several factors. Firstly, many of the key agents in this study’s 
narrative have passed away (e.g. Penney, Cook, Macklen and Quinlan). Persons of interest for this 
study (particularly for later periods) often remain in official positions or know sensitive technical 
information. Enlisting their support would raise a series of ethical and practical limitations (e.g. time 
constraints and access) given the subject matter still is under considerable classification restrictions. 
Those willing to speak publicly about their interactions with the British nuclear weapons 
establishment have tended to be sceptical of the enterprise (such as Zuckerman and David Owen) 
 
31 TNA, ES1/973, 1956 
32 Holzman, (2019) 
33 Each case study chapter discusses source limitations. Information was drawn from alternative file series. 
34 Jones, (1)(2017), Jones, (2)(2017), Stoddart, (2012), Stoddart, (1)(2014) Stoddart, (2)(2014), Arnold & Pyne, 
(2001), Gowing, (1)(1974), Gowing, (2)(1974) and Cathcart, (1994) 
35 Baylis, (1995), Aylen, (2015) and Moore, (2004) 
36 McNamara, (2001) 




and have already supplied their views for academic analysis.38 In contrast, the available archival 
documents of policy debates and propositions provide an accessible (if incomplete) contemporary, 
less retrospective record which contain a variety of positions that must be analysed critically.  
Nonetheless, the early periods of this study would have been most enriched by interviews; 
the weapons establishment’s staffs’ experiences in the 1940s and 1950s informed the belief of a 
pressing need to retain skills. Evidence for this in Chapters 3 and 4 is drawn from papers included as 
miscellaneous annexes to files, which discuss individual scientists, engineers and technicians.39 
Although the passage of time made interviews of this cohort impracticable. When the ES and AB files 
(which pertain to the weapons establishment) become accessible after the ongoing security review, 




Introduction: What is Knowledge management? 
 
With the research question established, the following section will present the framework 
from which Britain’s nuclear weapons history shall be analysed with. This section will present a range 
of knowledge management concepts that have been claimed to be relevant to a particular branch of 
science and engineering: nuclear weapons development. Knowledge management emerged as a 
field of study in the 1990s, focused on the study of how organisations retain, utilise and transmit 
information necessary for their function.41 Due to the application of knowledge management theory 
in thousands of studies across multiple disciplines (sociology, economics, business studies, 
philosophy etc.), there is no singularly accepted definition.42 However, there are epistemological 
concepts that are routinely cited as being core concepts within the field.43 The following section will 
review the applicable concepts and their literature in regard to nuclear weapons development, 
including the Science and Technology Studies concept of heterogeneous engineering and how these 
can be utilised to support a nuclear weapons establishment’s institutional interests. The result will 
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be the construction of a theoretical framework which will then be employed by this thesis in its 
examination of the British nuclear weapons effort.  
 




In terms of the epistemology that will be examined in this thesis, the first component that 
needs to be understood is explicit knowledge. Derived from the philosophy of Michael Polanyi, 
explicit knowledge was succinctly defined by MacKenzie and Spinardi as “information or instructions 
that can be formulated in words or symbols and, therefore, can be stored, copied, and transferred 
by impersonal means, such as in written documents or computer files.”44 According to Collins, the 
general perception is that “explicit [knowledge] is taken as the norm” as it comprises all written 
information.45  
Within the context of developing and maintaining nuclear weapons, the necessity of explicit 
knowledge is clear. Explicit knowledge includes all technical drawings, scientific data, computer 
codes, diagrams, imagery and non-personified training and educational resources that would 
inevitably be both used and created within a nuclear weapons program. The value of such 
information has long since been recognised – within a year of nuclear bombings on Japan, the US 
Atomic Energy Act of 1946 introduced the new concept of ‘restricted data’ which meant that sharing 
“all… [information]… concerning the manufacture or utilization of atomic weapons, the production 
of fissionable material, or the use of fissionable material in the production of power” was strictly 
prohibited unless it had already been expressly declassified.46 Unsurprisingly, the Soviet Union also 
demonstrated a keen interest in nuclear weapons relevant explicit knowledge as they maintained an 
extensive espionage network centred on the Manhattan project. Information sent back to the Soviet 
Union included a diagram of an implosion type device (by David Greenglass), details of the URCHIN 
neutron initiator system (by George Koval) and large quantities of technical data developed at great 
expense (by Klaus Fuchs, amongst others).47  
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Given that any explicit information will be interpreted within a local context, the relative 
value of this data remains highly contested. Within the Soviet programme, one of the chief 
scientists, Igor Kurchatov, claims that information obtained via espionage was only used for checking 
indigenously produced results against the Americans’, whereas Nikolai Alexandroff (in an effort to 
heap praise on the atomic spies according to Sagdeev) claimed that “there was no “Russian” atomic 
bomb - there only was an American one, masterfully discovered by Soviet spies.”48 In perhaps a 
more balanced assessment, senior Soviet Scientist, Abram Ioffe stated that the “information 
reduce[d] the volume of work by many months, facilitate[d] the choice of direction, and free[d] the 
Soviets from extended searches.”49 Holloway concurs, arguing that the stolen information allowed 
the completion of the Soviet nuclear programme in 1949 whereas it would otherwise have 
continued until 1951.50 This undermines the point that MacKenzie and Spinardi make about how 
“the possession of explicit information generated by previous efforts has not eased… [nuclear 
weapons development] dramatically” as it apparently did in this case.51 
 Nevertheless, it has been argued that ever since the first series of nuclear proliferation 
attempts, the relevance of explicit knowledge as a barrier to nuclear weapons activity has 
diminished. As MacKenzie and Spinardi state, “much of the relevant explicit knowledge is now 
irrevocably in the public domain.”52 Even as early as 1958, the authors of the Nth Country Problem 
and Arms Control provided details on the physics behind nuclear explosives, leading them to state 
that “the legend of the [nuclear] ‘secret’ is totally obsolete.”53 Within a pre-existing nuclear 
programme, the retention of explicit knowledge is trivial as MacKenzie and Spinardi acknowledge 
that “barring social catastrophe, explicit knowledge, if widely diffused and stored, cannot be lost.”54 
However, the assertion that explicit knowledge plays no role in impeding nuclear weapons 
development ignores several relevant factors that could limit a nuclear programme.55 For one, while 
many of the principles behind nuclear explosives have become publicly available, certain specific 
aspects remain challenging to research without access to classified materials or the ability to 
interpret and reconfigure other dual use items. This is apparently recognised to some extent by 
MacKenzie and Spinardi who stated that “the design of a fission bomb is fully public knowledge,” 
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although only “at this general level.”56 The areas from which an understanding derived from the 
publicly available information would prove insufficient to operationalise certain technologies would 
likely include the specifics of nuclear hydrodynamics (including computer codes), advanced uranium 
enrichment technologies, different types of initiators, tamper designs, the exact requirements for 
explosive charge shaping and phasing for thermonuclear devices. It is interesting to note that these 
coincide with what remains ‘restricted data’ under classification provided by the US Department of 
Energy, indicating their enduring value to proliferation attempts.57  
Collins introduces the concept of “concealed knowledge” and “logistically demanding 
knowledge,” both of which have clear relevance to nuclear weapons information.58 “Concealed 
knowledge” clearly refers to information that is purposefully withheld from public access by those in 
the know, while “logistically demanding knowledge” is information that is possible to express 
explicitly but is often not.59 Both of these concepts work in unison – the ‘concealed knowledge’ of 
official classification keeps explicit knowledge on the specifics of nuclear weapons design out of the 
public domain; while it is possible to reconstruct some of this information from open sources, it 
would likely prove time consuming, as well as increase uncertainty in the final product. As 
recompiling this information would likely require a tacit understanding of the topic at hand, Revill 
and Jefferson refer to this use of explicit knowledge as “weak tacit knowledge.”60  
Reconstructed explicit knowledge from disparate sources would have to go through a 
process not too dissimilar to that of ‘reinvention’ as described by MacKenzie and Spinardi, as it 
would first have to be verified.61 This can be observed in how some proliferation attempts start with 
extensive literature reviews to acquire enough explicit knowledge before they can act. For example, 
Frost quotes Stumpf, who states that “South Africa[‘s proliferation programme] began [with] a ‘very 
modest investigation, confined to literature studies’ into the peaceful use of nuclear explosives.”62 
This also proves true for non-state actors – Aum Shinrikyo conducted a series of open source 
literature reviews before embarking on their unconventional projects.63 The observation that 
secrecy can continue to impede proliferation in this way has been recognised by the policy 
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community: the US Office of Technological Assessment states that “secrecy [can be used] to restrict 
the flow of knowledge” thereby creating additional “obstacles” to proliferation.64 
Not only must explicit knowledge be reassembled before it can be used, but it must also 
come from a trusted source to be believed: an inability to operationalise even basic explicit 
information led Al-Qaeda to search for the fabled nuclear material ‘red mercury’.65 While multiple 
sources have indicated the fictitious nature of the substance, the alluring prospect to a 
conspiratorial mind-set of a method of avoiding many of the technical challenges associated with 
proliferation must have been too appealing. Without corroborating information or a tacit 
understanding of the subject at hand, if a recipient of explicit information cannot trust the veracity 
of the information they are provided, then it would be of limited utility. For externally acquired 
information to be used, it would either have to be checked against other trusted sources or be 
verified by experimentation – both may prove challenging depending upon the relevant information 
in question. In an apparent effort to exploit this factor, Risen claims that the United States provided 
Iran with flawed design schematics for a component used to detonate implosion type devices as part 
of Operation Merlin.66 Ideally, the device would prove non-functional and diminish the Iranian 
nuclear establishment’s trust in externally acquired information. This move apparently failed 
according to Risen, as the Iranians had “created a strong base of sophisticated scientists 
knowledgeable enough to spot flaws in nuclear blueprints” in conjunction with information from the 
AQ Khan network and therefore unintentionally assisted their efforts.67  
These constraints on operationalising explicit information help explain both the continuing 
justification for classification and the demand for nuclear information by potential proliferants and 
fledgling nuclear programmes. Even after there were supposedly no secrets to nuclear weapons, AQ 
Khan was providing large amounts of information, along with physical samples and equipment to 
assist proliferation among states – if the information was so readily available, then it would be 
expected that there would be no demand. Alternatively, it could now be argued that the AQ Khan 
network has raised the level of explicit knowledge about nuclear weapons available to states to such 
an extent that it could be dismissed as a trivial obstacle. Kroenig claims that "China assisted Pakistan 
with its nuclear program in the early 1980s with a package that included uranium enrichment 
technology, weapons-grade uranium, and a nuclear weapons design."68 In turn, AQ Khan is believed 
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to have passed on this design on to several other countries.69 It therefore appears that state nuclear 
aspirants are able to acquire sufficient explicit knowledge from external sources. However, even if it 
is accepted that a sufficient level of information exists to make basic nuclear weapons design 
relatively simple, this does not remove explicit information as a barrier, either historically or in the 
present: as Stewart argues, many of the associated technologies linked with proliferation, such as 
producing carbon fibre, demand a process of indigenisation which have associated explicit 
knowledge requirements. All this information would have to be acquired, reassembled and trusted 
before it can be acted upon.70 However, this interpretative process requires a deeper understanding 
of the technologies involved; it is this sense that is developed in a more painstaking fashion and can 
be subject to loss, unlike explicit knowledge. 
 
Tacit Knowledge 
What is Tacit Knowledge? 
 
 How does one know how to ride a bike? Polanyi’s 1958 ‘Personal Knowledge’ argued that in 
addition to there being explicit information, there was also ‘tacit’ knowledge which enabled 
individuals to undertake a range of practices.71 A basic definition of tacit knowledge offered by 
Polanyi was that it consisted of “a wide range of not consciously known rules of skill and 
connoisseurship which comprise important technical processes that can rarely be completely 
specified, and even then only as a result of extensive scientific research.”72 While MacKenzie and 
Spinardi’s seminal 1995 article was the first to apply the concept of tacit knowledge to nuclear 
weapons, the literature on tacit knowledge and its application to nuclear weapons design has since 
developed.73  
While the field of knowledge management has offered many definitions for the term ‘tacit 
knowledge’ over time, Collins has had notable success in utilising the concept for explaining the 
difficulties in replicating scientific experiments with his paper on TEA lasers and measuring the Q of 
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sapphire.74 In both of Collins’ studies, scientific results were only reproduced when people were 
transferred from institution to institution, receiving hands on training in person.75 This approach has 
since been replicated by Vogel, with studies looking at biological weapons proliferation, particularly 
in the Soviet Union.76 The laboratory at Stepnogorsk only became successful in producing anthrax 
after it received additional technical assistance from the Ministry of Defence in 1984.77 The idea that 
successful transmission of nuclear weapons technology could only occur through interpersonal 
contact was recognised by Winston Churchill in 1945, who observed that the transmission of 
“practical production methods… would not be an affair of scientists or diplomats sending over 
formulas… any such disclosure would have to take the form of a considerable number of Soviet 
specialists, engineers and scientists visiting the United States’ arsenals.”78 With tacit knowledge 
recognised as important to the production of nuclear weapons, the following section will examine 
the various sub-components of tacit knowledge as offered by Collins and illustrate how they could 
potentially affect the process of nuclear proliferation and the maintenance of a nuclear arsenal. 
 
Spectrum between Weak Tacit and Explicit Knowledge 
 
 As previously highlighted by ‘concealed knowledge’ and ‘logistically demanding knowledge’, 
the disaggregation between explicit knowledge and what could be considered tacit knowledge is not 
absolute. As Polanyi later argued, seeing explicit knowledge and tacit knowledge as mutually 
exclusive and diametrically opposed is misleading - all explicit knowledge requires some tacit 
interpretation.79 Rather than in an effort to deliberately hide information, knowledge transfer 
through impersonal means can prove an imperfect process due to the original author’s fallibility in 
capturing the totality of the required information for its replication. Collins therefore introduces the 
concept of “relational tacit knowledge” and describes several mechanisms highlighting the 
limitations of utilising and transmitting explicit knowledge. 80 While Collins argues that ‘relational 
tacit knowledge’ could be conveyed explicitly, it should be perceived as tacit knowledge as it 
requires “matter-of-course imitation” for its transmission and replication.81 Collins also argues that 
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‘logistically demanding knowledge’ and ‘concealed knowledge’ should therefore also be considered 
tacit knowledge as little understanding of the subject at hand would likely prove a barrier (if not 
insurmountable) for the information’s reassembly. 
The three forms of ‘relational tacit knowledge’ presented by Collins which are best described 
as a ‘weak’ form of tacit knowledge’ are “mismatched saliences”, “unrecognised knowledge” and 
“ostensive knowledge.”82 ‘Ostensive knowledge’ is information that is better conveyed when 
instruction is combined with proximity to and physical manipulation of equipment. What separates 
‘ostensive knowledge’ and somatic tacit knowledge according to Collins is that the information 
conveyed could potentially be recorded explicitly.83 Perhaps the most common of these are 
instances of “mismatched saliences” which occur when the author of a piece of work intends to 
convey the instructions for a process but assumes a too high level of institutionalised practices and 
background information for it to be interpreted correctly. As Collins indicates, it is practically 
impossible to remove this as a factor “because however hard the teller tries to tell all, he or she 
cannot do it.”84 ‘Unrecognised knowledge’ is when crucial practices carried out unwittingly by the 
author go unrecorded because their importance has not been realised.85 As a result, necessary 
details are missing and therefore results cannot be replicated.  
While from an external perspective it may seem unlikely that any nuclear weapons 
technology would be developed without a clear understanding of its functional characteristics, an 
outstanding example of the limitations of knowledge transfer impacting the production of nuclear 
weapons has already been highlighted by Last and Ouagrham-Gormley with the troubles that the US 
nuclear weapons establishment had with replicating FOGBANK.86 FOGBANK is the codename for an 
aero-gel substance, critical in the inter-stage process for several types of US and UK thermonuclear 
weapons. New FOGBANK was needed as part of efforts to sustain life extension programmes for 
several types of warheads.87 This substance was produced at the Oak Ridge Y-12 site in building 
9404-11 from 1975 until 1989.88 A lack of demand for new nuclear weapons in a post-Cold War 
world combined with the likely cost of refurbishing building 9404-11, which was due to be 
decommissioned in 1993, saw use of the site scaled back to only making small test batches of 
FOGBANK.89 However, in 2000, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) undertook life 
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extension programmes for the W76, W80 and B61-7/11 warheads, prompting the approval of 
renewed large-scale FOGBANK production.90 However, the original 9404-11 production facility had 
been largely abandoned since 1993, so it was decided in 2003 that the construction of a new 
production facility was necessary.91  
While this new facility was produced at great expense (~$50 million) and started to produce 
minimal test batches in 2007, it was found that the new FOGBANK was relatively impotent.92 This 
proved intensely problematic as “the precise techniques used to manufacture Fogbank were [by 
now] forgotten.”93 According to Lillard, efforts to replicate old manufacturing methods were foiled 
as “some of the historical design records were vague and that some of the new equipment was 
equivalent, but not identical, to the old equipment.”94 This created a critical situation for the NNSA 
due to the necessity of producing this material - they upgraded the project to “Code Blue”, making it 
the agencies chief priority.95 At a cost of a further $69 million and 19 months of work, a process 
equivalent to the historical method was resolved and able to produce working FOGBANK.96 After 
further investigation, it was found that modern purification processes were removing too much of 
an essential chemical that was necessary for FOGBANK’s good function – however, this was only 
discovered after the NNSA had reverted to a reconstructed form of the historical process.97 This 
episode clearly highlights both the value of the ‘unrecognised knowledge’ of the necessity of the 
impurity and the effects of the ‘mismatched saliences’ in introducing vagaries into the recorded 
production processes, thereby exacerbating the effort required to reproduce them. This appears to 
be confirmation of a quote highlighted by MacKenzie and Spinardi from a 1987 report to congress 
which states that “[US] documentation [on nuclear weapon’s manufacturing processes] has never 
been sufficiently exact to ensure replication...we have never known enough about every detail to 
specify everything that may be important.”98 
Somatic Tacit Knowledge 
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In contrast to ‘weak’ tacit knowledge, Collins argues that ‘somatic tacit knowledge’ is 
internalised and impossible to render explicitly.99 While relational tacit knowledge’s transmission is 
aided by social interaction and repeated close proximity with those who are already in the know, 
person to person interaction is the only method by which somatic tacit knowledge can be 
transferred. As already noted, the classic example provided by Polanyi demonstrating the need for 
tacit knowledge is of how to ride a bike. 100 This has since been reiterated by Collins, MacKenzie and 
Spinardi and Revill and Jefferson.101 As somatic tacit knowledge is embodied in people, MacKenzie 
and Spinardi rightly point out the information’s inherently local character, as it is tied to specific 
individuals.102 
While the idea of ineffable, physically embodied skill may seem remote from nuclear 
weapon design, MacKenzie and Spinardi highlight the field of producing reliable nuclear primaries in 
particular as being dependant on tacit knowledge.103 For the majority of America’s nuclear history, 
nuclear engineers were able to verify the reliability of their designs through an iterative process of 
full nuclear testing. However, they argued adoption of the CTBT could potentially disrupt the process 
by which designers developed an intuitive understanding of how nuclear implosion devices 
worked.104 Understanding how to build nuclear devices with enough energy retained to detonate 
secondary stages was understood as an intuitive skill, developed through testing experience.105  
MacKenzie and Spinardi’s interviews with US weapons engineers suggested that minor 
variations in materials and conditions meant that accommodating for all possible circumstances was 
impossible, thereby making a sense of whether a weapon will work reliably more of an “empirical 
art,” than a hard science.106 Therefore, the most important quality imparted by a tacit understanding 
of nuclear weapons relevant technologies is that of good “judgement.”107 It was through the ending 
of the accumulation and transmission of this ‘skill’ through the halting of nuclear testing and the 
design of new nuclear weapons that resulted from the end of the Cold War and CTBT that led 
MacKenzie and Spinardi to predict the potential for the “uninvention of nuclear weapons.”108 
Without access to this sense of judgement, MacKenzie believed that only “relatively crude nuclear 
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weapons” with limited military utility could be produced – boosted or thermonuclear weapons 
would be out of reach.109 
Other areas of nuclear weapons work influenced by tacit knowledge highlighted by 
MacKenzie and Spinardi include the machining of nuclear weapons components (especially the 
creation of spherical fissile pits), visual quality assurance and the creation of reliable conventional 
explosive shaped charges.110 According to Kroenig, the design of gaseous diffusion centrifuges, which 
is now the preferred method for the enrichment of fissile material, also requires a degree of tacit 
knowledge: “inexperienced engineers” are liable to overstrain their centrifuges, causing them to 
self-destruct.111 Conversely, an abundance of relevant somatic tacit knowledge can enhance a 
programme – Lewis and Zimmerman note that Yuan Gonfu was able to shape China’s first uranium 
pit overnight based on his years of experience with his equipment rather than specific instruction on 
fissile metal metallurgy.112  
While the maintenance of existing knowledge was the problem that Collins and MacKenzie 
and Spinardi were primarily concerned with, both recognise that there is a difference between initial 
transmission and rediscovery of a lost art.113 As Collins observed during his investigations into 
replicating TEA lasers, the most efficient means of transferring this knowledge is via interpersonal 
exchange.114 In a clandestine (or at least isolated) nuclear programme, it is unlikely that states would 
ever be able to receive the totality of the somatic tacit knowledge that they required from hiring 
rogue foreign scientists due to the number of separate tasks involved.115 Even in the case of foreign 
state assistance, Montgomery has argued that somatic tacit knowledge may not get transferred as 
assisting states tend to supply technology rather than train indigenous workers.116 Simply having 
access to relevant technologies avoids the iterative developmental process which is needed for the 
acquisition of tacit knowledge and therefore may be counterproductive.117 This is especially 
important within the context of nuclear proliferation as MacKenzie and Spinardi argue that it is a 
challenge that consists "predominantly [of] practical engineering problems rather than, for example, 
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deficits in explicit knowledge of nuclear physics.”118 Therefore, the ability to develop and retain 
nuclear tacit knowledge internally is of critical importance to nuclear weapons programmes. 
Examples highlighting the limitations of exploiting externally acquired explicit information 
due to a lack of tacit knowledge may include the failure of the Libyan programme and the protracted 
development of North Korea’s nuclear capability. In both cases, each state is believed to have 
received a significant amount of explicit information and physical samples from the AQ Khan 
network but were unable to successfully utilise them due to an inability to adapt them to local 
circumstances and constraints.119 Montgomery cites a claim that the North Koreans may have 
initially “slavishly followed a recipe,” without the pre-requisite technical ability to do so, and thereby 
hindered their own progress.120 Similarly, Kemp strongly argues that this was initially the case with 
the Pakistani’s efforts to develop a CONR centrifuge from information acquired from URENCO and 
also with Iran, when they provided incomplete information on the P1 centrifuge from AQ Khan.121 If 
the need arose to deviate from externally acquired explicit instructions, which would almost 
certainly be the case in a nuclear weapons programme, a certain level of interpretation, 
improvisation and innovation would be required on behalf of the proliferators or those attempting 
to follow legacy instructions. While sociologists involved in knowledge management disagree as to 
the source and process of innovation, most describe it as having a tacit component: these range 
from the “crude empirical methods” that take place without “a deep scientific knowledge” described 
by Rosenberg or through the process of “internalisation” as described by Nonaka et al.122 This 
applies to established nuclear weapons programmes too. As will be seen in the British nuclear 
programme, utilisation of American information did not make the process of making nuclear devices 
trivial; foreign designs had to be adapted to local conditions which required a deep understanding of 
the technology at hand.123 
As a result, when exploiting nuclear weapons technology, it appears that it is first necessary 
to build a base of relevant tacit knowledge before meaningful progress can be made. Once gained, 
this tacit knowledge can be lost as it is embedded within people and practiced over time. 
‘Reinvention’ of tacit knowledge as compared to transmission would likely be a painstaking process, 
but Collins recognises that “rediscovery of non-social kinds of tacit knowledge is always a 
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possibility.”124 As already argued in the cases of proliferation for Iran, North Korea and Pakistan or 
with FOGBANK within the United States’ established nuclear arsenal, tacit knowledge poses another 
obstacle to progress on nuclear weapons development. MacKenzie and Spinardi concur, stating that 
“the requirement for tacit knowledge thus serves as the equivalent of friction in a physical system: 
slowing things down.”125 This knowledge management problem is not an absolute barrier to the 
progress of a nuclear weapons project in the same way that access to some physical materials or the 
pre-requisite political will could be, but a lack of tacit knowledge could impose operationally 
significant delays and substantially increase costs. Koch has argued that delays (although she argues 
that they are the result of supply-side constraints) have already “change[d] leaders’ strategic 
calculations regarding the value of their nuclear weapons programs” within select cases, sometimes 
leading to their abandonment.126 
Black Boxing 
 
 Crediting the ideas forwarded by Latour, MacKenzie and Spinardi suggest that the continuing 
need for somatic tacit knowledge may diminish as many nuclear weapons relevant technologies 
could become progressively “black boxed.”127 ‘Black boxing’ (also referred to as ‘deskilling’) is a 
process by which the prerequisite skills necessary for the completion of a task, which were once 
embodied in individuals, become increasingly unnecessary through improved equipment. The 
example that MacKenzie and Spinardi provide include advances in computing and the greater 
availability of diagnostic equipment for implosion devices.128  
This theme is highly evident in the resurgence of literature concerning biological weapons 
and tacit knowledge. The central question is whether advances in genetic engineering have 
trivialised the creation of bioweapons.129 Recently, Kroenig and Volpe have expressed their concerns 
over whether additive manufacturing methods are making nuclear proliferation easier.130 Others, 
such as Christopher are more tempered, stating while it is not currently the case, future technologies 
are likely to enable the easier production of proliferation sensitive materials such as maraging steel 
(which is used in advanced centrifuge designs).131 Computer numerically controlled machinery, 
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particularly precision lathes, have been suggested to have made the manufacturing of pits 
significantly easier, where otherwise it would have required a skilled craftsman.132 
While ‘black boxing’ may aid nuclear proliferants, it has a complex relationship with 
maintaining existing arsenals. The key question for the role of ‘black boxing’ has been whether it has 
allowed for nuclear weapons to remain credible after the CTBT. With no nuclear testing, nuclear 
weapons certification in the US has become reliant upon computer simulations under the Stockpile 
Stewardship Programme, which rely on data from previous tests.133 The inability to adapt and 
improve upon these codes in the absence of new explicit knowledge was a concern to MacKenzie 
and Spinardi who believed that weapons establishments may become “no longer developers of new 
weapons but custodians of past ones,” a job that would get progressively harder due to an inability 
to retain “the sameness of artefacts” due to tacit knowledge loss (as seen with FOGBANK).134 Latour 
noted that “paradoxically, the more science and technology succeed, the more opaque and obscure 
they become.”135 Therefore, while ‘black boxing’ may assist in the maintenance of nuclear arsenals in 
the near term, it is unlikely to fully eliminate tacit knowledge requirements when a deep 




 The logical progression from the idea that tacit knowledge is a locally acquired attribute and 
dependent upon interpersonal transmission is that a bank of tacit knowledge can be stored within a 
particular community in order to facilitate its function. In referring back to the bike analogy, Collins 
suggests that this type of knowledge is demonstrated in how individuals navigate traffic in a socially 
acceptable way.136 In the context of a collective enterprise, this was the idea behind Lave and 
Wenger’s concept of ‘communities of practice’ and first applied to nuclear weapons by 
McNamara.137 Although McNamara was interested in how all the workers at US nuclear laboratories 
developed a shared sense of identity and values, Vogel’s interpretation of her work is that it 
demonstrated a type of “communal synthesised tacit knowledge that cannot be separated out into 
individual components and is therefore more difficult to transfer.”138 This has obvious ramifications 
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for nuclear weapons development. For proliferation, even the transfer of individuals who hold 
relevant somatic tacit knowledge (such as rogue foreign scientists) would be insufficient to produce 
results as their work is tied to specific institutions. For existing nuclear arsenals, this would suggest 
that breaks in practice or the dispersal of a pre-existing organisation would inhibit the ability of the 
institution to be reconstituted later. 
While MacKenzie and Spinardi mostly focused on the role of ‘key’ weapons designers, they 
hinted at the importance of tacit knowledge at a collective level with the suggestion of how US 
nuclear weapon designs “were the products, not of individuals, but of a complex, differentiated 
organization” and how there existed “communally sanctioned knowledge.”139 Nevertheless, Sims’ 
main criticism of MacKenzie and Spinardi’s idea was its over emphasis on individuals, instead arguing 
that there existed “transactional knowledge” that was shared amongst different parts of the 
weapons community.140 ‘Transactional knowledge’ differs from collective/communal tacit 
knowledge in that it is less centralised and homogenised, instead being distributed among particular 
technical specialities which have to negotiate amongst each other for a coherent result.141 This 
places an emphasis on the structure and management of a weapons programme given the large 
number of interlinked tasks that scientists and engineers have to complete in coordination with each 
other.142 Sims also recognises that this fragmentation of tacit knowledge provides further evidence 
for its importance as “the core knowledge of each [technical] group has remained distinct and 
apparently inaccessible to experts in other fields.”143 The difficulty in transmitting this information 
even within a single establishment would imply that each element of a weapons programme would 
have to be developed and maintained through continuous practice for the programme to continue 
to be able to produce viable devices. 
Management and Leadership 
 
If it can be accepted that promoting effective knowledge management plays a role in 
facilitating nuclear proliferation and the maintenance of an arsenal, then how a programme is 
managed would also be expected to have an impact on its efficiency. This was the conclusion 
reached by Sims on ‘transactional knowledge’ when he stated that in assessing proliferation, one 
“should also look at whether the country in question possesses the cultural outlook and experience 
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with building interdisciplinary collaborations required to sustain a large-scale research and 
development program.”144 The organisation, development and dissemination of relevant tacit 
knowledge has consistently been argued to have been facilitated by effective leadership, according 
to the school of ‘knowledge management’ headed by proponents such as Nonaka and Takeuchi.145 
An appreciation of these factors’ impact on proliferation has recently been incorporated into the 
works of authors such as Hymans, Ouagrham-Gormley and Braut-Hegghammer.146 This allows for an 
added layer of analysis of the conditions that can negatively impact a nuclear programme, such as 
the impact of extreme ideologies and over interference. 147 
Hymans has produced the most developed work on the role of management on nuclear 
proliferation after having observed the declining efficiency of nuclear proliferation attempts over 
time not being well explained by commonly offered variables, such as the Nuclear Non-proliferation 
Treaty and the lack of political will. 148 In a position similar to that advocated by Sims and Nonaka, he 
contends that “it stands to reason that the effects of good or bad management on the efficiency” of 
proliferation will be noticeable given the “huge managerial challenge of nuclear weapons 
projects.”149 Although not framed within the perspective of tacit knowledge, Hymans analysis is 
arguably strengthened by it: if poor management impedes the spread of tacit knowledge, then it 
provides a direct causal mechanism that can explain why poor management fosters inefficiency. 
Hymans argues that states and individual institutions can be split between neo-patrimonial 
and Weberian legal-rational management styles.150 According to Hymans, a neo-patrimonial 
institution regularly interferes in the work of the personnel involved whereas a Weberian legal-
rational one respects their “autonomy,” thereby enabling them to “apply their individual [sic] 
knowledge” and “strongly promotes teamwork.”151 The main example he provides of neo-
patrimonialism interfering with a nuclear weapon’s project is how Iraq’s efforts were scuppered by 
Hussein Kamel’s “bureaucratic empire building, crudely authoritarian motivational strategies, and 
wanton foreign procurement binge.”152 According to both Hymans and Ouagrham-Gormley, one of 
the chief ways in which authoritarian leadership styles can negatively impact ‘big science’ projects is 
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by imposing arbitrary deadlines for workers, with the possibility of sanctions if they are not met: this 
creates an organisational culture where workers simply follow directions, rather than focusing on 
innovation, collaboration and sharing knowledge.153 
In contrast, Hymans suggests that Weberian legal-rational states and institutions can foster 
good leadership by offering “inspiration and facilitation” that develops “professionalism,” which is 
defined as “institutionalized autonomy… discretionary specialization and a sense of vocation… [along 
with] a rigorous formal education system to the next generation.”154 Unfortunately, how this process 
occurs remains underdeveloped as Hymans does not provide a full case study on a Weberian legal-
rational state. He does however examine China, where he argues that their nuclear programme was 
successful due to functional professional management on a ‘micro’ scale.155 
This approach has received criticism as North Korea, the “poster boy for [neo-patrimonialism 
within] this theory,” has achieved considerable recent success in advancing its nuclear weapons 
programme.156 In terms of additional nuance that “[moves] beyond blunt distinctions between 
democracies and autocracies,” Saunders’ work suggests additional variables guiding domestic 
nuclear weapons policy.157 These include the clarity of the perceived threat and the expansion or 
contraction of the circle of actors involved in nuclear decision making.158 The interaction of these 
variables can result in degrees of centralisation or delegation in nuclear decision making across 
different states.159 Saunders’ model helps explain why scientists are sometimes granted influence 
over nuclear weapons policy, afforded autonomy or otherwise subjected to assertive control and 
monitoring. 
Within Saunders’ framework, Britain’s nuclear weapons establishment experienced 
comparatively benign conditions. The contraction of actors involved in decision making never 
matched her ‘centralizers’ or ‘gamblers’ paradigms.160 Instead, AWRE either faced a ‘mobilised’ 
bureaucracy providing oversight over the nuclear programme or enjoyed the ‘delegated’ autonomy 
provided by institutional independence.161 The professional autonomy afforded to AWRE was rarely 
under threat; this allowed its leadership not only to focus on the technical aspects of the programme 
but also the managerial aspects needed to attract and retain staff. Yet Aldermaston’s relationship 
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with Whitehall was not flawless. AWRE experienced varying degrees of oversight or delegation 
afforded to it by the government. Assertive government control imposed strict secrecy and fiscal 
limitations that often hampered Aldermaston’s efforts. Conversely, too much institutional autonomy 
impaired the communication of knowledge management concerns. The challenge of striking the 
correct balance was an issue that the British government never fully resolved between 1947 and 




As indicated in the explicit knowledge section, nuclear weapons institutions have routinely 
established impermeable cultures of secrecy.162 This can be imposed to avoid detection in cases of 
proliferation. One manifestation of strict secrecy applied to nuclear weapons programmes is physical 
dispersal. Ouagrham-Gormley observes that dispersal disrupts “knowledge transmission belts” 
(thereby creating knowledge “circuit breakers”). Ouagrham-Gormley cites Iraq’s WMD programmes, 
which were forced to locate facilities across the country to avoid detection, thereby halting 
progress.163 Ouagrham-Gormley also analyses how Aum Shinrikyo’s chemical and bio-weapons 
programmes were also subject to “multiple interruptions” which inhibited their efforts.164 
Ouagrham-Gormley therefore concludes that “for covert programs fearful of detection, the task is 
made more challenging as the imperatives of maintaining covertness directly contradict the 
requirement of efficient knowledge use and production.”165  
 However, even established programmes subject to less stringent forms of secrecy can also 
be affected. In order to maintain operational security, leadership of a nuclear weapons programme 
may “compartmentalize” their programme to reduce the chance of information disclosure.166 This 
will impede progress by preventing different specialised sub groups from communicating with each 
other as it can stop the exchange of ‘transactional knowledge’ as described by Sims.167 Hymans 
states that the early efforts of the Manhattan Project were impeded by “General Leslie Groves… 
[whose] security-minded administrative head tried to impose strict controls about information 
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exchange within the project.”168 Westwick substantiates this claim by providing the example of how 
“coordination… [was hampered between] different fast-neutron cross-section studies obtained by 
far-flung experimental groups.”169 Similarly, this thesis highlights how Britain’s training of new 
nuclear weapons specialists in the late 1950s was restricted by the ‘need to know’ principle even 
within a single site.170 
Even beyond preventing an adversary access to information, secrecy appears to persist as a 
culture at nuclear weapons related institutions.171 This raises the question – why? Aftergood 
observes that “secrecy can also protect a fragile [scientific] program from domestic political 
interference or opposition.”172 This will come at the potential cost of “intellectual stultification and 
shields corruption or mismanagement.”173 Kampani concurs following his study of India’s nuclear 
efforts, stating that the “fear of loss of agenda control will constitute a secondary incentive to treat 
the weapon development effort as a black program.”174 
However, the mechanism by which secrecy interacts with potential mismanagement is 
complex. As Aftergood notes, secrecy by its nature produces differentials in knowledge between 
those who have access to information compared to those that do not.175 This will be felt most 
acutely when non-technically informed civil servants and politicians interact with scientists from 
weapons programmes; pre-existing differentials in knowledge could be further exacerbated by 
mechanisms that purposely hinder inquiry such as official secrecy. Given this interaction is inevitable 
as part of policy making in regards to CBRN programmes, Balmer believes that “scientific advisors 
cannot be regarded as standing outside of the policy process and injecting a measure of objectivity 
into the proceedings.”176 After examining the history of Britain’s chemical and biological weapons 
programmes, Balmer notes that “rather than the scientific advisors’ authority being grounded in 
practical demonstrations of the efficacy of biological warfare, a very general and diffuse appeal to 
scientific authority formed the epistemological underwriting of their advice.”177 The authority of 
scientists as experts in their respective fields mean that they can have a determining influence on 
the research direction of a programme. Solly Zuckerman, the UK’s chief scientific advisor from 1964 
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to 1971 believed that “our ‘experts’ would… inform and persuade their civil servants and military 
colleagues – not a difficult task – and the idea would then find its way upwards until often as not it 
reached ministers.”178 Secrecy also enhances the connection between a weapons establishment and 
influential policy makers, for as Paglen observed for the American F117 programme, secret 
programmes create their own influential ‘geographies’ with direct connections to powerful state 
institutions.179 Similarly, Balmer also recognises how “[secrecy] does not so much deny knowledge, 
as it fractures and disrupts the topography of knowledge,” thereby creating power imbalances.180 
Secrecy means that decisions can be made without reference to scientific review, government or 
public scrutiny.  
The ability of scientists and officials to utilise knowledge disparities within CBRN 
programmes is highlighted by Forden, who cites the example of the Iraqi biological weapons 
programme. Their reliance “on its own mycotoxin experts” led them down a developmental path 
that was futile from a weapons perspective. Forden concludes that this was because the “program 
administrators did not have the specialized knowledge that would have allowed them to better 
evaluate the advice of their most capable experts.”181 Similarly, Kampani observed how “information 
asymmetries between political leaders and their technical advisors produced less than optimal 
choices in India’s ballistic missile program in [the 1980s]…. The net consequence was that the 
missiles developed represented the missile development agency’s organizational interests and not 
those of users’ potential for deployment and use.”182 As Aftergood notes, rectifying these issues is 
problematic as “in the best of cases, secrecy undercuts the possibility of peer review and oversight. 
In the worst of cases, secrecy will be applied far out of proportion to any requirements of national 




When studying the origins and adoption of technologies, authors such as Law and Mackenzie 
do not view physical artefacts as being devoid of a social or political context.184 First used by Law, the 
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concept of heterogeneous engineering refers to participants in the design and construction of a 
technology taking into account a range of considerations beyond the purely technical, including the 
“social… economic, and… political.”185 Flank and MacKenzie have both observed that nuclear 
weapons institutions vie for access to resources and political influence within a dynamic political 
environment and have to frame their technical solutions accordingly in order to satisfy the concerns 
of policy makers.186 This can involve a more active process, where “the heterogeneous engineering 
required from those pushing a new technology is the creation of the sense of a need for that 
technology. A radically new device does not find a market readymade: That market has to be 
constructed.”187 This can manifest in constructing threats that require solutions. Balmer’s work on 
biological warfare research in Britain highlights how experts define the imminence and severity of 
risks by leveraging their authority within their field. Therefore, Balmer believes that “risk can be 
regarded as a social construct.”188 
 From this perspective, arguments about risk must be viewed critically. An extreme example 
analysed by Vogel was a biosecurity experiment called ‘Project Bacchus.’189 In 1998, the US Defence 
Threat Reduction agency ostensibly tasked “about four” non-expert individuals to create an anthrax 
simulant from commercially available equipment. Vogel highlights how the agency had in fact tasked 
between seven and eight people onto the project, all of whom worked together previously, several 
of them having prior biological weapons expertise.190 Vogel states that the fact that “these caveats 
were not included as part of the technological threat narrative emanating from this project…is 
striking.”191 Awareness of the ability of institutions to ‘sell’ risks to further their interests also 
coloured the response to FOGBANK by some commentators. The NNSA communicated its inability to 
reproduce FOGBANK when the possibility of replacing the US nuclear arsenal with new Reliable 
Replacement Warheads was under consideration.192 This led some commentators to believe that 
highlighting knowledge loss was an effort to “argue that Life Extension doesn’t work, so a new 
warhead is needed” or “emphasizing the need for further maintenance.”193 Emphasising the 
importance of tacit knowledge certainly deflected the US Government’s Accountability Office’s belief 
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that cost overruns and delays were the result of “ineffective [implementation of] risk management,” 
such as the NNSA’s failure in attempting to develop alternative materials sooner.194 
 The suggestion by MacKenzie and Spinardi that nuclear weapons could become ‘uninvented’ 
through tacit knowledge loss has also been reinterpreted in this light. Sims and Henke suggest that 
“the argument the nuclear weapons community made about tacit knowledge in the 1990s served a 
rhetorical purpose. While it may have accurately described Cold War weapons knowledge, it also 
served to make the case that weapons testing and production should continue.”195 Hendry and 
Taylor concur, stating that “nuclear officials have rhetorically cast themselves as guardians of nuclear 
resources… [to] successfully defend themselves against undesirable change.196 In adapting to the 
post-Cold War environment, Sims and Henke characterised the range of rhetorical and technical 
solutions (such as either Stockpile Stewardship or Reliable Replacement Warheads) as a process of 
“socio-technical repair,” where credibility in nuclear weapons was reinterpreted through new 
perspectives on knowledge management.197 Nonetheless, the “scepticism” displayed by nuclear 
weaponeers in resisting the role of ‘black boxing’ nuclear weapons design through the use of nuclear 
simulations was a form of heterogeneous engineering, where skill itself was used to potentially 
justify ongoing nuclear weapons testing and design.198 
 This thesis demonstrates that concerns over nuclear uninvention are not new. From the 
outset of the British nuclear weapons experience, establishing a suitably sized skilled workforce had 
proven difficult and there were concerns over the institution’s ongoing sustainability. This fragility 
was based on their own understandings of the impermanence of tacit knowledge, even if not 
expressed in those terms. By concerning themselves with the social aspects of retaining and 
recruiting staff with enough tacit knowledge to undertake nuclear weapons work, Aldermaston’s 
administrators were heterogenous engineers. This meant that at times, research programmes and 
weapons work was advocated for to resolve social problems relating to staffing, rather than for their 
direct technical output.  
This is not to suggest that the bodies or individuals had anything other than their conception 
of promoting the national interest in mind as some authors have previously implied.199 As the 
individuals involved believed in nuclear deterrence, ensuring the arsenals continuation through 
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raising what they perceived as risks to its continuation was entirely consistent with a deterrence 
based perspective. As will be seen, the repeated internal programmes attempting to address these 
issues proves the earnestness of belief in the problem. However, premising their arguments in a 
conception of tacit knowledge made them inherently hard to challenge by external parties – nobody 
else was qualified (and often not permitted) to scrutinise the level of staffing required by Britain’s 
nuclear establishment. As resourcing the nuclear weapons establishment often had to compete with 
other policy priorities, this thesis proposes that the conscious decision to highlight the possibility of 
‘uninvention’ through tacit knowledge loss was used to promote an institutional interest rather than 
a ‘parochial’ one. In this regard, tacit knowledge-based arguments were a powerful and hard to 
contest tool for the establishment’s heterogeneous engineers in securing further programmes. 
 
Oversight and Autonomy 
 
How do governments ensure they receive balanced technical advice on nuclear matters 
when there is often only a single institution qualified to provide it? When conducting oversight or 
exerting their will, governments must contend with information asymmetries and possibly 
asymmetries in preferences. These challenges form the core of principal-agent theory, a frame of 
analysis used by social scientists to assess how principals (governments) induce action from their 
bureaucracies (agents).200 For nuclear weapons decisions, Kampani’s study of India’s nuclear 
programme argues that isolated nuclear “epistemic communities” pose “classic principal-agent 
problems” for decision makers.201 These include how principals are limited by “cognitive problems of 
‘bounded rationality’ as well as their agents’ domain expertise. Furthermore… agents constitute the 
permanent state. They are usually the best informed about how bureaucratic processes work within 
their specific agency and the state in general.”202 Kampani demonstrates that internal secrecy and 
these principal-agent problems “cocooned Indian decision-makers in a regime of relative ignorance” 
and allowed interested parties such as nuclear scientists to influence doctrine.203 In terms of failure 
to implement policy, Braut-Hegghammer has shown that principal-agent problems contributed to 
Saddam’s failure to convince international inspectors that Iraq was disarming due to 
misinterpretation of the Baath regime’s publicly stated intentions.204  
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Within this principal-agent framework, how do governments determine when weapons 
institutions are genuinely in danger of losing skills and need new research programmes? This is a 
near insurmountable challenge. Polanyi initially fashioned tacit knowledge as an argument to avoid 
the central planning of science.205 Only those already within the nuclear weapons community will be 
qualified to pass judgement. In terms of external attempts, Carrigan acknowledges that “measuring 
the impact of tacit knowledge on a nuclear weapons programme (or any endeavour, for that matter) 
is an inexact science.”206 Kampani recognises that standard approaches to overcoming the principal-
agent problems are not applicable as “the covert nature of most weapon programs makes the 
institution of transparency, information availability and multiple agent competition difficult.”207 
In terms of alternate approaches, the existing literature would suggest that asserting 
oversight would involve greater regulation over the relationships between key advocates of the 
weapons establishment and policy makers. MacKenzie states that “weapons system developers have 
often to spend as much time constructing and maintaining their relationships to human actors 
(politicians, industrialists, senior officers, the multifarious forms of ‘bureaucratic politics’) as they do 
forging physical artefacts.”208 As noted in the section on secrecy, when it comes to discussing 
weapons policy issues, these relationships tend to be unequal due to the inherent discrepancies in 
expertise enjoyed between practitioners and policy makers. 
Changing the institutional relationship between a weapons establishment and the 
government appears to be a key mechanism by which their interactions are controlled. Spinardi has 
observed a trend to reduce the “influence” and “independence” within the British nuclear weapons 
programme so the government could exert more control.209 The inability to provide oversight is 
Braut-Hegghammer’s alternative explanation of Iraq’s lack of progress towards nuclear weapons in 
the 1980s (compared to Hymans) where “scientists explored technologies that were unlikely to yield 
results [were pursued and]… constant regime reorganisation made auditing and peer review difficult 
for the regime and even the IAEC [Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission].”210 Braut-Hegghammer 
ultimately argues that the programme was “captured by scientists” due to the deliberate erosion of 
state capacity by the Baathist effort to ‘coup proof’ the state.211  
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While an extreme example in an authoritarian state, the history of the British programme as 
presented by Spinardi also highlights the role of attempting to exert oversight by reforming the 
relationship between the weapons establishment and policy makers via institutional 
development.212 As argued, this corresponded with either empowering a ‘mobilised’ bureaucracy to 
provide oversight over AWRE or providing the establishment ‘delegated’ autonomy.213  However, 
Aldermaston was not a passive actor in determining this balance. Although often not as decisive in 
determining nuclear weapons policy as sometimes portrayed by contemporaries, AWRE was at times 
able to modulate Saunders’ concept of “threat uncertainty.” 214 This was done by suggesting the 
possibility of nuclear weapons ‘uninvention’ via tacit knowledge loss in order to influence nuclear 
weapons choices and moves towards greater institutional autonomy. This raised principal-agent 
problems in the question of the level of autonomy afforded to scientists influencing their input into 
nuclear weapons decisions.215 How Britain incorporated the policy suggestions and heterogeneous 
engineering of its nuclear weapons establishment on the basis of its knowledge management 
concerns and then altered the level of autonomy afforded to Aldermaston via institutional reform 




 In conclusion, this chapter presented the research problem and research question of this 
thesis, which seek to explore the enduring knowledge management problems encountered by 
nuclear weapons institutions. Britain was selected as an ideal case study as it highlights the 
persistent difficulties in identifying and communicating the extent of a nuclear weapons 
establishment’s knowledge management needs. In constructing a theoretical framework and 
reviewing the existing literature, a range of knowledge management concepts drawn from the 
Science and Technology Studies field that are relevant to nuclear weapons development were 
analysed. It was argued that explicit knowledge is insufficient for all but the most basic nuclear 
weapons programmes. Examples demonstrated the necessity of tacit knowledge for a functional 
advanced weapons programme. However, as these skills are both retained by individuals and held 
on a collective level, the continual propagation of this knowledge assisted by the effective 
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management of a nuclear weapons establishment is also essential. This is complicated by the 
intervening role of secrecy and the tendency of weapons establishments to promote their own 
institutional interests which exacerbate principal-agent problems. How governments ensure 
effective knowledge management while resisting heterogeneous engineering through institutional 








As demonstrated in the theoretical framework, different approaches to knowledge 
management and leadership style have been argued in various studies to be key variables that have 
helped or hindered nuclear weapons programmes. However, it has also been demonstrated that 
nuclear weapons institutions engage in heterogeneous engineering to further their institutional 
interests. Having presented a conceptual framework of factors based upon knowledge management 
concepts, this study establishes how an analogous sense of these concepts was developed within the 
British nuclear weapons project, how attempts were made to rectify knowledge management issues 
internally, how any outstanding concerns were communicated with policy makers and how or if they 
affect the outcome of nuclear policy decisions. This chapter will present the reasoning behind the 
selected methodology, the processes involved and the areas that have been highlighted by the 
existing literature that will be further examined within each case study. It will be determined that 
process tracing applied to case studies will be the most suitable method for investigating the impact 
of knowledge management. The choice of studying the British nuclear programme will be justified in 
terms of allowing for a detailed analysis of a programme where it is evident that repeated 






How best to research knowledge management’s effects on a nuclear weapons 
establishment? As suggested by Bennett and Elman, qualitative methods are ideally suited for 
considering these types of problems as they are fit for “studying complex and relatively unstructured 
and infrequent phenomena that lie at the heart of [social science research].”1 Questions of 
knowledge management and nuclear weapons establishments fit within this category as although 
the contemporary arguments traced by this thesis were related to technical matters, the arguments 
 




were contested and resolved within a complex social and political system. Tracing the effectiveness 
of these arguments fits within a Social Construction of Technology framework, where “the success of 
a technology depends on the strength and size of the groups that take it up and promote it.”2 As 
MacKenzie detailed with his account of the development of missile guidance technologies, there is 
nothing preordained that required a certain technological path to be chosen.3 Instead, he states that 
it was instead a “complex process of conflict and collaboration between a range of social actors 
including ambitious, energetic technologists, laboratories and corporations, and political and military 
leaders and the organisations they head.”4 This is seen within the British nuclear weapons case as 
the organisational framework and personal connections that the weapons establishments 
proponents and detractors had influenced the weight of their arguments. Tracing these complex and 
context sensitive interactions behind this “social process” is something that can only be achieved 
through a qualitative research approach.5 
 A further factor necessitating a qualitative approach for this research is the intangible nature 
of the arguments examined. Concepts such as credibility and reliability of nuclear weapons can in 
one sense be empirically judged through testing, but as Sims and Henke have demonstrated 
(especially after the CTBT), are subject to flexible expert judgement that can alter due to “discursive, 
institutional, and material change in the repair of complex sociotechnical systems.”6 The role of 
expert judgement becomes even more prescient when predicting future ‘skill’ requirements for 
maintaining a nuclear weapons arsenal. As will be highlighted, even the most informed Aldermaston 
administrators were only able to allude to potential future requirements. Administrators 
consistently called for skills to be retained but could only allude to their special and unique nature, 
combined with the consequences of their loss rather than precise numbers or requirements. This 
was because future technical problems were unpredictable and supposedly only resolvable based 
upon expert judgement and intimate familiarity with the technology. When a definitive figure was 
placed upon future staff requirements in the 1960s, it proved one of the most contentious episodes 
in the establishment’s history and is covered in detail in Chapter 6. The factors driving staff 
recruitment and retention are even more unquantifiable, based in perceptions of morale, political 
support from government and upholding beliefs in the need to retain nuclear arms. Responses to 
upholding these criteria are quantifiable, but directly comparing staffing figures at Britain’s nuclear 
establishment over time would be meaningless given the fluctuations in production, research, 
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diversification and the role of automation in work at the nuclear weapons establishment over time. 
Only through systematic qualitative analysis can a sense be built up of the importance of various 
processes based upon the attitudes and perspectives provided. 
Any attempt to retrospectively gauge a comparable ‘quantity’ of tacit knowledge within 
Britain’s nuclear weapons institution would likely prove futile. Although Collins’ case studies have 
proven that the effects of the dissemination of tacit knowledge can be observed from institution to 
institution (and therefore numerically), measuring its accumulation within one locale is problematic.7 
As will be demonstrated, attempting to measure knowledge management issues directly was 
challenging even for contemporaries and cannot necessarily be divorced from the institutional 
context they are made within. Nonetheless, the scale, urgency and attention paid to the internal 
measures taken to resolve knowledge management issues indicate the seriousness with which these 
problems were treated with. 
Given the above merits of a qualitative approach, it is therefore unsurprising that the 
predominant method used by MacKenzie and Spinardi, Hymans, Braut-Hegghammer, Ouagrham-
Gormley or Vogel to present their findings is the use of “disciplined configurative” type case studies.8 
As highlighted by Flank who explored the “reasons and processes” behind the “historical sociology of 
nuclear proliferation” for India and South Africa, the content of each case study is necessarily 
primarily “descriptive” as the influences upon a weapons establishment are wide ranging.9 Hyman’s 
and Montgomery’s work are among the few exceptions that attempt to apply qualitative metrics to 
the intersection of nuclear proliferation and knowledge management, but even then, the majority of 




A further benefit of a qualitative approach is that it allows this thesis to tackle the doubly 
problematic task of transposing a knowledge management framework onto a historic nuclear 
programme with mismatched contemporary terminology. Although the previous chapter presented 
multiple subcategories of tacit knowledge to highlight their breadth and relevance to nuclear 
weapons production, Lynch notes even Collins recognised that “there is no possibility of drawing a 
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bright line between tacit and explicit knowledge…[and that it is] fuzzy at the margins.11 This is paired 
with historically ambiguous arguments calling for retention of ‘skills’ at AWRE. ‘Skills’ and similar 
references could wholly or in part refer to the utilisation of explicit concealed or logistically 
demanding knowledge rather than any tacit dimension. This is hard to entirely dismiss given the 
nature of the sources. However, this is unlikely; Collins notes that even some tasks that have been 
presumed to be made wholly explicit via ‘black boxing’ still require tacit knowledge to contextualise 
and operationalise.12 This theme will be returned to in the conclusion as a similar logic has been 
adopted by AWE since the halt of nuclear testing. Furthermore, as the argument over skill retention 
matured over time, it incorporated aspects commonly associated with tacit knowledge rather than 
esoteric explicit knowledge; by 1962, ‘skills’ were personally embodied and gained via ongoing 
practice, could easily be lost and were held collectively.13  
This thesis also highlights the subtle adaptability of the ‘skill’ retention case as the emphasis 
on different components of this argument changed with institutional and technological 
circumstances. AWRE’s authoritative appeals to ‘skills’ as “something mystical and inspirational” that 
defied easy measurement is directly akin to Polanyi’s original conception of tacit knowledge, as 
explained by Schmidt, as a “deflective construct” to avoid central planning.14 Although rooted 
directly in the difficulties encountered by AWRE, the importance of the establishment’s 
contemporary sense of knowledge management for this thesis is in how it was responded to and 
then used rhetorically to influence policy. This sentiment is agreed with by Lynch, who in examining 
Collins’ typologies, states that “how the claimed reality of tacit knowledge plays out may be more 





To explore how nuclear establishments have responded to their knowledge management 
concerns, the best available method is what George and Bennett detail as “process tracing.”16 This 
provides the ideal qualitative method for examining historical case studies as envisaged by this 
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thesis. This was due to their forwarded method’s ability to explore “causal processes and intervening 
variables through which causal or explanatory variables produce causal effects.”17 
Mahoney offers specific advice for using theory tracing within the security studies field. 
Indeed, he offers Tannenwald’s study on The Nuclear Taboo and Sagan’s The Limits of Safety as 
examples of where the method has been applied to nuclear relevant issues.18 According to 
Mahoney, process tracing involves ascertaining and testing the intervening mechanisms between 
cause and effect within historical empirical data.19 Tannenwald explains that this method can 
convert “rich historical narrative[s] into an analytical explanation couched in theoretical (rather than 
empirical) variables.”20 To test the explanatory power of pre-existing theoretical variables, Mahoney 
recommends one should suggest the evidence one would expect to find if cause X led to effect Y 
through empirical observations. For example, if a weapons establishment was engaging politicians to 
acquire more work, one would first have to determine whether this could be linked back to an 
identified problem with knowledge management at the weapons establishment. If such links cannot 
be established, then this would strongly indicate that the suggested theoretical variables have little 
explanatory value.21 
Alternatively, if these events could be substantiated and a convincing line of argumentation 
forwarded to link them, this step can be reiterated with any “intervening or antecedent factor[s]” 
uncovered to find any sequential explanations.22 These could include the role of contemporary 
international events or how influential individuals influenced this process. Secondary or tertiary 
stages are necessary to explain the link between the understanding of knowledge management 
within a weapons programme and how this translates into changes in nuclear policy. The ability to 
test for ‘sequential explanations’ will allow for the assessment of the importance of a range of 
“intervening” variables such as the role of secrecy, the advocacy of management to policy makers or 
internal knowledge retention programmes.23 By inspecting and ordering the role of various 
theoretical mechanisms rather than just their effects and relative magnitude, an understanding of 
how the complete process of knowledge management translating into outcomes can be established. 
By understanding the process by which results are obtained, process tracing assists in the ability to 
inspect “recurring empirical regularities” or “puzzling outcomes.”24 However, Tannenwald advises 
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that the basis of this method remains “good narrative” and that the explicitness of approach “should 
not become such a fetish that it overwhelms the narrative.”25 Nonetheless, methodological rigour is 
needed to establish a causal chain between perceived threats to tacit knowledge and efforts to 
influence nuclear policy. As such, hypotheses are drawn from the secondary literature to highlight 
mechanisms that demonstrate the recurring phenomenon of knowledge management concerns 
leading to internal retention measures, heterogeneous engineering and then government reaction.  
 
British Case Studies  
 
As highlighted in the previous chapter, Britain provides an ideal case study for assessing the 
challenges of knowledge management, as the effort underwent periodic reorganisations in order to 
improve variables highlighted in the conceptual framework such as tacit knowledge retention 
(through retaining staff and their ‘skills’) through greater provision of autonomy or centralisation in 
order to improve governmental oversight. This means that it is simple to configure the history of 
Britain’s effort into periods that generally relate to programmes of work or major reorganisation. 
These transitions provide four distinct periods for study. These are: 
 High Explosive Research (1947-1952) 
 AWRE and Hydrogen Bomb Development (1954-1958) 
 Skybolt Crisis to the Polaris Improvement Programme (1960-1969) 
 AWRE under the MoD to Contractorisation (1973-1993) 
These periods were chosen as each contained new major programmes of work and 
institutional reorganisation for the establishment. These reorganisations and policy responses were 
often undertaken to correct the inadequacies of the prior system. Successive governments 
implemented these changes with a desire to increase the efficiency of the programme by improving 
knowledge retention, without diverting significantly more material resources to the nuclear 
weapons establishment.  
Therefore, by splitting the history of Britain’s nuclear weapons efforts into these periods, 
this iterative within-case analysis approach allows for the differing outcomes and causes of 
perceived threats to knowledge management at the weapons establishment to be observed. The 
discussion, responses to and implemented changes resulting from perceived deficiencies in 
 




knowledge management will provide the core observable manifestations of empirical findings in this 
thesis. The conclusions of this thesis examine events after 1993 to confirm whether a similar process 
continues to manifest but cannot comment upon them in the same level of detail due to source 
limitations.  
The commonalities between the cases, in their causes, processes and outcomes will highlight 
how the discourse and pressures to maintain knowledge management were a persistent and cyclical 
theme within Britain’s nuclear weapons establishment between 1947 and 1993. This thesis will 
demonstrate that the ability to maintain nuclear weapons and to adapt to potential future defence 
needs was consistently perceived as being fragile. This stemmed from the early recognised need of 
maintaining people with specialised tacit knowledge skills through work and thereby educating the 
next cohort of professionals to sustain the establishment’s future. However, as the supply of nuclear 
weapons work was inconsistent, managers at AWRE/AWE and officials within the Ministry of 
Defence had to find alternative remedies which could include lobbying for further work for the 
establishment. How ministers responded to these efforts differed. They either chose to mobilise a 
consensus around rejecting uninvention or delegated nuclear weapons decision making, thereby 
empowering Aldermaston’s advocates to advance knowledge management concerns.26 These 
decisions established the conditions in which the weapons establishment would find itself when 
staff retention inevitably became an issue once again when a programme of work neared 
completion. 
Approaching the eras chronologically is logical given that each chapter will necessarily be 
interlinked, as whether the perceived failings of the prior institutional format were realistic, 
correctly identified and acted upon successfully is debated in the following periods. As will be 
demonstrated by quoting the concerns of contemporaries, reorganisations were justified on and 
motivated by concerns to improve elements of knowledge management presented in chapter one, 
even if not expressed in the same terminology. Additional causal mechanisms (or the lack/weakness 
thereof) such as the role of influential officials and international events that help explain the 
outcome are examined. By comparing the causes and outcomes identified in each case study, this 
allows for an understanding to be developed of how the processes by which knowledge 
management concerns translate into a pressure to provide further work to a nuclear weapons 
establishment.  
 




By grounding analysis around knowledge management issues within the UK’s nuclear 
weapons establishment and how they were resolved within each case, this method can generate 
hypotheses for each of the identified periods of study. In line with process tracing best practice, the 
following section will present a brief outline of each of the four case study sections, drawing from 
the available secondary literature and highlight inferences that will be examined to help understand 
the process of translating knowledge management concerns into policy actions within the following 
chapters.27 For the sake of focusing on the organisation of the programme and brevity, a detailed 
history centred on technical developments within the UK’s nuclear weapons programme is avoided. 
Technical details will be introduced to the analysis when relevant.  
 
High Explosives Research (1947-1952) 
 
Although Britain first investigated the possibility of fission weapons through the MAUD 
committee with the assistance of exiled scientists, its efforts became subsumed under the American 
Manhattan Project.28 While Britain expected to share in the fruits of the project after the war, the 
prospects for this occurring diminished over time. As a result, the Attlee government gave approval 
for the initiation of a nuclear weapons programme on 8th January 1947.29 
This effort, called High Explosive Research (HER), would be beset by organisational 
challenges as it proceeded to conduct the proliferation campaign while still forming itself as an 
institution. Numerous knowledge management issues were encountered such as justifying and 
diverting enough resources to the project, justifying the programmes’ existence, how it should be 
organised, identifying skill shortages and what could be undertaken to rectify them. It was in this 
environment that the British nuclear weapons programme developed a culture that emphasised the 
vulnerability of its skills and knowledge base and a need to campaign amongst the bureaucracy and 
politicians for the work it received. 
In this contested environment, the management of the British nuclear weapons project 
emerged on an ad hoc basis. Unlike the American effort at Los Alamos, there was initially no single 
nuclear weapons research institute. While there had been some discussions over whether to 
integrate nuclear weapons research within the Atomic Energy Research Establishment at Harwell, 
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which had been founded in 1946, this was rejected to keep this ‘peaceful’ effort separate for 
political reasons.30 As the Ministry of Supply and the subordinate Armament Research Department 
(ARD) were deemed to have spare capacity and relevant infrastructure, the nuclear weapons 
programme, HER was initially incorporated within these institutions. Both the Ministry of Supply and 
the ARD were vestigial organisations from the Second World War tasked with producing 
conventional armaments. Therefore, the organisational structure that William Penney was tasked to 
lead from 1947 was unique for both the geographic distribution of its work and its complete 
ignorance of nuclear fission related science. While none of the staff that worked within the HER 
project had prior nuclear weapons work experience (save Penney himself), many of those selected 
for HER work from Fort Halstead and Woolwich Arsenal had relevant conventional weapons 
development expertise which allegedly proved vital to the progress of the project.31 Arnold claims 
that without the Armament Research Department, “Penney could never have built up a nuclear 
weapons team so quickly.”32 
 Nevertheless, situating the HER project within the scientific civil service was a move that was 
retrospectively heavily criticised by Lord Cherwell. He claimed that it was one of the central reasons 
why the Soviets had developed their bomb first.33 Overall, this claim is rejected by Gowing, who 
states that “the manpower problems [for manning a new agency] would have made the task 
impossible.”34 Yet the institutional framework within which the HER programme found itself working 
within did have several disadvantages. While well established, the civil service framework was 
allegedly inflexibly bureaucratic and responded poorly to the sudden demands of the nuclear project 
on seemingly minor issues of staff housing and transportation.35 Chief amongst these matters were 
the civil service pay restrictions, which constantly effected Penney’s ability to attract more staff.36 
After Operation Hurricane, Cherwell would eventually persuade Churchill of the merits of moving 
the programme to a free standing corporation: the UK Atomic Energy Authority, to free it from these 
restrictions. 
While the HER project was conducted before the principle of non-proliferation had been 
normalised, it was operated in strenuously applied secrecy.37 In addition to procurement and 
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communication delays, secrecy further compounded the unattractive conditions for HER staff. 
Career minded scientists could not publish their work and instead worked at Harwell.38 Penney 
bitterly complained that “such men do not wish to work in the top-secret atmosphere essential to 
HER.”39 When the effect of secrecy was combined with the separation from the ARD in 1950, it 
produced a near existential threat to the programme. The ‘need to know’ basis of the HER project 
had left it with minimal cabinet level political support and its relative prioritisation was delegated to 
the Chiefs of Staff.40 According to Cathcart, Tizard nearly successfully lobbied the chiefs into 
deprioritising HER in favour of conventional weapons research.41 Without the determined efforts of 
Lord Portal, this would likely have had the effect of denuding HER of scientists at a vital juncture 
which could have endangered the programme.42 
How well this initial effort was handled in terms of knowledge management is in dispute 
when comparing the analysis of MacKenzie and Spinardi to Hymans.43 Hymans, who focuses on 
governmental capacity and professionalism, quotes Gowing who states that “[Britain’s] early atomic 
project’s success was remarkable and possibly unique.”44 In contrast, MacKenzie and Spinardi assert 
that the United Kingdom’s effort to produce nuclear weapons “turned out not to be straight 
forward” due to the limited tacit and explicit knowledge retained from the Manhattan programme.45 
They cite how while it was initially planned to be completed with a “staff of less than 400, covering 
reactor development as well as weapons work. By the start of 1952, however, the program's 
"nonindustrial" staff numbered over 5,000, with more than 1,000 of these devoted to the weapons 
work alone. Furthermore, “the five years it took to make the intended copy was longer than it had 
taken to make the original.”46  
In sum, the HER project successfully overcame a range of serious managerial conditions to 
successfully detonate its first device in 1952. Its ability to do so is often credited to effective 
management and leadership from senior scientists despite the “machinery of government …[being] 
diffuse and ill-suited to ensure strong central direction or coordination.”47 This may be because 
politicians “left most of the technical issues involved in the construction [of the bomb] to be 
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resolved by those managing the project.”48 However, the effort appears to have been more 
strenuous than initially predicted and Cherwell’s reforms of the HER project into the UKAEA 




From the above reading of the secondary literature, it can be inferred that: 
 Placing the HER project within ARD initially allowed for the prompt assembly of an 
embryonic nuclear establishment with experienced staff.49 
 A lack of representation on research committees threatened HER’s continuation due to 
reprioritisation compared to conventional arms projects.50 
 Secrecy and inclusion within the civil service limited the recruitment of necessary staff. 51 
 The creation of the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority was the result of the problems 




 While Britain successfully detonated its first nuclear device with Operation Hurricane in 
October 1952, the United States conducted its first thermonuclear test in November 1952. Given 
that the UK’s nuclear weapons programme had been in part instigated to ‘keep pace’ with US 
nuclear weapons development in order to resume strategic cooperation, it was evident that the UK 
would have to develop an indigenous hydrogen bomb programme.53 However, neither Cherwell nor 
Penney had been keen on a premature push for the development of hydrogen weapons as 
Aldermaston’s capacity was already stretched delivering Blue Danube devices.54 While minimal 
activity on developing hydrogen weapons occurred in the next two years, March 1954 saw the 
detonation of the US’s Castle Bravo test, which showed that the technology was viable. Cherwell had 
increasingly agitated for hydrogen bomb development since 1953 and Penney had become more 
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confident in the rudiments of thermonuclear technology by early 1954.55 Following their advice, 
Churchill approved the development of a UK hydrogen bomb project in July 1954.56  
 This large intake of work came at an inopportune time for Aldermaston. While the 
organisation had successfully developed fission weapons, short term expedients in terms of 
management had been taken to deploy them as soon as possible. Attempting to correct these issues 
in 1954 had partly motivated the reorganisation of the weapons effort under the UKAEA as the 
AWRE, advocated by Lord Cherwell.57 While many of the reforms appear to have been needed 
rationalisations from a management perspective, they appear to have introduced employment 
uncertainty when it was least needed as staff were given two years to decide if they were to stay at 
AWRE. 58 Staffing issues, the perennial problem at Aldermaston, appear to have been further 
compounded by the rise of the anti-nuclear movement.59 According to Arnold, as staff recruitment 
matched wastage, AWRE “was displaying classic symptoms of an approaching nervous 
breakdown.”60 
 How AWRE was able to recover from this nadir in early 1954 and go on to produce 
thermonuclear devices by November 1957 remains a theme under-developed in the secondary 
literature. Simpson credits “dynamic management and leadership” at Aldermaston for the rapid 
delivery of a thermonuclear device from cabinet decision to delivery.61 Both Arnold and Pyne and 
Jones credit this recovery largely to the personal influence of William Cook, a senior naval scientist 
seconded to the programme in September 1954.62 Cook took over management responsibilities from 
Penney who was freed to work on more scientific work. Notably, Arnold and Pyne detail how Cook 
dismantled the culture of compartmentalisation at Aldermaston by instituting Weapons 
Development Policy Committee meetings where inter-specialisation discussion was encouraged.63 
How staffing issues were resolved is not sufficiently explained. Extra resources dedicated to the new 
programme likely enabled a new round of recruitment to replace previous deficiencies.64 
Nevertheless, McIntyre highlights industrial accidents at AWRE as an indication of an ongoing lack of 
trained staff.65 While not significantly acted upon in this time frame, this chapter will highlight the 
 
55 Arnold and Pyne, (2001), p.39-41 
56 Churchill, (1954) 
57 TNA, CAB129/56, Cabinet - Atomic Energy Organisation, 25/10/1952 
58 Arnold and Pyne, (2001), p.75 
59 Ibid., p.76 
60 Ibid., p.76 
61 Simpson, (1986), p.104 
62 Jones, (1)(2017), p.32 & Arnold and Pyne, (2001), p.76 
63 Arnold and Pyne, (2001), p.80-82 
64 Ibid., p.79-80 




promise of providing a diversified research portfolio. This offer was the main incentive to staff who 
increasingly began to identify themselves with the specialised skills they held and were concerned 
about their future career prospects.66 
 Despite problems with recruiting and retaining staff, AWRE was testing thermonuclear 
devices by May 1957. Although the 1st Grapple test was considered a failure, shortcomings had been 
rectified by the Grapple Y series of tests in 1958. Notwithstanding the disorganisation that had 
reined in 1954, AWRE had developed a thermonuclear capability before the imposition of an 
international test moratorium which they had been perpetually threatened with by the Foreign 
Office.67 
Further research needs to be conducted on how these processes are interconnected and 
how the challenges faced by the UKAEA were overcome. While the answer may be a matter of 
resourcing, limited information is available on how Cook improved the management at AWRE. 
Questions regarding AWRE’s 1953-4 plight have been posed by Arnold and Pyne, but insufficiently 
answered: for instance, they ask “whether the setting up of [UK]AEA at this stage was a wise, if 
difficult, measure to meet new circumstances and needs, or an untimely disruption at a critical 
period”, but they do not provide an answer.68 As Walker notes from his recent article on this era of 
British nuclear developments, The National Archives remains an “untapped source, on the nuts and 
bolts of the British nuclear weapons program.”69 
 
Hypotheses 
From the above reading of the secondary literature, it can be inferred that: 
 Seemingly imminent agreement on a nuclear test moratorium helped expedite the 
thermonuclear programme.70 
 The transition to the UKAEA negatively affected AWRE staffing.71 
 Cook improved information sharing at Aldermaston to the benefit of the project.72 
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 Staff members had begun to recognise the tacit knowledge that they held by calling themselves 
‘weaponeers.’73 
 
Polaris Improvement Programme (1960-1970) 
 
The conventional narrative that explains the origins of the Polaris Improvement Programme 
starts from the resumption of strategic cooperation with the US under the 1958 Mutual Defence 
Agreement, following the British hydrogen bomb programme. The agreement led to a plan wherein 
the UK would purchase Skybolt missiles to augment its deterrent, but President Kennedy cancelled 
the programme in the face of technical deficiencies. Because of the subsequent 1962 Nassau 
Agreement, Prime Minister Macmillan secured the UK’s purchase of the Polaris missile system. 
While Polaris was adequate for US purposes, there was a growing awareness of its warheads’ 
vulnerability to interception from Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) systems. Whitehall was 
becoming increasingly concerned that American extended deterrence would fail in a nuclear 
scenario where only the United Kingdom was targeted as unhardened British Polaris warheads 
would be blocked from striking Moscow. 74 While the US in 1967 passed on developmental ideas on 
hardening Polaris missiles to their Antelope standard to the British, the US-Soviet negotiations on an 
ABM treaty placed the possibility of future technological transfers in jeopardy.75 This factor, 
combined with the potential insufficiency of the Antelope upgrade when combined with the limited 
British missile inventory led to the perception of the necessity of an indigenous upgrade 
programme.76 Therefore, in 1967, the MoD directed AWRE to begin searching for technical 
solutions.77 
However, Stoddart presents a different interpretation of events leading to the acceptance of 
paper studies towards improving Polaris. In the 1960s, Aldermaston found itself again in a staffing 
crisis where a lack of new projects and funding was leading to a “brain drain.”78 Civil servants were 
informing ministers that unless a programme of Polaris improvement was initiated at AWRE, then 
Britain would be unable to maintain an independent credible deterrent.79 Such a view was endorsed 
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by the Kings Norton Inquiry and led to a state of interminable paper studies from 1967 onwards at 
the cost of £4 million a year as the Wilson Labour government stalled on approving the development 
of a Polaris Improvement Programme, that would eventually become the Chevaline system.80 
This chapter will trace the history of this theme, highlighting how the origins of the Polaris 
Improvement programme lay within the rapid expansion of the weapons establishment in the late 
1950s with Britain’s thermonuclear programme. This was followed by a change of policy under the 
second Macmillan administration which was intent on making considerable defence spending 
reductions. Within this political environment, AWRE strongly made the case for further 
developmental programmes on the grounds of retaining skills. Although it appeared that significant 
reductions would be made at the weapons establishment, the cancellation of Skybolt required 
Aldermaston to develop interim weapons and a warhead for Polaris. Despite this work and measures 
by the Wilson government to provide civilian diversified research to AWRE, select officials were 
making the case in 1966 onwards that new work would again have to be provided to keep the 
establishment viable.  
Given that elements of Wilson’s first administration advocated unilateral nuclear 
disarmament and were intent on preventing any further development of nuclear weapons, it was 
inevitable that AWRE’s efforts to secure further work would be contested. This chapter will examine 
the prelude to and findings of the Kings Norton Inquiry. The panel had been instituted to determine 
how few staff could be employed at Aldermaston to keep it viable. While it was expected that this 
would provide justification for further economies, it will be demonstrated that the results further 
enabled the progression of work on Polaris Improvement based on retaining tacit knowledge.  
Within this contested political environment, the instrumentality of select civil service figures 
in forwarding the necessity of Polaris upgrades is agreed by contemporary commentators, such as 
McIntosh and Pyne.81For example, William Cook, who was now Chief Scientific Advisor to the MoD 
and former AWRE deputy director “proved to be a formidable White-hall operator” and “fought 
Zuckerman [Polaris Improvements main critic] at a political level.”82 Victor Macklen, Cook’s deputy 
and from the UKAEA, was variously characterised as “Mr Nuclear” or a “nuclear freak” and accused 
of being “unnecessarily aggressive” when advocating for Chevaline. 83 As McIntosh makes clear, “the 
role of the nuclear scientists is… vital to understanding the momentum of the Chevaline project.”84 
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This chapter will trace the role that the limited oversight provided by the Ministry of Technology, 
UKAEA and Cabinet Office afforded both the Ministry of Defence and AWRE in formulating their 
arguments in favour of further nuclear weapons developments, further protected by official secrecy. 
The 1960s therefore represents the zenith of AWRE’s operational independence and marked 
political influence. However, the questionable strategic logic of Chevaline and immense resources 
devoted to the programme would later be criticised. How such a dynamic developed is debated and 
will require further research: McIntosh suggests the political need to reach technological parity with 
the US was a driver, combined with professional pride by AWRE in seeking the best indigenous 
capability regardless of costs.85 Campbell offers a more cynical assessment in that “if Chevaline had 
not gone ahead in the early 1970s, the Aldermaston nuclear weapons design staff would have had 
nothing to do.”86 Even Spinardi, who argues against the overall proposition that nuclear weapons 
development in the UK was driven by scientists concedes that Chevaline was the exception.87 He 
goes as far as to say that “the Chevaline case suggests that too much discretion over research aims 
may have a Frankenstein effect.”88 Through process tracing, this chapter will largely agree by 
demonstrating that the initial justification for a Polaris Improvement Programme was premised on 
the need to retain knowledge within the establishment rather than an operational justification for 




From the above reading of the secondary literature, it can be inferred that: 
 AWRE cited possible nuclear weapons ‘uninvention’ in 1960-1962 to argue against staffing 
reductions. 89 
 Civilian diversified research failed to stop concerns over a ‘brain drain.’ 90 
 The Polaris Improvement Programme was forwarded to retain expertise at AWRE.91 
 The Kings Norton inquiry was unable to effectively determine AWRE’s staffing needs.92 
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 The Ministry of Technology and UKAEA failed to contribute effective oversight over AWRE.93 
 
Kings Norton to TASM (1970-1993) 
 
 This chapter will trace the developments that unfolded after the conclusion of the Kings 
Norton Inquiry until the contractorisation of the establishment in the 1990s. Given that many of the 
documents relating to this period remain classified, it is the least well covered by secondary 
literature. Nonetheless, many of the same themes and processes that have been identified in 
previous periods can still be observed in action with new archival information that has recently been 
released. 
The first development that this chapter will trace is how, in the aftermath of the Kings 
Norton Inquiry, government ministers realised the need for AWRE to face greater oversight. This is 
evidenced by how in 1973, the AWRE was transferred from the UKAEA (representing a clear 
organisational break from the prior 1954 settlement) to the MoD’s Procurement Executive. Spinardi 
claims that the shift from internally appointed AWRE directors to “imposing career civil servants 
[was done] in the hope that they would be more responsive to the interests of Whitehall, and not of 
the nuclear scientists,” but he provides no further evidence.94 Whether this policy represented an 
immediate improvement is questionable, given the limited capacity of the MoD Procurement 
Executive to provide oversight.95 One significant effect of this move was to remove the AWRE’s 
director’s discretionary sponsorship of research projects, thereby curtailing the chances of self-
initiated programmes.96 
 After the gradual reduction of staffing levels at the establishment, AWRE experienced a 
series of safety incidents in 1978 that further disrupted Chevaline production and created a sense of 
crisis.97 It will be shown that the institutional changes implemented after Kings Norton were in part 
responsible for this process. Furthermore, it will be demonstrated that safety concerns in 1978 
accelerated pre-existing trends of skilled industrial labour leaving the establishment to the extent 
that both Labour and Conservative governments were forced to enact measures to maintain the 
viability of the establishment. The limitations on the capacity of the weapons establishment would 
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then influence the Thatcher government’s decisions over Trident, nuclear cruise missiles and 
replacement of WE-177. 
 Through examination of newly released files, it will be found that staffing recruitment and 
retention problems would continue to be prevalent issues AWRE throughout the 1980s. Poor 
morale, pay and strikes led to the concern that Trident production would not be fulfilled on time, 
thereby endangering other AWRE development projects. While measures were implemented to 
rectify these issues in the short term, contractorisation was seen by the Thatcher government as 
being able to provide a sustainable basis for the establishment outside of the civil service. The 
commonalities between these arguments and those that led to the foundation of the UKAEA will be 
highlighted, further emphasising the cyclical nature of the attempts to balance control and 
institutional freedom for the nuclear weapons establishment. 
 This chapter will also demonstrate AWRE’s awareness of the need to retain its own 
institutional knowledge through methods other than a continual supply of developmental work. This 
initially manifested after the Kings Norton inquiry with the start of ‘trickle’ production, where a small 
number of warheads were broken down and reassembled each year so that skills would be routinely 
practiced. In addition, growing concern over the possibility of a comprehensive test ban treaty led 
AWRE exploring ways of transitioning from a model based upon socially retained knowledge on 
nuclear weapons development to a greater emphasis on generating new explicit knowledge through 
simulating nuclear weapons physics in laboratory conditions. 
 The chapter will conclude by tracing the heterogeneous engineering of the Tactical Air 
Surface Missile (TASM), a nuclear system intended to replace the aged WE-177. While the end of the 
Cold War virtually guaranteed that no new developments would proceed, it will be shown that 
similar arguments over the fragility of skills at the weapons establishment and the need for 
continuous development were cited in an attempt to acquire authorisation of the project. 
Hypotheses 
 
From the above reading of the secondary literature, it can be inferred that: 
 AWRE’s transition to the MoD was an attempt to provide greater oversight of the 
establishment.98 
 




 Reductions to AWRE under the MoD contributed to the plutonium incidents in 1978.99 
Although the secondary literature on this more recent era is limited, the chapter will derive from 
primary sources that:  
 AWRE’s limited capacity in the 1980s was the result of loss of staff and skills and this in turn 
impacted nuclear policy. 
 AWRE instituted internal programmes to retain tacit knowledge explicitly in response to 
challenges raised in the Kings Norton inquiry. 
 Contractorisation was justified on providing AWE the autonomy allegedly needed to manage 
staff effectively, intended to save money and improve knowledge retention. 




In conclusion, this chapter has presented how process tracing will be used to highlight the 
cyclical causal mechanisms for how the weapons establishment’s concerns over knowledge 
management led to heterogenous engineering. Britain was selected as providing the best series of 
case studies as it has repeatedly reformed the organisation of its weapons institution to improve 
knowledge management. Furthermore, debate exists over the role of institutional interest in 
determining its weapons developments. A brief history of each era selected to be examined as a 
case study was presented which summarised the existing literature on the period. Several 
hypothesised mechanisms suspected of being in operation for each period were provided that will 
be tested in the subsequent chapters. By studying the process by which AWRE/AWE has attempted 
to influence weapons policy by asserting its own fragility, this thesis demonstrates that warnings 
over ‘nuclear uninvention’ were not new with the end of the Cold War, but a powerful mechanism 
that could influence weapons policy in the case of Britain.
 




Chapter 3: Fighting for HER (1947-1952) 
Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the initial operation of Britain’s nuclear weapons establishment. As 
detailed in the framework, a historical narrative will be constructed through a series of mechanisms 
that shows how the early nuclear weapons programme became aware of its own knowledge 
management requirements after experiencing recruitment difficulties, then needed to actively 
advocate for its own interests and how this resulted in the creation of the Atomic Weapons Research 
Establishment (AWRE). In 1947, Britain’s initial nuclear weapons organisation, the High Explosive 
Research (HER) project, undertook development of a nuclear test device. HER was initially organised 
as a subdivision of the Armament Research Department (ARD), an institution primarily tasked with 
conventional weapons research and part of the Ministry of Supply (MoS).1 Being a MoS project, HER 
was an entirely government led initiative where the staff and scientists involved were civil servants. 
After a tumultuous initiation, the HER project was able to test a nuclear device by October 1952. The 
delivery of this capability in five years has been subsequently praised by authors, such as Hymans, as 
being efficient, whereas contemporaries, such as Lord Cherwell, castigated the perceived 
organisational failures behind the project.2 The contemporary perception of mishandling of the 
project led to the creation of the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) and AWRE as a 
result. 
By critically analysing a range of primary and secondary sources, this chapter will examine 
the challenges confronted by the HER project between 1947 and 1952. First, both international and 
economic conditions under which Britain’s nuclear programme was undertaken will be presented. In 
brief, Britain’s nuclear weapons programme operated under significant economic restraints, 
reflecting the reality of the UK’s post WW2 need for civil and economic reconstruction. Additionally, 
the desire to resume nuclear cooperation with America provided much of the impetus for the 
programme until 1958 and this was reflected in many of the decisions surrounding HER. Using this 
context, the impact of subsequent policy decisions affecting the organisation of the HER project will 
be traced, to ascertain the underlying dynamics behind how the HER project was handled. This 
process will find, based on evidence and accounts from contemporaries, that while HER was 
managed efficiently, the interface between ministries and government on the one hand and the 
scientific and technical administration of HER was fundamentally undermined by a pervasive layer of 
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secrecy. Due to the level of secrecy imposed upon the project, HER suffered from unclear direction, 
struggled to maintain industrial priority and was constantly competing for staff with other research 
establishments. Critically, Penney and Portal, amongst others, played a vital role in fighting for HER’s 
interests. Nevertheless, institutional infighting for resources led to frustrations with the MoS being 
readily evident from 1950-1951. However, many of the problems encountered appear to have been 
gradually overcome by reform and several staff retention schemes were implemented by HER. As a 
result, by the time the Hurricane tests had been conducted and further organisational reforms were 
being considered in 1953, many of the highlighted issues had already been resolved.  
In terms of explicit knowledge, it is worth emphasising that much of the theoretical basis for 
implosion type weapons was already known to the British due to their involvement in the 
Manhattan Project. A detailed technical “Manual on design of Bikini bombs” (which remains 
classified) was produced by JL Tuck in 1946 from knowledge gained in America during the war.3 
However, essential elements such as knowledge over the metallurgy of fissile metals, the workings 
of polonium initiators and detailed production information of components remained as outstanding 
issues.4 
Resolving these outstanding technical problems would require an indigenous effort as few 
Los Alamos “Alumni” worked directly for HER. A key exception was William ‘Bill’ Penney, the 
appointed superintendent for HER, who had also worked in the Manhattan Project.5 Aylen states 
that as a result of his experience, “Penney had both the formal knowledge and the tacit know-how 
to transfer the essentials of bomb production to his new team.”6 HER’s over reliance on Penney as 
both chief scientist and administrator (as Chief Superintendent Armament Research – CSAR) led to 
the somewhat sarcastic observation that, by the end of the project, the organisation at Aldermaston 
was “‘5000 people helping Bill Penney.’”7 However, it should be noted that despite the knowledge 
transferred, the British design used for the Hurricane tests and subsequently in Blue Danube devices 
was not a direct copy of an American design, instead incorporating additional safety features and a 
greater explosive efficiency.8 The technical accomplishments necessary to deliver these capabilities 
were largely gained through intensive experimentation between 1950 and 1952. This is unsurprising 
as information on weapons had only been shared with British scientists on a ‘need to know’ basis.9 
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The ability to marshal the staff and facilities needed for these achievements is instead presented as 
the culmination of a greater logistical and political process which is accounted for here. 
Before turning to the analysis, a note on the limitations on the available sources should be 
made. The National Archives has multiple files concerning HER, but many have significant redactions 
based on national security concerns. Fortunately, most of these redactions appear to cover detailed 
technical matters which are not of specific interest for this study. When Penney’s team faced 
prominent scientific or engineering challenges, they were brought up in a generalised way to the 
Atomic Energy Council (AEC) and a sense of the barriers conveyed to fellow councillors.10 As will be 
suggested in the following analysis, overcoming technical challenges appeared to be a function of 
marshalling staff, time and resources. Another one of the limitations of the primary source material 
is that many of the papers are from HER’s ‘perspective’ and often highlight problems rather than 
resolutions. As Cathcart states, “Penney was never averse to raising the alarm over dangers to his 
timetable.”11 Therefore, secondary literature, particularly Gowing’s official history ‘Independence 
and Deterrence’ and Cathcart’s ‘Test of Greatness’ are used, both of which employ evidence no 
longer accessible such as interviews with direct participants.12 By combining new analysis of primary 
material and multiple secondary sources, this chapter presents a new perspective on the 





 Unlike the Manhattan Project conducted under war time conditions or the Soviet Union’s 
rapid and determined attempt to obtain a measure of nuclear parity, Britain’s effort was conducted 
with limited resources. Comparing the British effort to the Manhattan Project, the capital spent on 
fissile material production by “the Americans…[was] seventeen to twenty-five times the amount in 
half the time.”13 Given the weak economic situation of Britain following the war, combined with 
extreme pressures to reinvigorate the economy, build new housing, support social welfare 
programmes and a myriad of international commitments (Greece, Palestine, India, etc.), resources 
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devoted to the atomic energy programme (AEP) were unlikely to be lavish.14 While the AEP 
theoretically enjoyed high industrial priority throughout 1946-1952, even in terms of defence 
research spending, HER and the AEP had to compete with the ROTOR air defence project and 
developments in guided weapons.15 Penney observed that this meant that “the Ministry of Supply 
and the country as a whole were trying to do everything at top priority.”16 In the end, the entire 
capital invested in AEP between 1946 -1953, equated to 0.67% of total government capital 
expenditure or 1.5% of total defence spending.17 While Cathcart states that “at the time…[this] price 
seemed desperately high,” both he and Gowing repeatedly credit the frugality and efficiency of both 
the AEP and HER.18 As a result, Britain’s proliferation programme represents the first case of nuclear 
proliferation by a non-superpower, being more akin to subsequent examples as resources and 
manpower were relatively limited.19 
 It was these limiting economic conditions that meant that “solely on the grounds of 
urgency,” HER was placed within the MoS and the ARD to make use of existing spare capacity in 
relevant skills and facilities.20 Rather than create an independent atomic weapons institution, this 
initial organisational structure was selected as “[the MoS] had…spare resources of land, factories 
and skilled manpower, and few questioned the Government’s decision.”21 However, even at the 
earliest stages of development, it was debated whether a separate weapons institution should have 
been founded: a 21st July 1947 meeting between Penney and Portal stated that “the ideal 
arrangement may be for C.S.A.R. [Penney’s leadership position] to concentrate all [nuclear weapons 
relevant] research within his organisation, [although] such a course may be impracticable.”22 This 
path was initially rejected as “manpower problems would have made the task impossible.”23 
Nevertheless, this was a decision that likely benefited HER as “the core of Penney’s team” was from 
the ARD, who were “well-versed in everything to do with the operation and testing of high 
explosives, including the measuring of phenomena of very short duration.”24 Although based on 
expediency, this foundation confirms the hypothesis that placing the HER project within ARD initially 
allowed for the prompt assembly of an embryonic nuclear establishment with experienced staff. 
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 The hope of resuming equitable cooperation on atomic matters between Britain and 
America was the other driving factor behind the scale of the UK’s AEP. Britain had commenced its 
early nuclear weapons work with the MAUD committee and the Tube alloys programme from June 
1940 onwards, with the 1943 Quebec agreement seeing the effort merged into the American 
Manhattan project for the duration of the war. Churchill had expected joint nuclear weapons 
cooperation to continue after the end of the war, but Roosevelt’s death in 1945 and his failure to 
inform his colleagues of any accord aborted this initiative before it began.25 Despite a November 
1945 tripartite agreement promising nuclear energy cooperation between the UK, Canada and the 
US, the arrest of Alan Nunn May in March 1946 highlighted security concerns in the British nuclear 
establishment. In April 1946, a UK request for technical information on reactor construction was 
rebuffed by the Americans on these grounds.26 This approach was officially codified in the 1946 
McMahon Act which prohibited the transmission of atomic relevant ‘restricted data,’ even to US 
allies. This meant that if the UK wanted to develop either a civil or military nuclear programme, it 
would have to develop the technology itself. Other than knowledge gained through the UK’s initial 
participation in the Manhattan Project, Gowing states that “in general there was little exchange of 
information and no exchange of materials other than uranium” during the period 1947-1952.27 
While a full account of the subsequent negotiations between the US and UK is beyond the 
scope of this chapter, they did impinge upon the British weapons programme.28 From the outset, the 
scale of the AEP and HER programmes were in part calibrated to prove to America that Britain 
possessed technical capabilities worthy of ongoing partnership.29 As the HER project was therefore 
in part an element in a wider negotiation, its organisation was influenced by this approach. Although 
this will be evidenced when relevant in the following analysis, HER was kept secret in part to 
obfuscate its true progress and HER’s split from the Armament Research Establishment (ARE) in 1950 
was prompted by the potential for a possible merging with American efforts. 30  
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Hampered by Secrecy 
 
As argued in the initial chapters of this thesis and demonstrated by Ouagrham-Gormley, 
secrecy can prove a debilitating barrier to proliferation as it blocks the transmission of tacit 
knowledge.31 While the British nuclear weapons programme was conducted during a period in which 
there was no major taboo against nuclear weapons proliferation, Attlee imposed a level of secrecy 
on the project that was “beyond rational explanation.”32 This approach may have been a 
continuation of the Churchill government’s war time mentality where information on atomic matters 
was kept to the “smallest possible circle.”33 While the British programme did not stop scientists 
within the programme exchanging knowledge within their own institutions, the level of secrecy 
imposed was frequently cited as having a significant negative effect on progress. Few cabinet 
ministers and civil servants were aware of the project, and as will be made clear, this had multiple 
significant debilitating effects on HER. Gowing clearly outlines that “the price of excessive secrecy… 
was confusion in some quarters and ignorance in others which reduced efficiency and 
involvement….had it not been for the extraordinary competence of…[leaders of the civil elements of 
the AEP] and William Penney, the project might have been an expensive fiasco.”34 The negative 
effects of this imposed secrecy were further exacerbated as they were imposed on a bureaucracy 
which, Baylis and Stoddart claim, itself emerged from a lack of clear decision making over nuclear 
weapons from 1945-1947.35 The following section will confirm the hypothesis that secrecy impacted 
HER’s attempts to maintain industrial priority, thus delaying the foundation of an initial skills base by 
limiting recruitment. It will also suggest that this generated discontent over HER’s inclusion in the 
civil service, leading to the creation of the UKAEA.  
 When the GEN 163 sub-cabinet committee on nuclear weapons met for the only time in 
January 1947, the attendees decided that the British nuclear weapons programme would be 
conducted under “special arrangements conducive to the utmost secrecy.”36 Rather than solely 
attempting to prevent the Soviets uncovering technical details of the programme, other domestic 
and international considerations appear to have been equally pressing. Firstly, the high cost of the 
project would make it unpopular in the post-war environment with the public and certain Labour 
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MPs.37 Attlee would later divulge that he did not brief his full cabinet as he “thought that some of 
them were not fit to be trusted with secrets of this kind.”38 Other projects, such as the National 
Health Service had far more popular support in 1947, a year so economically fraught it was referred 
to as the Labour government’s ‘annus horrendous.’39 If the scale of the intended project was more 
widely known, this increased the chances of a leak to the public, which would have placed further 
political pressure on an already unstable government. 
In terms of the international dimension, Lord Portal who had been appointed in January 
1946 as Director of the Atomic Energy Research Establishment, acted as a “powerful steer.”40 He 
advised keeping the programme secret, in order to not endanger the ongoing negotiations with the 
Americans over civil and military nuclear cooperation.41 Another factor contributing to the 
imposition of the secrecy over the project was likely the desire to avoid accusations of hypocrisy in 
foreign affairs: Attlee had publicly championed an effort since August 1945 for international control 
over nuclear weapons.42 Although this initiative failed, to reveal that Britain was preparing to 
proliferate while supporting international control over nuclear weapons would have immediately 
collapsed the initiative and invited scorn. Alternatively, Gowing suggests that the simple “awe and 
fear” inspired by the two recent demonstrations of nuclear weapons may have been sufficient to 
inspire the imposition of “very special secrecy” upon the programme.43 In all likelihood, a 
combination of the above factors influenced the limited number of individuals informed of the 
project. Gowing reports that upon reviewing the imposition of secrecy arrangements in 1948, Bevin 
believed that it had been necessary for “political reasons and… [wanting to avoid] difficulties… with 
the United States.”44 In contrast, not all of those informed thought that such secrecy was necessary. 
The Chancellor of the Exchequer believed that “there was little point in trying to keep the fact 
secret” as it would be “widely assumed” that the UK would be proliferating anyway.45 
 As became evident, the plan that was approved by the GEN 163 committee to produce 
nuclear weapons had not been properly developed and scrutinised, likely due to its highly limited 
circulation. Lord Portal had commissioned Penney in October 1946 to produce a report in how to 
subvert the ARD in order to produce atomic weapons under the cover of “Basic High Explosive 
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Research”. 46 However, as this plan had been drafted in isolation, there had been no consultation 
with the Chiefs of Staff, MoD, MoS or the rest of the AEP. This meant that basic questions over the 
size of the desired nuclear force, division of tasks and clear lines of authority were left unaddressed. 
Penney himself wasn’t even appraised of vitally relevant secret information; he was given “no bomb 
production assignment to match…[or the] plutonium production plan.”47 As the GEN 163 never 
reconvened and both the cabinet and Parliament were practically excluded from the atomic 
programme, there was little high level oversight. Answers to these issues had to be resolved in an 
ad-hoc fashion as the issues presented themselves.48 This was the crux of many of the problems that 
the HER project would later experience as “Penney’s plan [of using the ARD] was deliberately 
minimal in conception” and would have to be scaled up at the unexpected cost of other programmes 
who vociferously defended their interests.49 
 Nevertheless, the overbearing secrecy surrounding HER, with it only existing as a clandestine 
subdivision of the ARD, quickly presented its own problems after the weapons programme was 
initiated in May 1947. Despite the urgency of the work, Gowing argues that “excessive secrecy was 
delaying progress…for officers…[who] could not be given an inkling of the real nature of the job they 
were asked to do.”50 Material and recruitment problems were left unresolved despite the priority 
allocated to them, for as Hinton remarked, “priority so secret isn’t terribly effective.”51 Secrecy also 
isolated HER from the rest of the AEP. For instance, Penney could only meet clandestinely with other 
former British Los Alamos staff.52 While an ‘informal agreement’ existed between the Atomic Energy 
Research Establishment at Harwell and HER about research sharing, wider technical collaboration 
was impossible for as long as these conditions prevailed.53 High level coordination was prevented as 
there was no representation for HER at the AEC.54 This was especially important as the AEC was the 
premier committee for organising the AEP.55 No representation led to basic confusions over the 
division of labour between the atomic establishments: both Penney and Hinton believed each 
other’s organisations would be responsible for fabricating plutonium components.56 Secrecy also 
imposed a logistical cost as “until 1949, all Penney’s atomic contracts had to [clandestinely] go 
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through Harwell” which proved extremely inefficient for both organisations.57 This was becoming 
increasingly unmanageable as by 1949, HER’s requirements were “equal to at least 60 per cent of 
Harwell’s…[resulting in] wasteful re-labelling, re-vouchering and forwarding.”58 There was a concern 
that this would “overload” the procurement system and contribute to delays for HER.59 As a result of 
these issues, the Minister of Supply in March 1948 “reported to his colleagues that this [secret] 
arrangement was becoming increasingly ineffective, an impediment to progress and a possible 
source of embarrassment or even danger.”60 The struggle to recruit staff under both strict secrecy 
requirements and from within the civil service were therefore believed to be limiting the nuclear 
programme. This was a crucial step in the process of Portal and Penney becoming increasingly active 




To resolve organisational issues and to improve secrecy, the Minister of Supply moved to 
place a ‘D-notice’ on British nuclear weapons efforts. A ‘D-notice’ was an informal but generally 
respected block on press coverage of particular topics, issued by the Parliamentary Press 
Committee. Issuing one was intended to provide leeway for modest disclosures over the intentions 
of HER to relevant officials, while enacting an opprobrium on wider press coverage beyond the 
simple protection of secrecy through obscurity. However, the Press Committee initially rejected the 
request, as it first stipulated some form of announcement to Parliament of the nuclear weapons 
project.61 Therefore, on 12th May 1948, a Parliamentary question was raised for the Minister of 
Defence on whether “adequate progress” was being made on “the development of the most 
modern types of weapon.”62 The response stated that “all types of weapons, including atomic 
weapons, are being developed.”63 While the minister was asked to comment further on the 
development of atomic weapons, he refused to do so.64 
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This “oblique” response satisfied the Press Committee who issued D-notice 25, blocking “the 
[further] disclosure of information about…the development and production of atomic weapons.”65 
While the parliamentary question was reported, the D-notice deterred any wider comment and the 
public remained largely uninformed.66 The immediate and crucial effect of this development was 
that Penney was invited onto the AEC and was henceforth able to coordinate the fabrication of 
bomb components with other constituent parts of the AEP, with Portal having official oversight over 
the entire endeavour for the first time through a single body.67 This helped resolve outstanding 
issues, such as who would be responsible for uranium, plutonium and polonium components, each 
of which would require their own specialised facilities at Risely, Harwell or with HER (eventually at 
Aldermaston).68 As construction of these facilities would take time, coordinating this process was 
vital to the eventual and timely outcome of HER.  
Secrecy and Priority 
 
While the imposition of a D-notice allowed for some prior limitations related to secrecy to 
be lifted, others remained in place. Secrecy continually impaired recruitment for HER as prospective 
candidates were not told the nature of the work they were applying for and had to wait weeks for 
their security statuses to be checked.69 Nevertheless, the minor increase in openness in 1948 did 
allow for minor transfers within the civil service, filling secretarial and drafting roles which had 
previously been overly difficult to fill.70 The other obstruction to HER progress related to secrecy 
frequently cited by Penney was an inability to cite the hard fought over atomic energy prioritisation 
to industry (the attainment of which will be dealt with in the following section). Penney himself 
stated in 1949 “[that] he did not benefit from a priority directive because he could not disclose that 
ARE was engaged on atomic energy work.”71 Nevertheless, Penney was complaining as late as 
February 1951 of steel shortages due to his inability to communicate his priority to industry.72 While 
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Portal had stated in April 1949 that “secrecy would have to be relaxed rather than that H.E.R. work 
should be delayed,” inefficiencies imposed by secrecy persisted.73 
The apparent solution to these issues, championed by Portal from at least 1950 onwards, 
was that HER and Aldermaston “should be publicly announced… to be the Weapons 
Establishment.”74 This would have been beneficial as it would have allowed for a clear citation of 
priority to local authorities, industry and other ministries, thereby potentially expediting 
construction and HER work.75 While this case had been made at the AEC as early as May 1949, the 
Minister of Supply only allowed building work at Aldermaston to be cited in relation to the general 
AEP.76 However, priority citation was further hampered by the inability to connect HER (still 
operating from ARE facilities) to be linked to atomic work in any form.77 If HER and Penney were 
connected to Aldermaston and Aldermaston was connected to atomic work, the press would quickly 
realise that atomic weapons work was underway at the site. Chapman Pincher appears to have 
made this connection in the summer of 1951, but “the Daily Express refrained from publication” as 
they did not want to “infringe the spirit…of the D-notice.”78 A new D-notice, ‘25b’, was issued 
blocking publication of information linking ARE establishments to atomic work.79 In the spring of 
1951, the Minister for Supply realised the absurdity of the situation and concluded that “the official 
secrecy surrounding the U.K. atomic weapons project is unnecessary and futile and is a hindrance to 
progress.”80 
 Although some were convinced of the benefits of greater openness, the Joint Intelligence 
Committees remained unmoved.81 With HER activities now centralised onto the Aldermaston site, 
they believed in “keeping the Russians ignorant of the exact location of our Atomic Weapons 
Work.”82 However, some changes were implemented: Attlee’s renewed priority directive for the 
atomic energy from September 1949 was reclassified from top secret to confidential in May 1951.83 
Until that point, prioritisation for HER had been “ineffective with industry because it could not be 
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quoted.”84 While the AEC had wanted the new directive to be made entirely public, it did allow for 
HER to directly cite atomic energy prioritisation in select cases.85 
 The fact that such secrecy was maintained reflected the unique “’barbed wire’ mentality” 
surrounding Britain’s nuclear weapons efforts.86 Secrecy related restrictions remained in place 
throughout much of 1951 and with elements proceeding into Churchill’s term (such as 
Aldermaston’s connection to weapons work), despite secrecy’s negative consequences being 
brought to the attention of Ministers and routinely vented at the AEC. Although Prime Minister 
Attlee had accredited great priority and resources to the atomic programme, including the nuclear 
weapons effort, “his intentions were frustrated by the paranoia he himself had engendered.”87 From 
a political perspective, stringent secrecy was also problematic. The predicted resistance from left-
wing labour MPs may have been challenging but the apparent lack of progress under the Attlee 
government towards a nuclear weapon was becoming a vector of attack from the Conservatives in 
the run up to the 1951 election. This was especially true after Lord Cherwell’s victory in the House of 
Lords in July 1951, which censured the government’s lack of progress towards developing nuclear 
weapons. 88 
The importance of protecting all information relating to the organisation of the weapons 
programme was also becoming irrelevant in the face of increasing leaks: in July 1951, Cathcart notes 
that the New York Herald Tribune reported that Britain would conduct a nuclear weapons test in 
“Australia within a year.”89 In retrospect, given the depth of Soviet intelligence penetration into the 
British Nuclear programme via Fuchs and Alan Nunn May, it is questionable what advantage the 
Soviets would have gained from a clear British announcement of intent, given they had detonated 
their first device in 1949. Perhaps the most ironic example of Soviet espionage on the British nuclear 
weapons programme in this period is highlighted by Cathcart; he notes that Donald Maclean as a 
senior diplomat stationed in Washington and as an agent for the Soviet Union, first informed the 
Americans and likely the Russians of Britain’s nuclear ambitions in March 1948, two months before 
Parliament had any indication of the project.90 
Nevertheless, after the October 1951 election, the secrecy surrounding the nuclear weapons 
programme was maintained, with Churchill largely following on with the policies established by 
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Attlee.91 The veil was partially lifted when Churchill announced on 26th February 1952 to Parliament 
that a weapons test would be conducted “in the course of the present year.”92 Ironically, Churchill 
lamented that “there was no reason why Parliament in time of peace should not have been made 
fully aware” of the decision to develop nuclear weapons, which drew furious protestations from 
Attlee, who stated that “We [Attlee and Churchill] have carried on precisely the same policy on the 
advice of our experts and advisers with regard to the publicity of these atomic matters.”93 
Debates over Priority: Limited Resources 
 
Gowing notes that while Prime Minister Attlee had initially emphasised the AEP’s 
importance verbally to a select cabinet audience, in 1946 it enjoyed no “specific priority 
statement.”94 In February 1947, this was rectified when Attlee issued a directive to all relevant 
ministries that the AEP was to be regarded “as a matter of the highest urgency.”95 While this may 
have been theoretically useful in expediting acquisitions for the AEP, the document was marked as 
top secret and therefore not widely distributed. Gowing further notes that as the government issued 
an unclassified high priority directive in 1947 for “items which the winter fuel crisis had revealed as 
critical,” it effectively relegated atomic energy to “primus inter pares” with other industrial 
concerns.96 Although Penney’s early efforts in the ARD were implicitly included in this directive, the 
additional layer of secrecy separating HER from the rest of the atomic establishment blocked its 
usage on HER’s behalf. Removing this barrier had motivated the ‘public’ announcement of the 
programme in 1948. However, maintaining priority and getting explicit overriding priority for atomic 
weapons was a more involved process, combining secrecy, bureaucratic infighting and reflecting the 
‘reflexive’ nature of Britain’s decision to acquire nuclear weapons.97 
As resources were not infinite, favouritism exhibited towards the AEP would inevitably come 
at the expense of other government led projects, particularly defence related projects under the 
MoS. Ideally, Attlee should have clearly specified, early on to his administration, the relative 
importance he placed in each of these projects. However, repeated subsequent government 
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communications regarding relative prioritisation were insufficiently detailed and poorly 
communicated due to overbearing secrecy. The ambiguous nature of these communications, left to 
individual interpretation, meant that priority became a “confusing riddle.”98 For instance, the prime 
ministerial directive in February 1947 that prioritised the AEP did not necessarily place it above 
“other high priority programmes.”99 
As a result, problems related to priority continued throughout the next two years, as various 
ministries interpreted the directive as they saw fit. For instance, the Ministry of Health and the 
Ministry of Labour had decided against the wishes of the Ministry of Works (who were charged with 
the construction of atomic infrastructure) that housing for atomic workers did not share the same 
priority as atomic infrastructure itself.100 According to Penney, construction delays of HER facilities at 
Foulness due to differing priority interpretations were potentially imposing 12 month delays as early 
as November 1947.101 This contest heavily impacted progress at Harwell and Windscale too, thereby 
delaying the delivery of fissile and radioactive materials to HER. HER was also directly affected by 
problems with priority at Harwell as they were reliant on routing their atomic priority orders through 
them.102 Recruitment of staff at both Harwell and for fissile material production was becoming 
increasingly problematic, with Hinton’s lack of engineers rivalling HER’s issues and also threatening 
to delay the project.103 
1949: Rapid Expansion 
 
As later investigations of HER and the AEP’s organisation by the Waverley committee would 
uncover, “the atomic project had never been given an overall directive.”104 This was evident in how 
little thought had been given to what the desired outcome for the HER project was. Sir Henry Tizard, 
an influential advisor on multiple defence science committees, emerged as the main critic to this 
undirected approach even though he was outside of the AEP bureaucracy. Unlike Cherwell, Tizard 
had a poor relationship with Churchill and had thus largely remained bereft of classified information 
relating to nuclear weapons between 1945 and 1947, but was nevertheless in charge of the Defence 
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Policy Research Committee (DPRC). 105 Therefore, when making recommendations on the allocation 
of defence research spending, Tizard’s committee could confidently forecast potential conventional 
requirements, but only allude to nuclear weapon matters.106 Nevertheless, the committee was the 
first body to attempt to rationalise a nuclear weapon requirement within British defence policy 
planning. Without full knowledge of existing commitments made towards producing nuclear 
weapons, the committee’s report in July 1947 attempted to make an estimate of the number of 
atomic weapons required for an independent nuclear deterrent. The committee placed the figure at 
1000, which was well beyond the capacity of the atomic programme in terms of fissile material 
production alone as planned at the time, “by a factor of 24.”107 
 The realisation that difficult defence prioritisations would have to be made was more fully 
realised following the Berlin blockade, as the likelihood of war with the Soviet Union appeared more 
imminent in 1948. While not accepting the prior 1000 figure, the Chiefs of Staff concluded that 200 
British nuclear weapons were needed in the event of war.108 This was a significant increase from the 
tokenistic amount required in the near crash plan envisaged by Penney previously in 1946 and would 
be impossible with the then approved means of fissile material production.109 While Portal resisted 
the setting of this figure as it appeared unattainable, thereby undermining the justification for the 
programme, the target instead resulted in a justification for increasing fissile material production.110 
Meeting these figures would mean significant increases in capital, labour and material expenditure; 
a plan was forwarded to build an additional third reactor at Windscale and a uranium enrichment 
plant at Capenhurst.111 Given the worsening security outlook, the decision to proceed with this 
enlarged fissile material production plan was made in February 1949, despite reservations over the 
growing amount of resources devoted to the AEP which would now come at the expense of other 
defence projects.112 
Competing for Skills: Existential Threat 
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The balance of resources allocated to the AEP compared to other vital research projects such 
as guided weapons, created further grounds for ministerial infighting. This was especially true as the 
decision to expand the AEP “had [initially] been taken by Ministers without full knowledge of their 
implications for other crucial defence programmes.”113 While the previous period can be 
characterised by reserved inter-ministerial debate over the interpretation of priority, the new 
directive and increased resourcing led to the nuclear programme’s existence being openly 
challenged. It was from this point that Tizard emerged as the chief “protagonist” in a move to 
deprioritise and potentially end the British nuclear weapons programme, in favour of reallocating 
resources back to conventional projects.114 
Tizard’s opposition to a British nuclear weapons programme slowly emerged around the 
idea that if the Soviet Union was to be deterred, resources should be allocated in programmes 
where they would provide novel increases to Western military capabilities, rather than sub optimally 
replicate American nuclear efforts.115 Allocating resources to guided weapons (anti-aircraft missiles) 
and the ROTOR project (early warning air defence radar network) would also make sense if American 
deterrence failed and nuclear attack was imminent.116 However, Tizard lacked direct influence: he 
chaired the DPRC, which advised on “the formulation of scientific policy in the defence field, [but] 
had no jurisdiction on the atomic project.”117 When partially inducted into the nuclear project 
through the foundation of the ‘Atomic Energy (Defence Research) Committee,’ which Tizard chaired 
from February 1947, he quickly found that their only responsibility was to denude other defence 
projects of their scientific staff for HER.118 From this vantage, he would have seen the opportunity 
cost being expended by pursuing atomic weapons as it stripped scientists from other priority 
programmes and therefore Cathcart states that Tizard’s “experiences on the cake-cutting 
committee… undoubtedly shaped…his views” against the nuclear weapons programme. 119 
Following a letter from Attlee confirming Portal’s right to strip scientists away from other 
defence programmes due to atomic energy’s overriding priority in February 1949, Tizard wanted to 
make it clear that this would jeopardise progress in other defence research areas.120 Tizard therefore 
set about agitating the Minister of Defence and Chiefs of Staff through the DPRC to consider 
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whether the unbridled priority for the AEP should be retained.121 The DPRC wrote a memorandum to 
the MoD, highlighting that the priority for the AEP would lead to the situation where the atomic 
bomb would be delivered before the means to deliver it, as well as generate delay research into 
other vital research areas.122 
Tizard also personally met Lord Tedder, Chief of the Air Staff and convinced him of the need 
to review defence research allocation, at least on the grounds of “[preserving] some balance 
between the weapon itself and the means of using it.” 123 This precipitated a meeting in May 1949 
between “the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defence…the Minister of Supply…and Tizard” wherein 
he attempted to convince them of the need to reassess prioritisation.124 The matter was referred 
back to the Chiefs of Staff who ultimately endorsed the priority awarded to the AEP and HER “for 
[the] political and strategic reason” of having an independent deterrent capability.125 
 The outcome of this review resulted in Attlee issuing another priority directive in September 
1949, in an attempt to provide further clarification. While the statement that he “regarded… [fissile 
material production and civil nuclear research] as being in a class by themselves” may have 
appeared encouraging to the nuclear weapons effort, Attlee equivocated when affording HER the 
same definitive overriding priority.126 Instead, HER was given the same priority as “other vital 
defence research and development projects.”127 Although Attlee foresaw some further conflict 
between HER and other defence projects over “some skilled scientists, engineers and technicians,” 
he appears to have underestimated both HER’s “insatiable... appetite for scientists” and the 
resentment this would engender from other research projects.128 Within the context of rifts 
beginning to emerge around the potential partition between the conventional and nuclear weapons 
work within the ARE, large staff transfer requests submitted to Tizard inevitably created the pretext 
for further conflict.129  
Even though Cathcart asserts that Tizard’s efforts in 1949 to overturn atomic prioritisation 
were ultimately “doomed” due to their timing, Tizard did not abandon his effort to overturn AEP 
priority.130 Ironically, as Tizard’s arguments were based on pragmatic resource allocation amongst 
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the Western Allies, as the prospect for imminent global war increased, the argument for prioritising 
atomic infrastructure and nuclear weapons decreased.131 Almost immediately after the Chiefs of 
Staff’s review in 1949, world events unfolded in such a way to support his thesis. The Soviet atomic 
bomb test in August 1949 nearly forced an immediate review of the atomic programme as it 
appeared the Soviets would produce significant quantities of atomic weaponry far faster than 
expected.132 Klaus Fuchs’ confession to atomic espionage in January 1950 (followed by the Burgess 
and Maclean affair in 1951) further eroded at the rationale for the British nuclear programme; 
resuming cooperation with the Americans seemed ever more distant given Alan Nunn May’s actions 
had provided the impetus for the 1946 McMahon act.133 
With Tizard once again agitating and Attlee refusing to directly intervene, the matter was 
passed on to the Chiefs of Staff.134 They met in early 1950 to once again review the priority and 
necessity of the British nuclear programme, but this time, with a “new note of hostility.”135 The 
potential for transferring staff away from atomic work was openly considered, with Portal suggesting 
that this “would endanger the survival of the project.”136 According to Gowing, rather than arguing 
the merits of the AEP, Portal had to argue that cancelling the British Atomic weapons programme 
would not save a significant amount of capital as it had already been spent on construction. 137 
Furthermore, any relieved scientists would likely be recruited by the United States rather than be 
useful in other conventional weapons research.138 Additionally, Portal suggested weakening the 
programme would diminish the future prospects of Anglo-American nuclear cooperation as Britain 
would have little to offer.139 Portal even threatened the possibility of his resignation, stating that if 
there were a downgrade in priority, “there would be no reason for him to continue in his 
appointment.”140 Due to this spirited if somewhat desperate defence, Portal was successful in 
maintaining the overriding priority enjoyed by the atomic project in a new directive issued April 
1950, but this time the AEP was afforded the same joint overriding priority as guided weapons.141 
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While Gowing states that Portal would ultimately “win” these confrontations, he had to 
continue to defend HER and the AEP’s priority as it was “constantly disputed.”142 The last significant 
attempt to redress the prioritisation balance back towards conventional armaments during Attlee’s 
administration appears to have been in February 1951, where Portal had to cite the programmes 
overriding priority to fend off a move to have the programme “slowed down.”143 In the same month 
at the AEC, committee members clearly demonstrated an awareness of the ongoing political 
sensitivity of prioritisation.144 All divisions of the atomic programme were asked “to be 
discriminating in their use of priority…[for fear of] being attacked on the ground of misuse.”145 
Churchill surprisingly made a final effort to withhold resources from HER after the 
Conservatives came to power in late 1951. Churchill was shocked by the extent of the previous 
administration’s efforts to acquire nuclear weapons and that the costs had been kept secret from 
Parliament. When Lord Cherwell pressed Churchill to approve a nuclear test for 1952, he 
unexpectedly refused, believing that American cooperation on nuclear weapons would be 
forthcoming.146 Only after several weeks of pressure exerted by Lord Cherwell on Churchill and the 
realisation that £100 million had been spent on the project did Churchill assent for a test in 1952.147 
Additionally, due to the level of secrecy imposed on the project “all the old confusions were 
repeated” about priority and the AEP.148 Penney complained in November 1951 that if “the top-
priority in the UK atomic energy project is now the making of atomic weapons, then they [the 
government] should say so openly with clear voice.”149 Super priority status afforded to rearmament 
programmes was initially not given to the AEP until Churchill verbally reaffirmed the projects 
“absolute” priority. Even then, citations of super priority status in were allowed in mid-1952, only 
after the public announcement of the upcoming Hurricane tests.150 
 
The Personal and Political 
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Before assessing the direct impact that the contest over prioritisation had on HER, it is worth 
highlighting the role that individuals with strong convictions and personalities had on the gradual 
formation and retention of British nuclear policy from 1946-1952. Without a clear unified directive 
for what sort of nuclear force was necessary, and with the prospective chance of American 
assistance and/or war with the Soviets being imminent, the course of the programme appears to 
have repeatedly hinged on the input of individuals at key meetings. This perhaps reflects that the 
British decision to proliferate appears to have been made on emotional grounds to retain great 
power status, rather than on a rational defence basis.151 The most famous of these interjections was 
made by Foreign Sectary Ernest Bevin in the GEN 75 meeting on October 1946, when, in reference to 
the nuclear bomb, he declared that despite the costs: “we’ve got to have this thing over here 
whatever it costs… We’ve got to have a bloody Union Jack on top of it.”152 Afterwards, Portal 
reportedly said to the Minister of Supply that “if Bevin hadn’t come in then, we wouldn’t have had 
the bomb.”153 
Beyond Prime Ministerial views on atomic weaponry, other personalities played a significant 
role in shaping or confusing policy.Gowing and Arnold, these were private attempts to “muffle..[  
Nonetheless, the main clash of personalities was between Portal and Tizard. On the one 
hand, Portal is credited by Gowing with having “fought throughout, almost in barricade style to 
protect the projects formal priority.”154 Additionally, they state that “it is doubtful that they would 
have justified the high priority they got, especially against the vehement advocacy of Tizard, if it had 
not been for Portal.”155 On the other hand, one of the key factors behind Tizard’s favouritism 
towards conventional projects observed by contemporaries was that “they saw in this the remains of 
Tizard’s extreme soreness at his exclusion from atomic energy affairs during the war.”156 As Tizard’s 
biographical memoir for the Royal Society states: “The dichotomy between ‘nuclear’ and ‘non-
nuclear’ aspects of defence led to much frustration of the latter because of the abnormal priority 
and secrecy given to the former.”157 This is a factor that has been observed by Baylis, who 
commented that “bureaucratic interest alone…does not provide a wholly comprehensive 
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explanation for these disputes…Personality traits also played their part…Tizard and Portal…[seem to 
have shared] a mutual dislike between the two men.”158  
The hypothesis that a lack of representation on research committees threatened HER’s 
continuation was true to the extent that unclear communication and lack of a firm strategic 
rationale for the early British weapons programme ceded a large degree of volition to these 
competing agents. However, the fact that it was “Portal… [rather than Tizard] who had the Prime 
Minister’s ear” was itself a product of the intense secrecy surrounding the nuclear programme, 
which ensured routine and direct correspondence between the two men.159 The value of consistent 
political support would again be demonstrated in the coming split between HER and the ARE, which 
would provide a further justification for the creation of the UKAEA as an autonomous body that 
could advocate for the weapons programme. 
 Stoddart and Baylis recall how “personality clashes within the Chiefs of Staff Committee itself… 
made any coordination of policy virtually impossible.”160 When Bernard Montgomery was appointed 
Chief of the Imperial General Staff, he “was not interested…and hardly disguised his contempt for” 
the views forwarded by colleagues representing other service branches.161 The guided weapons 
project, the perpetual threat to HER and the AEP’s priority, enjoyed their own support from notable 
members of the Chiefs of Staff and the Minister of Defence Emanuel Shinwell, who “stood by his 
guided weapons” in his efforts to ensure that they enjoyed equal priority.162 According to Farmelo, 
requisition orders submitted by HER were routinely obstructed by “blinkered and uncooperative civil 
servants.”163 According to and] diminish” the effect of prioritisation which was “disliked by some 
Ministers and departments.”164 Nevertheless, these efforts were in part overcome due to the 
continued advocacy on behalf of HER by influential supporters such as Bevin during Attlee’s term 
(especially during the priority disputes in 1949-1951) and then Cherwell under Churchill.165 
Prioritisation’s Impact on HER: the ARE Split 
Centralisation and Competition over Skilled Staff 
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While Tizard and Portal fought over the relative prioritisation of the atomic programme, this 
debate was “mirrored” by a rift in the Ministry of Supply that had a demonstrable impact on the 
organisation of the HER project.166 HER had existed as an “anomalous entity,” within the Ministry of 
Supply’s ARD since 1947 and its expanding manpower requirements had brought it into conflict with 
the conventional work of the ARD.167 Penney had originally guessed that he would require a non-
industrial staff of 220 for the nuclear weapons programme, but in 1948 he now estimated that he 
required 500.168 Antipathy within the defence research establishment against HER slowly built as 
more scientists were transferred to the nuclear weapons programme to satisfy this demand; Penney 
believed that coordinators of conventional projects “looked on me as a highwayman, picking their 
staff and this and that.”169 As the scientists and staff were stripped from other conventional work, 
mostly internally within the ARD/ARE, this fed into the escalatory spiral of bureaucratic conflict over 
priority, involving the Ministry of Supply, Tizard, the Chiefs of Staff and eventually the Prime 
Minister. 
 As Gowing notes, the production requirements forwarded by the Chiefs of Staff in 1948 for 
200 weapons necessarily required scaling up manufacturing facilities.170 While the production of high 
explosive components (such as the lenses) could be left at Royal Ordinance Factories, other 
components could not easily be fabricated in sufficient quantities at satellite HER facilities at 
Woolwich and Windscale.171 Centralising this effort would mean the creation of a site dedicated to 
the British nuclear weapons effort. While both contemporary arguments and knowledge 
management theory would advocate for this approach at the earliest opportunity (to reduce costs 
and increase knowledge transmission), Penney resisted this initiative for as long as possible.  
Penney’s justification came from his mandate to deliver a workable nuclear device as 
promptly as possible, rather than institutionalise Britain’s ability to produce nuclear weapons.172 He 
argued that relocation to a new site would constitute a significant opportunity cost in terms of time, 
further delaying the first test. Penney was instead in favour of expanding the HER facilities at ARD 
sites.173 This was because he recognised that moving to a new site would begin the divorce of the 
HER project from the ARD. This would mean redistributing resources and staff (some of whom were 
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unwilling to relocate to Aldermaston) that had previously been split between conventional and 
nuclear work.174 In addition, the physical separation would result in HER administratively splitting 
from the ARD, meaning some duplication of function for administration, further stretching meagre 
resources.175 
Despite these objections, the Ministry of Supply selected Aldermaston after an extensive 
search. The notion of whether a relocation was necessary was heavily discussed over the course of 
the AEC meetings in February 1949, where most councillors agreed on the need for “a British ‘Los 
Alamos.’”176 Of interest was how it was also concluded that no ministerial approval was needed for 
the creation of a nuclear weapons establishment “since it was implicit in the general authority to 
make atomic bombs.”177 According to Cathcart, Penney believed that reform, if immediately 
implemented, would place an unmanageable administrative burden upon himself and create 
contests over manpower with the remainder of the ARE precisely when HER needed to focus on 
weapons work.178 Penney already had “a hundred vacancies to fill in senior grades” and was already 
engaging in debate with Lockspeiser, the MoS’s Chief Scientist, over the transfer of electronic 
engineers to the programme.179 Penney also believed that the expertise needed for a first nuclear 
device was best found amongst those familiar with conventional explosives rather than within an 
institution primarily focused on nuclear physics, stating that he “[could not] in fact see an important 
and certain research function for the atomic establishment if implosion bombs alone are to be 
deployed.”180 The other pressing concern for centralising the production of atomic weapons work on 
a single site was that there was “by no means a negligible risk” that it would be vulnerable to soviet 
atomic attack before an arsenal of weapons could be delivered.181 To avoid these problems, Penny 
was successfully able to temporarily ensure that “unified control of HER and ARE were accepted for 
the time being.”182 
 Rather than a need to improve the management of the HER project, the final impetus for 
separating HER from the ARE was the failure to agree on Anglo-American nuclear cooperation in 
1950. Negotiations had resumed favourably in 1949 and it appeared that an agreement wherein 
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Britain would scale back its nuclear programme, offer its scientists and supply more uranium to the 
Americans in return for a limited nuclear arsenal and technical cooperation was soon to be 
agreed.183 If HER was to be largely relocated to America, it would have to be divested from ARE, so 
Portal tasked Penney with planning for this contingency. 184 In the event, talks of cooperation 
floundered in early 1950 due to the confessions of Klaus Fuchs resurrecting fears of systemic 
infiltration of the British programme by Soviet agents.185 While this could have aborted the planned 
ARE/HER split, Portal ordered Penney to continue with the plan regardless. Portal was likely 
concerned with the long-term institutionalisation of Britain’s nuclear weapons knowledge and skills, 
whereas Penney appears to have been predominantly concerned with the immediate task of 
delivering a single viable nuclear device and was “sceptical about the ability of this country, unaided 
by the U.S.A. to make any progress with super-bombs.”186 Nevertheless, HER was outgrowing its 
accommodations within the ARE; Cockcroft notes that “by the end of 1950… [HER] work at Fort 
Halstead…[required] 600 of the 997 posts allocated to HER.”187 The secrecy and security 
requirements to keep the work at Fort Halstead physically separate from conventional work 
research making the situation untenable.  
 As Penney had predicted, the split between HER and the ARD caused him to “[drift] into his 
most bruising political battle” as he had to settle with the new ARE CSAR and MoS officials over the 
settlement of what staff would go where.188 While Penney and the other AEC members perceived 
the theoretical benefit of “[concentrating] nearly every aspect of H.E.R.” on one site, the 
organisational transition immediately encountered problems.189 Firstly, there was a delay of several 
months as Penney waited for the new ARD CSAR to be appointed. The reallocation of staff from ARD 
to HER or vice versa could only be negotiated with the new appointee, so no progress on the new 
organisational setup could progress until a candidate was selected. This directly impacted HER work 
as Penney was unsure of what positions would need to be recruited for during this period.190 
Cathcart relays how Penney reported to Portal that the “continued inability to make the necessary 
appointments to the new posts in HER is having a catastrophic effect on the work.”191 This was 
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repeated in AEC meetings, where Penney claimed that delays were “having a most serious effect on 
H.E.R. progress” and the matter may have to be taken to the Prime Minister. 192 
When the new CSAR was appointed at the end of July 1950, this precipitated an inevitable 
“fierce tug of war” as Penney, Poole and their staffs debated over the allocation of scientists and 
assignments to be split between the ARE and HER.193 In terms of workload, the main contest was 
over who would retain purview over where shaped charged research should be conducted. The 
technology had clear utility for both ARD and HER as it had relevance to implosion type nuclear 
devices and conventional anti-tank warheads. Several months of back and forth exchanges resulted 
in an unsatisfactory provisional compromise wherein each organisation would have an independent 
explosives research team, but due to the secrecy surrounding nuclear weapons, research would not 
be shared by HER to ARE. 194 It was acknowledged that this opened up the potential for duplication 
of some shaped charge research, an unsatisfactory solution given the prevailing budget restraints.195 
Demarcation of conventional explosives work was only finally resolved between Royal Ordinance 
Factories, the MoS and Aldermaston in 1952.196 The other general contest was over the split in what 
staff would go where. Even before the new CSAR had been appointed, Harry Garner, the MoS’s new 
chief scientist after Lockspeiser, advocated providing staff “far more generously in ARE’s favour” 
than to HER.197 Garner’s demands included “eight senior scientists, as well as several junior men” 
whose contributions were crucial to advancing the nuclear weapons programme.198 Among these 
senior scientists, whose transfer was considered, was W. Challens, whose lead on designing the 
firing circuits and other electronics was vital to the point that Penney warned that his loss would “be 
seriously prejudicing the actual function of the weapon.”199 When Poole was appointed as ARE CSAR, 
he further exacerbated this crisis by “adding another twenty names to the list, including an entire 
team of men engaged on full-time lens trials.”200 
As both Cathcart and Gowing observe, the fact that the assertiveness of the conventionally 
minded partisans in the MoS were in the ascendancy in early 1950 reflected the pressure Tizard was 
placing upon Portal over the priority enjoyed by the AEP.201 Poole and Garner explicitly quoted the 
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renewed equal priority enjoyed by guided weapons, believing that this entitled them to a greater 
share of senior scientific staff.202 However, as Portal managed to prevent the downgrading of the 
priority of the atomic project, the ARE’s manoeuvres to reclaim staff appeared to have faltered in 
the latter half of 1950. September 1950 saw the “final and… biggest demand” from the ARE for 30 
scientists out of Penney’s 300, in a situation when HER was already “forty scientists under 
strength.”203 However, this demand may have only been a maximalist negotiating position as Garner 
suggested that he would have readily accepted an allocation of 15 scientists.204 In the end, 
arbitration by the Sir Rowlands, Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Supply, decided that only 
five HER scientists were to be transferred back to ARE, none of whom were vital to HER’s progress.205  
This five-month long affair had distracted management away from scientific work, created 
considerable uncertainty and, from the perspective of producing a viable nuclear device as early as 
possible, had not been necessary as Penney had been arguing in 1949. While the potential future 
benefits of centralising atomic weapons work on a single site under a dedicated establishment were 
appealing, they continued to incur an immediate opportunity cost. Some long time ARE staff were 
unwilling to relocate away from their current locations where they had settled their families and the 
ARE continued to poach staff with promotion offers.206 Cathcart notes that between 1948 and 1950, 
scientists were being recruited on average at a rate of seven a month, but by mid-1950, this 
reversed to losing on average three a month.207 Given that HER never hit its full complement of 
scientists (“there were never fewer than thirty vacancies waiting to be filled”), this was far from ideal 
but neither did it prove disastrous.208 For example, In AEC meetings, Penney complained about 
“desperately” needing 30 skilled industrials for work at Fort Halstead and how “recruitment of 
scientific staff was not proceeding satisfactorily” as late as May 1951.209 Nevertheless, Penney had 
guided HER through this transition period and could henceforth direct operations at Aldermaston as 
its new ‘Chief Superintendent High Explosive Research’ (or CSHER).  
Even beyond the split from the ARE and the main conflicts over the AEP’s priority receding, 
some material and staff shortages continued to affect HER. However, experiencing problems 
approaching testing was especially critical as even as of March 1952, “only one of its seven principal 
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components was ready and in satisfactory condition.”210 Most of the preceding time between 1947 
and 1951 had been spent researching, creating specifications and organising the construction of 
facilities needed for assembly of finished components. Only after the necessary radioactive and 
fissile materials were delivered could certain components such as the tamper, initiator and the core 
be finalised.211 Even then, the facilities to handle plutonium at Aldermaston were completed just in 
time for these deliveries such that they “matched to an improbably exact degree.”212 This led to a 
“frantic race against time with serious problems solved only at the eleventh hour.”213 
 The two main problems that still faced Penney were understaffing and being unable to 
effectively quote industrial priority to ensure that components were delivered on schedule. 
Understaffing meant that some of the workshops fabricating components for Hurricane were 
operating at “not more than 2/3rds capacity of their machines.”214 This led Penney to stress the 
immediate need for “up to 50 skilled industrials [or] we shall either fail to keep our dates, or the 
Trials [sic] will have to be carried out on a restricted basis.”215 As Gowing notes, while it is not 
recorded how this issue was resolved, the timetable of Hurricane was still met, so either they made 
do or more workers were diverted to HER.216 
In terms of obtaining components from industrial suppliers, priority was still an ongoing 
issue. When confronted over problems acquiring electronic components for HER in potential 
competition with the ROTOR and guided weapons projects, the Ministry of Supply equivocated and 
called for an “appeal at [a] high level” to resolve these issues.217 This reached an impasse in 
September 1951 with difficulties in obtaining necessary electronic components for contractors that 
was giving HER “ground[s] for disquiet”.218 Given the equality between atomic energy and guided 
weapons priority, Penney complained that “the best priority we can quote is that we are agents for 
atomic energy and this is not strong enough.”219 Penney asked for “a government statement…that 
such priority is the first priority in Defence and ranks higher than Export priority.”220 This was not 
forthcoming and the solution was only found with a hastily imposed redesign of the firing circuits, 
completed and tested in “only two months,” incorporating components with looser tolerances that 
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were less in demand.221 Overriding super industrial priority was only granted and distributed on 26th 
March 1952, only six months before the Hurricane test was conducted.222 While the intention was to 
accelerate the programme “to the greatest possible extent,” it is difficult not to see this as having 
come too late to have been of much practical benefit.223 Nevertheless, the ability for HER to 
overcome these final hurdles before the test is instead credited by Cathcart in part to Penney being 
an “invincible optimist” and by Gowing to Penny’s organisational abilities.224 
 
Resolving Skill Shortages: Staff Recruitment and Retention 
 
As observed, one of the main ongoing issues hindering HER was the ability to attract and 
retain staff. As Brooking (Penney’s deputy since 1950) acknowledged, “a 10 million [pound] project 
without proper staff to operate it is no use to anybody.”225 While Gowing assessed the absolute 
number of staff required by the entire AEP to be “insignificant” at a national level, the manpower 
demands of the project were “high and at some points…critical” given the overall economic 
context.226 Furthermore, the tight requirements to deliver within their specified timeframes did not 
allow for much training or ancillary research to be conducted while the programme was 
progressing.227 Without the necessary complement of already experienced scientists, engineers, 
industrialists, draughtsmen, labourers and administrative support staff being both recruited and 
retained, the programme may have been unworkable or unsustainable. Even with the Hurricane 
tests nearing fruition, Penney worried about the fragile state of institutional knowledge in 1952 as 
“the HER establishment could easily become sterile in five to ten years unless we both keep the best 
of our top men and get an adequate supply of youngsters.”228 
However, as Penney’s modest initial proposals for HER had to be subsequently scaled up, 
HER was “constantly jeopardised by critical staff shortages and problems” and recruitment was 
perpetual.229 Transferring staff from other defence projects to HER (mostly within the ARD) was the 
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only way to come close to the prescribed numbers.230 Therefore, clashes over the allocation of staff 
were the main basis for conflicts over priority within the civil service and HER. There was even 
competition within the atomic programme for staff: Cockcroft’s (leader of the reactor element of the 
AEP) interpretation of priority favouring Harwell led to him offering “posts… to scientists who would 
have preferred to work on weapons.”231 Accordingly, overcoming staffing issues proved Penney’s 
main challenge as administrator of HER. This was certainly perceived at the time as Cathcart notes 
that “Portal was anxious about Penney’s mounting commitments: in January 1949 he had 
complained to the Chiefs of Staff that the chore of finding staff was diverting the CSAR from his real 
task of developing a weapon.”232 Even design decisions on the Hurricane test device reflected the 
manpower shortages and skill gaps as “a variety of expedients and some narrow shaves” were 
implemented to get it into a usable state.233  
 Penny’s ability to overcome these challenges was hampered by several compounding 
factors. Most pressing was HER’s perennial level of secrecy. Not only did secrecy hinder recruitment 
by making it impossible to disclose the nature of the work in placement advertising, but it also made 
the jobs unattractive for “the security of the work…[was] so restrictive.”234 Scientists were 
constrained in their research activities, unable to publish, the work was more time pressured and 
dangerous; employment within HER was unattractive compared to Harwell.235 When suitable 
candidates did apply, attempts to rapidly integrate them into the HER workforce were additionally 
“frustrated by delays in security clearance.”236 Secondly, despite the nature of the work, pay was 
relatively derisory compared to private industry and fixed according to civil service pay scales.237 
Management in Aldermaston complained in 1951 that “we are finding the gravest difficulty in 
recruiting any personnel… and this is being aggravated by the low scale of wages.”238 When assessing 
the recruitment of mechanics, of those selected for interview “when the conditions of service are 
known i.e., rates of pay, no special housing facilities, it is anticipated that not more than say 5% 
would be possible starters.”239 As a result, Penney considered that one of the “major advantage[s of 
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an Atomic Energy Corporation] would be…[the ability to] take the right man and pay him the right 
salary [which] would do more to ease this situation than anything else.240 
Even the mechanism by which many of the staff were recruited through the Civil Service 
Commission was inefficient. The indirect, laborious process, described as “Chinese whispers” by 
Cathcart “was very often decisive in losing candidates who were able to pick and choose among 
employers.”241 Moreover, due to HER being within the civil service which operated a centralised 
promotion scheme, upwardly mobile staff could be promoted out of the project.242 One absurd 
bureaucratic oversight highlighted in correspondence from Aldermaston in August 1951 was that 
young staff were being called up for national service. 243 This not only farcically undermined the 
secrecy of the project but also whisked away staff when they had just been recruited. Finally, the 
move to Aldermaston after the split from the ARE created uncertainty for the workforce: the 
physical relocation of staff, many of whom had families and were settled was a great 
inconvenience.244 As a result, the speed of centralising the effort was decelerated; it was 
acknowledged that a degree of “remote control” would be necessary for HER’s administration across 
secondary satellite facilities.245 
Essential Bomb Components: Houses, Buses and Salaries 
 
 While Penney as the superintendent of HER had a limited ability to overcome the underlying 
challenges faced by his organisation (i.e. imposed secrecy, the split from ARE, competition for 
priority, etc.), he could appeal at the AEC, to Portal, Sir Fredrick Morgan (Portal’s replacement after 
his retirement in Autumn in 1951) or Cherwell for greater resources. These lobbying efforts focused 
on several measures that were implemented over time to improve recruitment and retention of 
staff. As the lack of staff was highlighted by contemporaries as the key bottleneck of the 
programme, these seemingly innocuous measures likely had a major impact on delivering the 
Hurricane tests on time, judging by the attention devoted to these issues by HER administration and 
the AEC.246 
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One of the main lures for new recruits to HER was the potential access to newly built 
housing, which was in desperately short supply after the war in Britain.247 While only a “very few 
[scientists]…enjoyed the [free] provision of a house,” accommodation with controlled rents was 
considered one of “the most potent inducements we can offer [to] labour.”248 As a result, providing 
housing for HER workers, from labourers to scientists at both Fort Halstead and Aldermaston proved 
“to be a major, almost obsessive, anxiety.”249 However, the construction of housing was often 
behind schedule as both the Ministry of Labour and Health refused to concede that atomic energy 
priority covered the provision of housing.250 The 17th February 1947 AEC meeting agreed that while 
they felt the Prime Ministers declarations “placed an undue emphasis on secrecy,” overturning this 
held equal weight to getting “a specific reference…be[ing] made to priority for housing.”251 Attlee’s 
new directive following the expansion of the programme did cover housing, but this did not 
immediately solve the issue around Aldermaston, which was already “ill-provided with houses.”252 
Although Gowing claims that “from 1950 housing ceased” to be a serious issue, complaints persist in 
administrative papers from Aldermaston; for instance, a paper in August 1951 notes that “the lack of 
sufficient housing…in the area is still a serious handicap to recruitment.” 253 HER papers also make it 
clear that housing continued to make “it extremely difficult to recruit staff to Fort Halstead and 
subsequently transfer them to Aldermaston.”254 This is unsurprising given that accommodation for 
an estimated 600 families from ARE relocating to Berkshire had to be provisioned for.255 While it 
appears that housing was never solved satisfactorily within the timeframe of the Hurricane tests, the 
pressure exerted by the HER administration appears to have sufficiently relieved the problem. 
 In addressing the pay of HER staff compared to industry and universities, there was only a 
limited amount that HER’s administration could do, other than highlight the problem at AEC 
meetings. Overturning pay restraint was an uphill battle while HER and the rest of the AEP were part 
of the civil service as they were bound to civil service rates of pay, meaning “the authority to pay the 
market rate in salaries was denied.”256 Some special rates were available, but they were rarely 
offered and slowly implemented.257 While Penney repeatedly bemoaned this fact, pay restraint 
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reflected Britain’s contemporary economic situation. Devoting extra capital for HER salaries would 
have disenchanted all other civil servants, undermined national “income restraint [that] was 
essential to curb inflation.”258 However, as this problem was the result of macroeconomic 
conditions, it receded as conditions improved. Both the 1949 Chorley Report and the 1951 Gardiner 
Report recommended higher rates of pay for senior civil service grades.259 Ensuring that the pledged 
pay increases were implemented became a further preoccupation as it was perceived that “the 
Chorley Report would go a long way towards solving the problem.”260 From mid-1950 onwards, a 
joint “Treasury-Ministry of Supply Committee worked satisfactorily…and most of the salary 
complaints disappeared.”261 Although pay increases were only gradually implemented, it meant that 
by the end of 1952 “dissatisfaction over salaries had generally narrowed” across the AEP.262 A 
temporary labour shortage in the London area in 1951 affected Aldermaston, but self-corrected 
overtime. 263 Nevertheless, the inflexibility to determine salaries (especially for senior posts) heavily 
influenced arguments towards the foundation of the UKAEA.264 While still only a proposition in 
August 1952, Penney moved to increase the number of superintendent posts at Aldermaston simply 
to provide some internal career progression within HER to improve retention. 265 
 If pay could not be significantly improved, the main initiative beyond housing construction 
implemented to assist with recruitment and staff retention at Aldermaston was the creation of an 
‘Assisted Travel’ scheme. Created in reference to Harwell’s programme, where a fixed low rate bus 
scheme collected workers from the surrounding area and shuttled them between Aldermaston and 
Fort Halstead, this simple measure would have eased the burden on site transition and increased the 
catchment area for employees (thereby easing recruitment and lowering the demand for housing in 
the immediate areas).266 Even though such a measure may initially appear trivial, in the face of 
“reluctance on the part of Headquarters to introduce an Assisted Travel Scheme at Aldermaston,” 
Penney believed that it was an “essential requirement if present staff were to be retained and [for] 
future recruitment.”267 A MoS communique from Aldermaston (dated 25th January 1951) ranked 
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assisted travel as more important than increasing salaries for attracting new personnel.268 Rather 
than discussing problems in weapons design immediately, the first agenda item for HER 
superintendents held on the 5th February 1951 was discussing the implementation of assisted 
travel.269 Although this was perhaps an “obvious necessity,” the travel scheme’s implementation 
from February 1951 helped ease the logistical burden of Aldermaston and helped to progress the 
HER project.270 While perhaps not the most obvious aspect of a nuclear weapons programme, the 
attention paid to these social and logistical aspects by senior management indicates an awareness 
that their task was not only a technical task but a social one too. 
 
Lord Cherwell: An ‘Unsatisfactory’ Nuclear Programme? 
 
Despite the fact that Cherwell was employed by the Ministry of Supply “as a member of Lord 
Portal’s Technical Committee,” he would emerge from 1949 as one of the ministry’s chief critics and 
the driving force behind the foundation of the UKAEA.271 Cherwell’s personal role in the foundation 
of the UKAEA is hardly in doubt: his official biography claims the UKAEA as his “personal triumph,” 
which is credible, given his insistence on the issue despite the opposition of Attlee, Churchill and the 
MoS.272 While Gowing writes that Cherwell “knew a great deal about the programme and its 
problems,” it appears that his perceptions were largely influenced by Portal, who “briefed” him on 
the problems experienced by HER and the wider AEP.273 Given Portal’s role as Controller of 
Production (Atomic Energy), it appears that much of the negativity surrounding competition for 
resources and scientists within the MoS was transmitted to Cherwell, without the larger economic, 
political or defence related context.274 Furthermore, as Farmelo states, Cherwell’s criticism was 
“sometimes woefully ignorant of…[the AEP’s actual] progress”.275 While there were certainly 
problems experienced by HER within the Ministry of Supply, this chapter has argued that many of 
them can be traced back to a combination of Attlee’s decision to enforce strict secrecy upon HER 
and the related problem of unclear prioritisation while attempting to minimise the cost of the effort. 
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Cherwell’s assertion in 1951 that “salaries…housing, transport and so on…could easily be dealt with 
in an independent corporation,” compared to the civil service and within the same budget seemed 
optimistic given the lack of evidence behind the statement.276 
Instead, Cherwell’s opposition to the MoS was perhaps based more on emotional grounds, 
given that “dissatisfaction… did not begin until the autumn of 1949, when the first Russian atomic 
bomb was exploded.”277 In his Lords motion in 1951, he spoke of the “unsatisfactory” and 
“incredible” fact that the Soviet Union had acquired nuclear weapons first.278 It is therefore worth 
observing that Cherwell’s criticisms of the management of the AEP hinged on the failure to deliver 
nuclear weapons promptly, in comparison to the Soviets or the Americans. Furthermore, Cherwell 
reportedly also had a pre-existing ideological “dislike… [for the] principle of a Government 
Department running an industry.”279 
 In terms of implementing his agenda, Cherwell’s first move towards an atomic energy 
corporation began in 1950. Cherwell and several associates pressured the Labour government into 
reviewing the organisation of the AEP.280 While the AEC viewed the proposal with cautious optimism 
as it may have allowed for greater flexibility in setting salaries, they were nervous of the disruption 
that its implementation may have brought.281 However, the review rejected the idea of an 
independent atomic corporation, instead creating the joint Treasury-Ministry of Supply Committee 
which allowed for quick decisions on exceptional rates of pay.282 Initial resistance to the move 
towards a corporation was further stirred by the Treasury, who wanted to maintain control of the 
finances, and the MoS who wanted to retain the AEP.283 
 Undeterred, Cherwell steered the Technical Committee to pass a resolution favouring the 
institution of an atomic energy corporation. This renewed pressure led to a sharp series of 
exchanges between Cherwell and Attlee, where Cherwell cited that the “over whelming majority of 
people who have really been concerned with the project” were strongly in favour of an independent 
corporation, whereas Attlee appealed for the need for “concrete evidence” to justify such a 
disruption.284 Cherwell’s letter to the Prime Minister even contained a perceived “implied threat” to 
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convince Penney to accept a professorship at Oxford, unless his reforms were implemented.285 In 
Cherwell’s letter to the Prime Minister dated 31st May 1951, Cherwell lamented that the 
organisation of the AEP was becoming a “party issue.”286 Birkenhead believes that at some point in 
the spring of 1951, he convinced the Conservative shadow cabinet to adopt his organisational 
reforms as their official policy.287 This provided the prelude to Cherwell’s July 1951 House of Lords 
motion where he, with the Conservative party’s backing, admonished the government on their lack 
of progress towards delivering a nuclear bomb.288 
 
Greater Autonomy: Towards the UKAEA 
 
 With the election in October 1951, the Conservatives were in power and Cherwell was 
appointed as Paymaster-General. Rather than finding strong support for reform from within the AEP, 
Cherwell was surprised to find concern from scientists over the creation of an independent atomic 
corporation.289 Finding resistance from AER staff, the wider civil service and fellow cabinet ministers, 
Cherwell was forced to delay his plans until after the Hurricane tests.290 Nevertheless, in April 1952 
an interim organisational reform was made where an Atomic Energy Board replaced the AEC. It was 
still within the civil service and the AEP was still under the MoS, but the new board was chaired by 
Cherwell, who as a government minister could exert more influence that Portal or Fredrick 
Morgan.291 Following the success of the Hurricane tests, Cherwell forcefully resumed his push for an 
independent atomic corporation. Cherwell went as far as to threaten to resign unless Churchill 
supported his policy.292 This threat was ameliorated with the establishment of the Waverley 
Committee who were tasked with drafting a white paper on the proposal. Eventually, the white 
paper was published in November 1953, leading to the foundation of the UKAEA in July 1954.293 
 While the desired outcomes and impact of the foundation of the UKAEA on the AWRE will be 
considered in the next chapter, it is worth refuting Cherwell’s assertion that “the present 
organisation [HER and the AEP under the MoS]— [was] the cause of most of our delays and 
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frustrations” in delivering nuclear weapons.294 Even more bluntly, Cherwell asserted to Churchill in 
1952 that “with a different organisation…[a nuclear test] would have been held two or three years 
earlier.”295 Despite Cherwell’s repeated assertions, the only practicable ways in which the Hurricane 
test could have been brought substantially forward would have been to start earlier or devote even 
greater resources to the project. However, in both cases, these limitations were made on reasonable 
grounds. The “dragging effect” of the Initial delays were imposed to test the extent of the 
American’s willingness to cooperate on atomic developments.296 Furthermore, additional resources 
could only have done so much as recruiting manpower on all levels was the real challenge. For 
certain skillsets such as electronic engineering, this represented the limits of available skilled 
manpower in the country.297 Although paying more across the AEP may have aided the project, it 
would have broken pay restraint across the civil service in a time of austerity. Although 
hypothetically there could be greater flexibility to pay different rates within an independent 
corporation, increases for certain roles and grades would come at the expense of others. As Gowing 
states, “the miracle in the project as a whole was that so much was done so quickly by so few 
men.”298 Cherwell’s failure to acknowledge these factors suggests ignorance given that significantly 
faster production of fissile materials alone in this time frame would have been practically 
impossible.299 
 Being briefed by Portal and in touch with Penney, Cherwell was correct in his observations to 
the extent that HER’s relationship with the MoS had at times been fractious. The MoS had other 
ongoing defence projects other than HER to devote staff and resources to and had at times 
mishandled recruitment on HER’s behalf.300 As traced in this chapter, these issues reflected the 
result of an incremental process where HER faced a high demand for skilled staff but struggled to 
recruit them from within the civil service. Secrecy combined with unclear communications from 
Attlee’s government led to contests over the relative priority of the project. This had allowed room 
for civil servants to interpret government directives in line with their respective institutional 
interests. However, the civil service had reformed to overcome most of these issues through new 
directives and the insistence of the AEC, Portal, Penney and other notables within the AEP, such that 
“most of the frustrations had by…[1951]…been overcome.”301 Tellingly, in attempting to provide 
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evidence of the merits of an independent corporation to Attlee in 1951, Cherwell complained that 
“as to concrete instances of delay [,] no doubt a good many could be produced were not Portal and 
his men busy clearing them up.”302 The fact that this was Portal and (to a lesser extent) Penney’s role 
as administrators appeared lost on Cherwell. Gowing recounts that “during the summer of 1952 
Cherwell’s staff searched for all the evidence they could find of delays and staffing difficulties in the 
organisation. There was some…but not nearly as much as Cherwell had hoped for.”303 Therefore, 
Gowing bluntly concludes that Cherwell’s drive for the foundation of the UKAEA “was built on a 
misreading of the past.”304 
 Having administered HER from 1947, Penney’s reflections on the organisation of HER and 
the prospect of an independent atomic corporation are illuminating as he appears to have changed 
his mind over time. For instance, he recommended on 23rd November 1951 that “the advantages of 
a Corporation outweigh the disadvantages,” whereas in a draft letter to Cherwell dated 14th May 
1953, he could not “decide whether…[HER] will go better in an Atomic Energy Corporation or not.”305 
The antagonism Penney personally expressed against the MoS in 1950-1951 coincided with great 
difficulties in getting staff and material: it is therefore unsurprising that he could “see great merit in 
a corporation” when presenting the idea from Cherwell to the AEP during this time.306 The main 
frustration expressed by a senior HER colleague was the desire for HER to “be openly atomic, and 
have an established Priority.”307 However, a more considered response to the matter from a HER 
committee determined the main problem confronting HER to be a “lack of effective priority,” which 
was an issue with the “statement of Government policy” rather than organisational structure.308 
Therefore, HER as a body concluded in 1951 that “an Atomic Energy Corporation will create more 
difficulties than it will solve.”309 As the issues directly related to the MoS abated from 1951 and after 
the Hurricane tests, the potential disruption that the reorganisation would impose came to the 
fore.310 This resulted in Penney admitting in 1953 in an unsent draft letter of his own “confused state 
of mind” as he attempted to reconcile his own experiences with the future potential needs of the 
organisation, and the fact that many of his staff favoured remaining in the MoS. 311 In the balance 
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was the link between the MoS, with its discretion over staffing of other defence projects, against 
scientific connections with the rest of the AEP and the potential for greater organisational 
flexibility.312 Penney concluded pessimistically that “In either case, Aldermaston will be adversely 




Despite the reservations of Penney and the opposition of many HER staff, the Atomic 
Weapons Research Establishment was incorporated as part of the UKAEA in 1954. This move 
brought to an end the “very peculiar” organisational structure that had developed around HER over 
time.314 In terms of the hypothesis drawn from the secondary literature, this chapter has traced how 
the HER project had initially benefited from starting off as a clandestine sub-section of the ARD, 
forming into its own institution under the MoS after the split from the ARE in 1950. While rightly 
praised as providing HER an adequate skills base for tacit knowledge reliant tasks such as explosive 
casting, HER quickly outgrew the confines of a subdivision of the ARD. Archival material 
demonstrates that the HER project continued to suffer from skill shortages despite this foundation, 
both amongst scientists and its production workforce. In addition, the HER’s creation from within 
the ARD meant that it continued to compete with conventional projects for priority and had to 
routinely justify its existence amongst policy makers. This manifested with the protracted contest 
over maintaining and asserting industrial priority.  
This analysis further explored the numerous negative consequences of the overburdensome 
secrecy imposed upon the HER project. This included a lack of representation for HER on key policy 
making institutions such as the Defence Policy Research Committee and initially no direct 
representation on the Atomic Energy Council. This created the conditions for the AEP and HER’s 
needs to be frequently challenged by competing defence projects and ministries, most clearly 
embodied by Tizard’s attempts for HER to be deprioritised in favour of the ROTOR programme. With 
unclear direction from central government, competition over resources reflected the role that 
individuals with strong institutional interests such as Tizard, Portal and other members of the Chiefs 








“obstruction…[encountered by HER] from organizations within the British state whose priorities 
were different” noted by MacKenzie and Spinardi, was the product of secrecy and further enhanced 
by poor initial planning which required the nuclear weapons project to consume more staff and 
resources than initially estimated.315 However, secrecy also meant that figures such as Penney and 
Portal had direct lines of communication to the Prime Minister and could therefore present their 
concerns over skill shortages directly to the most senior levels of government, thereby overriding 
rival institutional concerns. This would prove to be an influential factor in deciding the principal-
agent relationship in later periods. 
This chapter also assessed claims, made most notably by Cherwell, that the civil service was 
responsible for slowing the progression of the atomic programme. It was argued that this belief was 
the result of the sequential difficulties experienced in recruiting skilled staff, problems encountered 
with priority and secrecy and the necessity of politically advocating for HER’s interests. In order to 
overcome these challenges, the HER project had to repeatedly assert its high priority, but contend 
with internal administrative matters such as pay, transport and housing within the weapons project. 
While these may have been unglamorous, these were amongst the chief concerns for HER’s 
leadership due to the necessity of maintaining the prerequisite skill base necessary to conduct their 
work. The intense effort expended to recruit staff created general discontent among senior figures in 
the AEP with the civil service. Penney expressed his concerns about HER’s inability to modify pay to 
rectify skill shortages and these issues were noted by Lord Cherwell, which in turn led to the 
transition to the UKAEA. However, many of these problems were temporary issues due to 
extraordinary circumstances and were being addressed. By the time of the transition to the UKAEA, 
Penney was uncertain as to whether it would provide a substantial benefit to the future of the 
nuclear programme. 
The transition to the UKAEA was intended to provide the nuclear weapons establishment 
with the autonomy to manage itself more efficiently. The culmination of the processes in this 
chapter led to the perceived need to improve the autonomy of the weapons establishment to aid 
recruitment and retention. This highlights the contemporary perceived importance of knowledge 
management issues. Nonetheless, as will be seen in the next chapter, the new system introduced a 
new series of problems. By tracing the British nuclear weapons efforts from their foundation to the 
end of Operation Hurricane, this chapter has examined both the dysfunction of nuclear weapons 
policy at a political level and the effective operation of the HER establishment on an administrative 
 




level. This contrast helps explain the differing perceptions of both the relative efficiency and 









This chapter uses process tracing to highlight how the British nuclear weapons 
establishment passed from a crisis in staff morale in 1954 to another in the early 1960s while it 
undertook its thermonuclear programme. It will be demonstrated that both of these crises were 
rooted in doubts about the sustainability of Britain’s nuclear weapons efforts and they threatened to 
denude the establishment of its newly created base of specialised staff when they were most 
needed. While various initiatives and good leadership allowed the Atomic Weapons Research 
Establishment (AWRE) to deliver on the British thermonuclear programme promptly, this chapter 
will trace how the measures taken established two ongoing processes that had serious repercussions 
for the establishment going forward. Firstly, the establishment’s workforce quickly expanded to its 
peak levels, but only temporarily to swiftly deliver results. As this cohort acquired testing 
experience, it was in the institution’s interest to retain as many of them as possible. Secondly, 
providing continued work for the staff at Aldermaston as initially promised in 1954 would remain a 
perennial issue and would go on to have significant future consequences for UK nuclear weapons 
policy as AWRE advanced its institutional interests.  
Initially, this chapter will trace the combination of drivers that led successive Conservative 
administrations in the 1950s towards strongly favouring developing thermonuclear weapons. 
However, the need to complete the thermonuclear programme before the implementation of a test 
ban treaty meant the project was conducted at pace. This section confirms the hypothesis that due 
to the perceived pressing need for a thermonuclear capability and the time in which the programme 
had to be completed in, greater resources were granted to AWRE compared to during the HER 
project. While complaints about funding and priority are notably absent from AWRE during this 
period, the tempo with which results had to be produced in placed great strain on the 
establishment.  
 The next section will assess the claim that AWRE suffered from a crisis going into the 
thermonuclear programme. Due to the workload imposed upon AWRE, rapid expansion of the 
staffing levels at Aldermaston was required. This thesis concurs with Arnold and Pyne that AWRE 




transition to the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) and lasted longer than otherwise 
suggested.1 It will be demonstrated that this ‘crisis’ threatened staff recruitment and retention and 
that senior figures believed that it threatened the progress of the thermonuclear programme. Short 
term solutions to improving morale, such as pay incentives and housing are assessed, in addition to 
the role William Cook played in advancing the programme.  
Rather than these factors, it will be argued that to overcome morale problems at AWRE, the 
offered solution was to ‘diversify’ the work of Aldermaston. This was primarily because AWRE’s 
skilled workforce, who increasingly identified as ‘weaponeers,’ were worried over the future security 
of their jobs and demanded reassurance. While promises were made to prevent redundancies 
through further work, these projects repeatedly failed to manifest before British nuclear weapons 
work was reduced. Although not immediately apparent, the combined interlinked processes of rapid 
expansion for the thermonuclear project, an apparent institutional crisis due to the transition to the 
UKAEA and staff identifying as weaponeers due to their alleged embodied tacit knowledge would 
have long term cyclical repercussions as it established a need to undertake heterogenous 
engineering. 
 The closing section of this chapter evidences a renewal of this cycle after the moratorium on 
atmospheric testing and the US–UK Mutual Defence Agreement in 1958. Greater US cooperation 
brought to the fore longstanding fears over AWRE’s future that had temporarily been suppressed by 
the influx of work brought by the thermonuclear programme. Although AWRE’s management again 
promised diversification as the solution to these difficulties, the establishments senior leadership 
recognised that they would have to be far more proactive in acquiring additional work. This was 
necessary not only to fulfil prior promises but to retain skills necessary to maintain a nuclear arsenal. 
This established a recurring process that would repeat until 1993. 
In terms of the sources used in this chapter, it is worth considering that many of the files 
remain classified, even compared to the prior fission programme. Nevertheless, recently declassified 
files at the National Archives provide Aldermaston’s internal management’s perspective into the era. 
While some gaps in the record remain, these cover more technical aspects of the programme which 
is not the focus of this thesis.2 Of more concern is that Arnold notes “that many of the most 
important and sensitive documents [for the period] were destroyed by Aldermaston during a 
'reorganisation' in the 1960s.”3 In addition, neither William Penney nor William Cook’s personal files 
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for the period are available.4 Nevertheless, from the archival material available, a picture emerges of 
how AWRE entered into a crisis in 1954, stabilised and then re-emerged into a crisis of confidence by 
1962. 
 
Consistent Political Commitment 
 
 The priority devoted to the thermonuclear programme, in contrast to the fission 
programme, was more consistent and less secretive. While initially beneficial, this had consequences 
for AWRE as it quickly expanded to a level that would prove unsustainable going forward. The ability 
to acquire this priority was the result of a sustained change in the Conservative party’s political 
thinking in relation to nuclear weapons and defence in the 1950s combined with the potential 
explosive yields of thermonuclear devices.5 The American’s Ivy Mike test of 1952 had demonstrated 
the viability of fusion devices and the Castle Bravo tests of March 1954 proved the practicality of 
thermonuclear weapons. Soviet nuclear developments followed apace, with a test in August 1953 
measured at around 400kt. While the British government were aware that the device was not a 
fully-fledged Ulam-Teller type design, the Joint Intelligence Committee believed that the test 
indicated the Soviet’s intention and capability to progress their thermonuclear programme 
imminently.6 Further adding to the pressure to follow a similar course, Penney briefed the cabinet in 
March 1954 that thermonuclear weapons would provide great economies in fissile material and 
greatly increase (to a practically unlimited degree) the destructive power of nuclear weapons.7 This 
was also paired with a change in attitude towards the feasibility of the UK building a hydrogen 
bomb: In 1952, Cherwell had briefed the cabinet that a programme would be “well beyond” the 
capacity of the UK, but had changed his mind by April 1953, instead arguing in favour of the 
flexibility, destructive power and potential economies that hydrogen bombs could provide.8 New 
information obtained from American tests led the Chiefs of Staff to state in 1954 that “the cost of 
producing these weapons should not be beyond our financial capabilities.”9 A Cabinet meeting in 
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July of 1954 discussed how the net additional cost of a thermonuclear programme would only be an 
additional £10 million. 10  
The strategic implications of the significantly increased yields offered by thermonuclear 
weapons were quickly realised. William Penney relayed to the Cabinet in March 1954 that the US Air 
Force still partially viewed fission weapons as a powerful augment to strategic bombing, but one 
that required large amounts of uranium which there was thought to be a limited amount globally.11 
This view, combined with opportunity costs that would be accrued by pursuing fission weapons at 
the expense of other programmes had previously led figures such as Tizard to argue in favour of 
resources being devoted to air defences rather than Britain’s nuclear programme.12 However, a 
belief in the ability of the RAF to adequately prevent destruction to mainland Britain receded in the 
face of the destructive potential of even a single thermonuclear detonation.13 With growing 
realisation of the implications of thermonuclear technology, the Chiefs of Staff further briefed the 
cabinet in July 1954 that the “world situation has been completely altered.”14 This conception of 
nuclear pre-eminence and the need for deterrence was typified in the 1955 Strath Report which fully 
cemented the destructive potential of thermonuclear weapons with its conclusion being that 
“overwhelming and immediate retaliation with it [i.e. hydrogen bombs] is our only reliable 
defence.”15 
In combination with these pressures, Churchill also believed the acquisition of 
thermonuclear bombs was politically important as, “influence depended on the possession of 
force.”16 Recalling Bevin’s comments on placing the Union Jack on the fission weapon, Hennessy 
quotes Plowden’s recollections of Churchill stating that “we must do it [develop a thermonuclear 
programme]. It’s the price we pay to sit at the front table.”17 While conforming to great power status 
was a stated motivating factor, the Chiefs of Staff acknowledged the need to bolster the UK’s 
“influence.”18 This often implicitly meant affecting the UK-US relationship which only grew in 
urgency after the Suez Crisis in 1956 wherein the need to tie American interests to British foreign 
policy goals became ever greater. For instance, in 1957, with the thermonuclear programme 
progressing, Edwin Plowden sent a letter to the Lord President of the Council summarising that 
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thermonuclear weapons would allow Britain to “occupy in the military field a position vis a vis the 
United States” so as to avoid becoming “something like those German States that in the 18th 
century provided excellent mercenaries to be hired with British gold.”19 Richard Moore quotes 
Harold Macmillan from a Defence Cabinet Meeting in July 1958 where he stated that “the political 
[sic] target of Britain’s nuclear force was not the Soviet Union at all, but the United States.”20 
  In a counter-intuitive way, another factor that ensured that the thermonuclear programme 
retained sufficient resourcing was that it was perceived to hold the potential to save money on 
defence. After the Second World War, Britain’s defence commitments in terms of rearmament, its 
remaining imperial commitments and participation in the Korean War placed a great strain on the 
economy. This was realised by John Slessor, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, who stated that 
“large, balanced, well equipped, conventional forces were not achievable in relation to Britain’s 
economic prospects.”21 As a result, the 1952 Global Strategy Paper placed a greater emphasis on 
nuclear deterrence as a solution to this predicament.22 As Maguire argues, the subsequent prevailing 
argument within Conservative governments of the 1950s for “those arguing that nuclear weapons 
could form the backbone of Britain's defences… utilized the Treasury's downward pressure on 
defence spending to advance their position by claiming that nuclear weapons were cheaper than 
conventional forces.”23 This was most clearly characterised in Duncan Sandys’ (Minister of Supply) 
‘Radical Review’ of defence spending in 1953 and eventually the famous defence White Paper of 
1957.24 Therefore, commitments towards developing thermonuclear weapons in 1954/1955 came at 
a time where most other aspects of the armed services were facing cuts. 25 This was repeated in 
1957 where reductions in manpower through the abolition of national service were perceived to be 
compensated for with proposed increases in nuclear firepower.26 These policy documents were 
particularly the product of Duncan Sandys, whose personal unwavering belief that a Britain relying 
on nuclear deterrence was the “only sane policy” both financially and militarily. 27 As Betts argues, 
Duncan Sandys’ beliefs stemmed from his personal experiences of WW2 and were highly influential 
in successive Conservative cabinets.28 This included support for an array of tactical nuclear weapons 
which AWRE would have to develop as “Sandys almost certainly had little or no regard for any 
 
19 TNA, AB16/1910, Plowden to Lord President of the Council, 20/02/1957 
20 Moore, (2010), p.28 
21 Paterson, (2012), p.16  
22 Ibid., p.16 
23 Maguire, (2012), p.562 
24 Betts, (2014), p.52 
25 TNA, CAB134/808, Committee on Defence Policy Meeting, 19/05/1954 
26 TNA, CAB129/86, Defence – Outline of Future Policy, 03/1957 
27 Betts, (2014), p.82 & p.216 




distinction between nuclear and nonnuclear weapons from the perspective of their being legitimate 
policy options, and that he therefore believed that Britain would have been wise to retain its 
capacity to develop and deploy tactical nuclear weapons.”29 This meant an additional workload on 
AWRE as it developed a thermonuclear capability. 
 By a combination of the above factors, British Conservative governments in the 1950s were 
led towards supporting the thermonuclear programme to a greater extent than Labour with the 
fission programme. Simpson believes that the thermonuclear programme was therefore “subject to 
much greater political pressures, imperatives and constraints than the Blue Danube one.”30 These 
‘imperatives’ meant that support for the initiative was maintained under three successive 
administrations with the corresponding level of financial resources and priority. In addition, prestige 
was publicly at stake after Anthony Eden declared that Britain would conduct a “megaton range” 
test in 1957.31 Although Saunders’ framework for the domestic politics of nuclear choices highlights 
the benefits of broad support to ‘mobilise’ state resources, the imperatives driving the programme 
at pace meant that it also faced other restrictions.32 
 
Imminent Test Ban: Limited Time Frame 
 
In contrast to financial or political backing, the most pressing factor that forced Aldermaston 
and Penney “to proceed at [the] upmost speed” was the potential imposition of an atmospheric 
nuclear test ban.33 While opposition to nuclear weapons was gradually increasing throughout the 
1950s, domestic and international support for banning nuclear testing was significantly bolstered in 
1954 following the American’s Castle Bravo test and the Lucky Dragon incident.34 The first talks 
discussing a ban between the United States and Britain occurred in April 1954 with negotiations with 
the Soviets starting in 1955.35 As recalled by Walker, Smith and Arnold and Arnold and Pyne, this 
placed Britain’s Conservative administrations in an uncomfortable position wherein they supported 
a testing ban, but ideally only when the UK had developed its own thermonuclear weapons. 36 
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However, while Britain lagged behind the Soviet Union and America in terms of thermonuclear 
technology, it was also susceptible from the international community (primarily the United States) 
forcing it through moral and political pressure to abide by a test ban treaty before it was ideally 
ready to do so.37 As it was not in the gift of British policy makers to dictate when an accord between 
the Soviet Union and the United States was reached, this meant that the thermonuclear programme 
would have to be conducted as rapidly as possible. As a result, the Ministry of Supply (MoS) moved 
in December 1955 for the Atomic Weapons Trials Executive to work for a trial date of May/April 
1957.38 
This timetable was far from ideal from AWRE’s perspective as in February 1955, 
“Aldermaston theoreticians…[still] groped for solutions” to fundamental issues for thermonuclear 
designs.39 As Arnold and Smith state, this meant that the Weapons Group at Aldermaston worked “in 
an atmosphere compounded equally of extreme urgency and extreme uncertainty… This sense of 
urgency affected everyone in the project, and prompted the most strenuous efforts from scientists, 
engineers and industrial workers alike.”40 Such were the theoretical uncertainties surrounding fusion 
tests that in 1956, Cook was only able to give a maximum possible yield, rather than predict an 
accurate figure.41 The Mosaic, Buffalo, Grapple and Antler series of tests occurred in such a 
condensed period of time that even marginal time savings, such as several days, attracted praise 
while logistical delays over shipping were a cause for “getting very worried.” 42 
 Though the time pressures before the Short Grapple test of May 1957 were severe, the need 
to rapidly deliver results only intensified after initially disappointing yields. Penney believed that 
“one stupid mistake… must have cost something in yield, perhaps 100 kilotons or so.”43 This first 
thermonuclear test was not truly in the megaton range: the device’s predicted yield had only been 
500 kilotons even if it had performed successfully. This was also acutely embarrassing due to the fact 
that initial information sent from Penney to Whitehall and subsequently relayed to the press claimed 
Britain was now a ‘megaton’ power.44 While Penney consoled himself that this test had been more 
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successful than the Russian’s first several attempts at a megaton range thermonuclear device, later 
assessments from November 1957 were more frank in that they concluded that “[the first] GRAPPLE 
[test] was disappointing…[and] was largely unsuccessful.”45 
After the first Grapple trials, Britain had still not achieved a true megaton thermonuclear 
yield device and was still far away from a serviceable weapon. As talks progressed at the United 
Nations the situation for AWRE became ever more desperate as there was “an overwhelming sense 
that time was running out.”46 A further compounding problem was the potential prospect of a 
nuclear weapons fissile material cut off treaty. While staged thermonuclear devices were being 
developed, AWRE designed an interim ‘megaton range’ ‘layer cake’ (a large mostly fission) weapon 
which would prove highly uneconomical if it was forced into an extended service period.47 If 
conditions had been less severe, the ideal testing regime foresaw staggered detonations “in both 
megaton and kiloton range[s] for a period of at least 2 years.”48 While Cook believed that “the 
quickest and most economical way to reach our final design is by a system of step-by-step 
experimentation,” it was not perceived that there would be enough time for this method.49 Penney 
acknowledged in autumn 1957 that “if there was no threat from the political side to stop the trials, 
AWRE would not be anxious to force the type of crash programme they were at present 
undertaking.”50 
After rapidly redesigning elements of the previously failed Short Granite device, another 
test, designated Grapple X, was ready for 8th November 1957.51 This test was a source of 
considerable anxiety as Penney admitted that “if the results were very poor… AWRE would then 
need time to re-consider the whole situation.”52 Two failures in a row would have suggest a 
fundamental flaw in Aldermaston’s approach to thermonuclear design. In the event, the test 
produced Britain’s first truly megaton yield and was considered “highly successful from a scientific 
standpoint.” 53 While this represented significant progress, the design “did not in any way represent 
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a Service warhead.”54 Instead, “the success of our November trial...[had] shown the scientists that 
they are on the right track.”55 Although Aldermaston’s understanding of thermonuclear implosion 
devices had advanced considerably by January 1958, “the achievement of…a warhead of a 1 
megaton within the weight of one ton and immune to countermeasures…[would] require [a] further 
series of trials.”56 The Grapple Y test, a further iterative improvement was scheduled for April 28th 
1958, which was “the earliest date that AWRE…[could] be ready for the trial.”57 However, as 
Aldermaston progressed towards delivering on its operational requirements, similar advances were 
being made towards a testing moratorium.  
On 31st March 1958, the Soviets announced a unilateral halt to their thermonuclear tests 
with the implicit challenge that this should be matched by the West.58 Shortly thereafter, America 
announced that it would suspend its testing programme of six months.59 This created an intense 
period of negotiation and coordination wherein Britain had to reconcile the objectives of its nuclear 
programme with the dawning political reality that testing would be imminently halted. While 
beyond the scope of this thesis, Walker provides an account of how this led the Macmillan 
government to pursue the overlapping objectives of delaying a Western moratorium until after the 
AWRE autumn testing programme, persuading the Americans to share more information on 
primaries and radiation immunity and at the same time, keep the prospect of a testing moratorium 
imminent.60 With the concession that negotiations on a test ban should start at the end of October 
1958, a hard deadline was placed upon British atmospheric testing so that “political considerations 
took precedence over the scientific imperatives” for the timings of final Grapple Z tests.61 This 
section has confirmed the hypothesis that despite consistent political support, the negotiations for a 
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Resources at AWRE: Limited Oversight & High Priority 
 
Unlike with the fission programme, financial constraints and competition with other 
government ministries for priority do not appear to have effected AWRE during the thermonuclear 
project.63 In the available files during the era, senior AWRE staff do not complain about the funding 
they received. This is perhaps unsurprising given that the interdepartmental Nuclear Test Policy 
Committee clearly understood government policy from 1955 onwards to be “to possess [an] 
independent [thermonuclear] deterrent and this is [the] highest priority.”64 Another factor in 
AWRE’s favour was that the government’s intention to acquire thermonuclear weapons was made 
public in February 1955.65 The open announcement inevitably created political imperatives towards 
devoting sufficient resources to the endeavour.66 Correspondingly, letters between Penney and Sir 
Donald Perrot (UKAEA’s head of Finance and Administration) from 1956 and 1958 about staff pay 
consistently acknowledge the continuing need for AWRE to expand its staff and deliver results as 
promptly as possible, premised on government policy.67 The intentions of the principal clearly 
aligned with the agent’s interests. In August 1954, AWRE’s staff total stood at 3908 but this had 
nearly doubled to 7589 by March 1958.68 Nonetheless, manpower consistently lagged the 
complement that Aldermaston was permitted (see Annex 1). Given the high priority and rapid 
expansion, spending quickly increased at AWRE without a corresponding increase in oversight. 
In terms of imposing some financial limitations on the programme, predictably, the Treasury 
was the main actor and at various stages, seen by nuclear programme insiders as the main threat to 
their testing programme. One of the highest-level challenges to the scale of spending on Britain’s 
thermonuclear programme came in early January 1956. Harold Macmillan in his then role as 
Chancellor raised a series of questions to the Prime Minister about the level of spending involved in 
Operation Grapple: Macmillan complained that the tests would cost a “very large amount” and 
asked why three megaton tests were necessary where one could presumably suffice.69 This 
suggestion is not explicitly discussed in Macmillan’s memoirs, but presumably arose from financial 
 
63 Apart from AWRE staff pay – see section on retention. 
64 TNA, DEFE7/921, Macklen to Powell – Nuclear Test Policy Committee, 18/11/1957 
65 MacLellan, (2017), p.34 
66 Compared to the secret fission programme. See Churchill’s speech to parliament in March 1955 where 
further political capital was staked on their acquisition. Winston Churchill, HC Deb 01 March 1955 vol. 537 
cc1893- 1905. Cabinet minutes suggest that there was little faith in keeping the project secret in any case. 
TNA, CAB128/27, Cabinet Conclusions, 08/07/1954 
67 TNA, AB16/1768, Cook to Perrott, 09/06/1956 & Penney, (1968), p.298 
68 TNA, AB16/2303, Comparison of Actual with Estimated Strengths, (n.d.) 




and political concerns due to the test preparations coinciding with a minor budgetary crisis and the 
need for a broad reduction in defence spending in early 1956.70 Nevertheless, this suggestion was 
quickly rebuffed with the move being opposed by Walter Monkton, the new Minister of Defence.71 
The antagonism between Britain’s nuclear establishment and the Treasury can be seen for example 
when the UKAEA and MoS were prompted to supply cost estimates to the Prime Minister for the 
costs of ongoing tests after Grapple X in early 1958. Simply providing an estimated budget was “first 
blood to them [the Treasury] against us on this matter, and the whole of our policy,” thereby posing 
a “danger” to nuclear testing.72 
 In terms of the Treasury imposing meaningful limitations on routine and capital spending 
projects at Aldermaston, the sense of overriding priority and the inability to provide serious 
oversight becomes apparent from the available sources. Even before the start of the thermonuclear 
programme, Maguire quotes a Treasury official from 1953 who noted that they “cannot help feeling 
that the first Aldermaston reaction to any new afterthought is to demand a new building 
automatically instead of making every effort to make do with the buildings already available or in 
hand.”73 The file for ‘Approvals for capital projects at Aldermaston and other Weapons Group 
establishments’ between 1955 and 1960 routinely records approval for spending projects without 
serious contestation.74 For instance, a May 1955 UKAEA note to the treasury reports a range of new 
projects and cost overruns against estimates. The request for spending authorisation concludes that 
“these tests cannot be delayed and the buildings required here will have to be built as quickly as 
possible.”75 In response to this lengthy series of requests, the Treasury simply briefly approved of the 
proposal as the works were “vital to the priority programme.”76 The apparent frustration with the 
inability to provide oversight on Aldermaston spending is evident in a letter dated 28th May 1956 
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from the Treasury, wherein rising estimates for a new radioactivity laboratory are approved, but it’s 
noted that “we [the Treasury] have little option but to agree to the new estimate.”77 
 While limiting funding for the development of thermonuclear weapons was never seriously 
considered, the ongoing costs for testing, especially Grapple Y, Z and predicted future trials did lead 
to questions being raised about the ongoing financials of the project in 1957-1958. The Nuclear Test 
Policy Committee had to continually seek approval of their financial plans for testing from both the 
Prime Minister and the Chancellor.78 This imposed some additional uncertainty on the future of trials 
as each test proposal had to be sequentially justified and approved as the total costs accumulated.79 
For instance, while Grapple X had proven the viability of British thermonuclear design ideas, the 
Minister of Supply had to push on 25th November 1957 that further tests were needed to develop “a 
device which is light, economical in fissile material and immune to counter-measures.”80 Beyond 
weapon design, the MoS also reported in the same month that there was also “big Service demand 
for indoctrination and Target Response,” which would involve test detonations of all of AWRE’s 
fielded designs.81 Tests were envisaged as occurring for the foreseeable future on a four monthly 
basis.82 The exorbitant costs involved also created questions over departmental spending. With the 
Grapple trials ongoing, the MoS was “in effect, supporting the extra costs of a large military force on 
the other side of the world,” to the detriment of all its other programmes.83 However, rather than 
potentially arguing for the projects cancellation, the issue of cost was raised within the context of 
creating a more equitable distribution of the expenses across government departments.84 
When detailing the costs of maintaining this testing programme, staff salaries and other 
expenses accrued by Aldermaston were not given great consideration as not only were they 
relatively insubstantial compared to the fissile material and logistics involved in trials, but resources 
devoted to them were considered standing costs that would have been accrued anyway.85 As a 
result, Aldermaston did not suffer the same resource deficiencies it had during the fission 
programme. Due to it being a lack of a problem, Aldermaston files of the era do not extensively 
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discuss or complain about funding. For example, when cuts to government expenditure were 
discussed at an Atomic Energy Executive (AEX - the successor to the Atomic Energy Council) meeting 
in 1956, the Weapons Group’s privileged position is evident: while the Production and Research 
Groups of the UKAEA had their respective executives justify their operations and scale back planned 
projects, Penney was able to swiftly reject cut-backs on the grounds that they would be false 
economies or create shocks to morale, but primarily that it would mean “fore-going the hydrogen 
bomb tests,” which would clearly be unacceptable.86 Other benefits enjoyed by Aldermaston during 
this era that were notably absent from the fission programme was their ability to second staff from 
the UKAEA, armed services and other defence research establishments.87 However, this facility was 
only provided in the spring of 1958, during the final sprint towards delivering devices for Grapple Z.88 
While temporarily beneficial, the process of lavishly resourcing AWRE during the mid-1950s made 




Given the successful outcome of the later Grapple tests and the settlement of the US-UK 
Mutual Defence Agreement in 1958, Walker believes that “testing constraints do not appear to have 
unduly harmed the UK weapons programme.”89 However, the pressure exerted by the imminence of 
a test ban meant that a number of expedients were taken by AWRE to deliver megaton devices. 
Contemporaries, such as Macklen, lamented in 1958 that the “trials… [were] not designed as a crash 
programme to fit in everything that is humanely possible before a sudden stop to nuclear tests as a 
whole.”90 Cook was complaining as early as late 1955 that the thermonuclear programme schedule 
“means compressing a three year development programme into just over a year.”91 The physical 
infrastructure at Aldermaston sometimes failed to keep pace with the programme. In letters to the 
Treasury requesting further facilities, the Materials division complained in December 1955 that as: 
“the staff of the Division has more than doubled in the last twelve months. Work is being carried out 
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in unsuitable temporary buildings scattered all over the establishment, and some processes (e.g. 
carbonyl plating) are being carried on under unsafe conditions. Even lecture rooms are being 
congested with laboratory work.”92  
The rush to deliver thermonuclear devices had consequences. In early 1956, it was 
suggested that inadequate thought was being devoted to safety features being implemented in new 
physics packages compared to that given to the problem leading up to Hurricane.93 This became 
evident with Violet Club, which was rushed into service and infamous upon delivery to the RAF: it 
had to be filled with ball bearings to prevent criticality accidents.94 Orange Herald, a boosted fission 
device, was described in safety terms as a “major difficulty” shortly before it was sent for testing on 
Christmas Island.95 While concerns over the safety of the Grapple devices were less prominent, 
progress reports repeatedly assert that further testing was needed to produce a “safer” device.96 
After Grapple X, a further document suggests that “two to three years” of testing were needed to 
differentiate between a “relatively safe” warhead for Blue Streak or Blue Steel, compared to a “safe” 
device.97 These flaws, combined with the superior efficiency of American designs likely contributed 
to the latter being chosen to equip Britain’s thermonuclear arsenal. Baylis and Stoddart go as far as 
to partially credit the failure of the first Grapple test to “pressure from the government” to beat the 
imposition of a test ban, which led AWRE to rush the process.98 
 The push to deliver material for AWRE’s programme was also not without incident. Most 
infamously, the production of tritium at Windscale was a significant factor in the 1957 fire, leaving 
Arnold to conclude that “Britain was not alone in taking risks under inexorable atomic pressure.”99 
Even at Aldermaston, an “accident at the lithium six deuteride building” in part credited to the pace 
of the effort, further “set back their programme.”100 According to Simpson, the thermonuclear 
programme also meant that “the acceleration of experimental work also let to a limited sacrifice of 
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stockpile numbers in favour of development devices” in the short term.101 However, as will be seen, 
rather than material or resources, the forced tempo of the programme placed the greatest strain on 
AWRE’s ability to expand as an organisation to cope with their new work. 
 
The State of AWRE: Growing Pains 
 
Multiple Tasks: Overburdened Establishment 
 
As the Churchill Conservative government edged towards a decision in favour of developing 
thermonuclear weapons in the latter half of 1954, the UKAEA had already started “considerable 
preliminary work…[with some] done before [the announcement].”102 At an AEX meeting on 18th 
March 1954, well before a definitive political decision had been made, Penney and the other leaders 
of the AEP discussed what would be required for a speculative delivery date for producing a 
hydrogen bomb in 1956.103 Preliminary measures that were to be implemented included securing 
supplies of and stockpiling tritium, deuterium and thorium, developing new implosion devices for 
primaries and acquiring new thermonuclear test sites. 104 According to Arnold and Pyne, this was a 
boon to the Weapons Establishment as by 1953, the establishment had struggled to establish a long 
term plan to sustain itself which was causing a perilous collapse in morale. 105 Penney, who had been 
considering leaving AWRE near the completion of the HER project, was once again tempted to 
search for an academic placement.106 
 Even with this preparatory work, AWRE’s task was formidable going into the thermonuclear 
programme as the requirements on the organisation were manifold and complex. Although new 
work would give a new impetus to the organisation, it added to the “already crushing programme” 
at AWRE.107 The complexity of the thermonuclear programme itself was exacerbated by the 
requirement of “contributing to the deterrent” at the earliest opportunity, thereby requiring the 
creation of an interim capability if thermonuclear efforts were halted by any arms control treaties.108 
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Therefore, the requirements from the military through the MoS to AWRE were to simultaneously 
fulfil multiple different operational requirements of warheads, ranging from improved fission 
devices (OR1127 – issued November 1953), interim megaton devices for gravity bombs (OR1136 – 
issued 1954), a megaton warhead for Blue Steel (OR1141 – issued 1954), a lightweight megaton 
warhead for Blue Streak (OR1142 – issued July 1955) and extremely lightweight fission warheads for 
tactical applications (OR1140 – issued June 1955).109 Fortunately, some of the research fulfilling 
operational requirements did have cross-applicability: lighter and more efficient fission devices 
served as better primaries and were fitted into later thermonuclear devices.110 
 AWRE’s task was also made harder by the organisation’s limitations in regards to their 
theoretical knowledge on thermonuclear weapon design, where “they would ‘start on a common 
level of ignorance’.”111 Some of the desirable requirements for a service for OR1141 were well 
beyond the scope of AWRE’s theoretical knowledge in 1955; ideally, a deployed service warhead had 
to weigh one ton and be immune to premature detonation caused by neutron radiation from a 
nearby nuclear explosion.112 Attaining these features would be no small task, given that these 
requirements were relatively advanced and that before Grapple, Britain’s knowledge of 
thermonuclear weapons remained “theoretical and unsupported by experimental evidence.”113 
AWRE’s limitations were also evident in that they also pursued until 1957 the concept of a ‘layer 
cake’ type thermonuclear device (referred to as Green Bamboo or ‘Type A’) at the same time as 
developing the Ulam-Teller two stage radiation compression configuration (referred to ‘Type B’ and 
Green Granite until the first Grapple series).114 While it had been intended to deliver a ‘Type A’ 
device as early as possible, getting the concept to work proved “much harder to get the 
thermonuclear side going than we had thought.”115 Due to uncertainties over how to proceed and 
time pressures, multiple paths were pursued simultaneously. Although beyond the scope of this 
thesis to provide a detailed technical history of weapons development (much of which remains 
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classified), this has served to illustrate the heavy burden of work imposed upon AWRE, beyond 
continuing to deliver upon Blue Danube devices.  
 
The First “Crisis” in Morale 
 
If the amount of work expected from Aldermaston had never been higher, the Weapons 
Establishment were also poorly placed to take it on. Arnold and Pyne claim that there was an 
ongoing “crisis” in Aldermaston from 1953 that was eventually stabilised by the leadership of 
Penney and Cook.116 According to their account, Aldermaston had not yet recovered from the 
stresses placed upon it from the HER programme and the Totem trials in 1954 as staff had been 
called to put in a tremendous and unsustainable effort to produce results.117 This position is 
vindicated by Penney who wrote in May 1954 that even the though the exertions had been heavy, 
“the morale of the non-industrial staff in AWRE…[had been at a] very high level… during the 
“Hurricane" and "Totem" trials,” but had since “steadily declined.”118 
 In testing this hypothesis, this thesis disputes the cause, duration and solution to the ‘crisis’ 
of morale that persisted at AWRE. The following section will present the readily acknowledge 
contemporary perception that the transition to the UKAEA created a significant “fear of the 
unknown” amongst many staff as they now perceived themselves to be exposed to the “icy blasts” 
of working conditions within a nationalised corporation.119 For example Penney noted in a May 1954 
memo that three of the four “reasons for the drop in morale” were due to issues pertaining to the 
foundation of the UKAEA.120 Arnold and Pyne credit the move to the UKAEA for creating “even more 
uncertainty and disruption” at Aldermaston but defer answering “whether the setting up of AEA at 
this stage was a wise, if difficult, measure to meet new circumstances and needs, or an untimely 
disruption at a critical period, is an interesting subject for discussion (but not here).”121 As will be 
seen, the transition to the UKAEA significantly exacerbated difficulties in recruitment and retention 
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of staff at a time where it was vital for AWRE to expand its strength. The following section will also 
make it clear that resolving the problem of morale in Aldermaston was both critical to the 
progression of the thermonuclear programme and that it involved a number of “expedients” and 
longer term policies.122 AWRE’s lingering inability to reach its full complement indicates that these 
problems persisted throughout the thermonuclear programme.123 It will be argued that the promise 
of diversified work at the establishment was used to stabilise the morale at AWRE rather than the 
personal leadership of Penney or Cook. However, diversification was never satisfactorily delivered 
upon, which would have important future consequences for AWRE. 
 
The UKAEA and Failure to Improve Retention 
 
When Cherwell spearheaded the initiative to reform the UK’s nuclear programme into the 
UKAEA, he did it on the basis that the scientific civil service had failed to deliver results promptly 
compared to Soviet Russia or the United States.124 He believed that the transition to a nationalised 
corporation would allow for greater institutional freedom in resolving employment issues, thereby 
attracting more qualified individuals who would accelerate progress.125 In practice, when AWRE was 
moved to the UKAEA in 1954, it generated problems of its own. The transition towards the UKAEA 
had the most profound effect on junior white paper grades at AWRE as their employment conditions 
had significantly changed, without those affected giving their approval to the move. As the shift to 
the UKAEA was a measure imposed on the former MoS scientists, staff were provided an ‘option 
period’ wherein they retained the right to swap back into the scientific civil service until February 
1956.126 This imposed further uncertainty on the Weapons Establishment as management was 
unsure of who would remain, and by extension, who would have to be recruited to fill vacated 
roles.127 Understandably, Penney complained that “it is extremely difficult to plan the programme of 
the Establishment when we do not know how many of the present staff will leave.”128 It was 
therefore recognised by the UKAEA that “the greater need [than recruitment at mid and low levels] 
is to ensure continuity by keeping as many as possible of the existing staff, particularly the scientists, 
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engineers and technicians. To the extent we are unable to do so, then the greater our recruitment 
problems.”129 
However, rather than tangible differences between conditions in the scientific civil service 
and UKAEA, Penney noted that the subsequent crisis in morale was perhaps “more emotional than 
rational” due to a breakdown of trust between staff and senior administrators.130 This meant that 
when some verbal assurances to the staff were made by the UKAEA that any negative consequences 
would be minimised, it appears that they were rejected due to the prevailing sense of mistrust 
between staff and the executive. 131 Whatever the reality of new conditions under the new UKAEA, 
staff disquiet with the situation was sufficient for Penney to believe in June 1954 “that a dangerous 
percentage of his staff might not accept Authority terms of employment.”132 Trust in the new 
authority was especially important for staff working at Fort Halstead or Woolwich Arsenal, as they 
were being asked to uproot themselves and their families to Aldermaston to unclear working 
conditions and questionable employment stability.133 An additional and somewhat justified fear was 
that further changes to the conditions of staff at the UKAEA would be imposed upon them in the 
future, so protestations had to be made now to make it clear that this would be unacceptable.134 The 
disgruntlement amongst certain sections of staff with the situation was such that Penney memoed 
Plowden in January 1955, stating that “the main threat to the "scientific", in contrast to the 
"political", success of the 1956 trials lies in the disaffection of the electronics teams at Fort 
Halstead.”135 
 Perhaps the obvious solution would have been to increase salaries for all AWRE staff in 
compensation for any perceived loss in benefits for being removed from the civil service. Despite the 
immense resources that would be devoted to the thermonuclear programme, significant wage 
increases were not an acceptable solution to central government; inflation and wage spiralling were 
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already damaging the UK economy and there was a push for wage “stabilisation.”136 As the transition 
to the UKAEA came with no appreciable increase in funding, any shifts in the levels of wages for 
particular grades was a zero sum game: an increase for senior staff meant a relative decrease for 
junior grades. The logic for this had been that the UKAEA’s “most urgent problem…[was] to ensure 
the retention of… existing senior staff and to secure an adequate supply of high level staff from 
Industry and elsewhere” where they were paid comparatively more.137 While this had the intended 
effect of retaining senior scientists within the UKAEA, it was a cause for disgruntlement amongst 
other junior ranks.138 Due to the protestations of the remaining scientific civil service, a further 
constraint placed upon the UKAEA was that pay “in respect of all save top-level posts” was linked to 
that of the civil service, meaning that junior pay couldn’t be increased even if there had been the will 
to do so.139 
Transition to the UKAEA also undermined certain benefits that made a career in the 
scientific civil service attractive. Even when staff were offered an immediate salary increase of 7% 
for transferring to the UKAEA, it translated in real terms to a pay increase “of only about 0.6%” when 
factoring in the loss of generous pension contributions.140 This was perceived as providing “derisory 
recompense for various disadvantageous features of employment under the Authority.”141 The 
effects of poor financial compensation were especially acute as the scientific civil service provided a 
great amount of flexibility for scientists who could transfer to different departments and research 
projects when there were open vacancies.142 
Another protection offered by the scientific civil service was that it offered protection 
against “abolition of office,” meaning “considerable efforts” would be made to find alternative work 
before “pensioning them off.”143 The lack of these two benefits led to concerns being expressed by 
AWRE staff who were considering transfer to the UKAEA of being left workless by future arms 
control treaties.144 Penney noted at a meeting of the AEX in May 1954 that “The popular outcry for 
the banning of atomic and super weapons [was] resulting in a feeling of impermanence.” 145 This 
observation was shared by the Lord President of the Council, who stated in September 1954 that 
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“staff are apprehensive that an international agreement banning or curtailing work on weapons 
would lead to redundancy.”146 A particular concern for certain staff at the Weapons Establishment 
was that their work was more similar to that conducted by the MoS in other armament projects.147 
From an individual’s career perspective, it would be foolhardy to remain at AWRE rather than 
transfer back to the wider civil service, where there would be a greater chance of future work – a 
factor that was acknowledged and needed to be countered according to the UKAEA.148 The 
outspoken Fort Halstead union representatives demanded that “some channel back to the Civil 
Service must be kept open.”149 
The UKAEA’s initial attempt to assuage staff fears in 1954 was by stressing “redundancy is 
just about as likely as it was in the railway business a century ago” and that they could be found jobs 
within the rest of the UKAEA, given that Aldermaston’s infrastructure would be useful for continued 
civil research.150 While this implied a pledge of other employment in the authority, it appears that 
the concerned staff simply did not accept this as sufficient. 151 When reassuring statements failed, 
multiple initiatives were discussed as part of plans to further assuage these fears from mid-1954 to 
February 1956. These included approaching the MoS to attempt to obtain a commitment that if 
UKAEA staff were made redundant, particularly those from the weapons groups with speciality tacit 
knowledge based skills (now terming themselves “weaponeers”), they would be readmitted into the 
scientific civil service.152 Rather than the MoS, it appears that this proposal seems to have been 
ultimately vetoed by the Treasury.153 An alternative suggestion was that the UKAEA should offer the 
guarantee that all AWRE staff transferred over would have employment guaranteed until they were 
60. This was proposed in the expectation that even in the case of nuclear disarmament, few would 
be unable to be transferred to alternative work. 154 Penney offered an alternative suggestion at an 
AEX meeting in June 1954 that the government should make “a policy statement from the 
Government as to its future use for atomic weapons [as it] would be helpful in allaying fears of the 
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staff.”155 This is a clear example of an institutional interest attempting to influence the government’s 
declaratory nuclear weapon policy to further its own interests.156  
Other ideas discussed between mid-1954 and January 1955, but ultimately discounted, 
included offering a flat 10% pay increase or an upfront monetary award for those joining the 
UKAEA.157 The AEX also considered seconding scientists directly from the MoS back into AWRE in the 
crucial run up to trials.158 This was rejected by Penney due to the “discontentment” it would 
introduce to have some staff working in (rather than for) AWRE on scientific civil service 
conditions.159 In the interim, a measure implemented to improve the retention of staff was to simply 
request that the MoS did not attempt to recruit staff from AWRE during their option period.160 The 
final arrangement agreed before the option deadline passed in February 1956 with the Treasury was 
that any staff made redundant by the UKAEA would be “provide[d] the opportunity of return to the 
Civil Service if a suitable post can be made available.”161  
 A concurrent process that further emphasised the importance of retention was a growing 
awareness amongst AWRE’s workers of their own perceived embodied tacit knowledge. This 
hypothesis is evidenced by the emergence of the term ‘weaponeers.’ Although the term is present in 
the official history of this period, the account does not note this as a new development.162 However, 
the primary sources explicitly note that the term ‘weaponeer’ emerged during industrial disputes 
between AWRE staff and the UKAEA administration. Select industrials with specialist nuclear 
weapons skills that did not have clear application in the civil sector began to self-identify as 
“weaponeers” to emphasis their value to the establishment based on their embodied experience.163 
This proved problematic in the transition to the UKAEA as “these “weaponeers” consider that they 
have a wider scope for their talents in the MoS research establishments than in the atomic energy 
authority.”164 This term was strongly contested however as it was perceived by its detractors as 
being used to leverage special privileges (either increased pay or stronger guarantees of continuing 
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employment) for AWRE workers that were denied to other UKAEA staff.165 For example, a July 1954 
memo by Perrott reports that a non-AWRE UKAEA staff member “represented very strongly” that 
the case of the “weaponeers” was overblown and that they were “by no means so much of a 
specialist as had been argued.”166 The “discrimination in favour of AWRE” was apparently generating 
significant resentment from the rest of the UKAEA staff, which is unsurprising given that serious 
consideration was being given to a flat 10% pay raise for AWRE non-industrials above the rest of 
other UKAEA departments.167 Even if disputed, the first clear claim to tacit knowledge made by 
AWRE staff stemmed from the interlinked processes of the high work load of the thermonuclear 
programme and the morale ‘crisis’ under the UKAEA. Although based in temporal circumstances of 
AWRE in the 1950s, satisfying the ‘weaponeers’ belief in the longevity of their profession proved a 
long standing and pernicious issue.  
 
Recruitment: Struggling to Expand 
 
 In July 1954, discussions in cabinet optimistically proposed that “if further scientists could be 
recruited, this additional production [of hydrogen bombs] could be undertaken without serious 
disruption of [the] existing programme for the manufacture of atomic weapons.”168 Therefore, even 
disregarding replacing the losses from staff who stayed within the civil service, the feasibility of the 
hydrogen bomb programme was predicated on significantly expanding staffing levels at AWRE.169 
However, this proposal seemed to diverge from the reality of recruitment for Aldermaston. During 
the HER programme, AWRE’s recruitment of scientists had been a perpetual problem and this had 
remained unresolved by the end of 1953: a 16th December meeting noted that “despite intensive 
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recruitment efforts… [Penney’s] strength was still some 70 or so short of the ceiling of [the] 510 
[complement] required.”170 
 If recruitment of staff for Aldermaston had always been difficult, then the transition to the 
UKAEA was perceived to have made the task even harder. In late May 1954, Penney complained that 
there had been a “drop in morale, partly associated with the transfer to AEA, [and that it] should 
come at a time when large additions to the already crushing programme of the Establishment are 
being contemplated… it [is] quite clear that AWRE cannot meet a big addition to its programme 
without more staff.”171 This ‘drop in morale’ also meant to Penney that “we shall… certainly continue 
to have the greatest difficulty in recruiting new staff.”172 In November 1954, Donald Perrott noted 
that the strength for scientific staff at Aldermaston had only increased by 2% that year “despite 
sustained efforts.”173 This situation was clearly not compatible with prompt delivery of devices for 
thermonuclear tests.174 In January 1955, Penney acknowledged the reality that the intended 
expansion of strength for white paper grades “from 507 to 668” (a 32% increase) for AWRE “would 
get nowhere near this target unless a real inducement was added.”175 It should also be noted that 
Penney acknowledged in a May 1954 report that continual recruitment was the reality for 
Aldermaston where staff wastage was “10% per year [even] before the drop in morale.”176 In 
October 1954, an AWRE official messaged the MoS acknowledging that “it is proving difficult to keep 
pace with wastage, let alone to build up the increased staff necessary if it is to meet its 
programme.”177 
 In terms of the underlying issues with recruitment, many of the same problems that had 
inhibited recruitment during the HER programme continued to restrict AWRE’s ability from 1954 
onwards. Notable among these was the UKAEA’s inability to substantially diverge from established 
Ministry of Labour or civil service pay rates (except at the most senior levels).178 This was combined 
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with what Cherwell recognised as “a genuine dislike of AWRE work, both on account of its intrinsic 
[dangerous] character and of the secrecy.”179 When these factors were combined with the perceived 
impermanence of the UKAEA, it is unsurprising that Aldermaston faced recruitment issues.180 
Dealing with wastage, meagre recruitment and the need to rapidly expand left Aldermaston 
with a problem across most grades, both for industrial and non-industrial employment. This was 
recognised as an issue in February 1955 when rather than scientists, “one of the limiting factors in 
the balanced growth of Aldermaston may lie in the local scarcity of unskilled… industrials.”181 For 
example, as with during the HER programme, national shortages of draughtsmen meant “service 
rates do not enable us [AWRE] to recruit and retain sufficient basic grade draughtsmen in 
competition with private industry.”182 One of the key problems in obtaining labour was that local 
contractor rates were several pence higher per hour.183 Lack of labour was reportedly having serious 
implications for the progress of work: the Chief Engineer reported in July 1954 that although he had 
“ample facilities,” work was being delayed due to a lack of manpower which “he could employ 
almost immediately.”184 Such issues were partially alleviated by offering “X” rates of pay: the band 
offered for dangerous work involving “chemical and/or explosive work.”185 Although this didn’t 
entirely close the pay gap between AWRE and the wider private sector, other incentives, such as 
subsidised housing and a wider work portfolio helped to mitigate the issue. 186 
 
Social Solutions for Technical Results 
Offering Additional Housing 
 
 If AWRE was to deliver results from the thermonuclear programme before halted by a test 
ban, improving staff recruitment and retention was essential. Not only was an expanded workforce 
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necessary, but it needed to keep its current skilled staff to train the incoming cohort. As during the 
fission programme, the most immediately available solution was increasing the amount of housing 
available to be offered to staff. As Arnold and Pyne note, a significant attraction of joining AWRE’s 
staff as a married man was that it “offered the added advantage of a house, at a time when housing 
was scarce.”187 Single men and lower grades were offered either lodging allowances or hostel 
accommodation.188 AWRE’s “first and major commitment in so far as housing is concerned” was 
providing for staff expected to move to Aldermaston from Fort Halstead or Woolwich Arsenal. 189 As 
many of the staff being transferred were still in their option period, being able to offer housing 
promptly was a practical necessity if they were to be retained. Building housing also allowed AWRE 
to attract more workers into the area, which was proving necessary “as we [AWRE] exhaust still 
further the resources of local recruitment.” 190 While pay from AWRE struggled to be competitive 
with the private sector for many grades (even with “X” rates), being able to offer housing was seen 
as a sufficient lure to offset this disadvantage and enable national recruitment campaigns.191 Even as 
housing supply improved after WW2, offering subsidised housing was still vital to offset the allure of 
the buoyant employment market in London.192 As a result, although 350 houses had been built and 
occupied by AWRE by 1955, a further 400 were under construction and another 400 were planned 
and awaiting approval.193 Although the approved ceiling for new house construction was set at 1500, 
AWRE pushed for this to be raised to 1900 in February 1955 to accommodate the increasing staff 
levels now required by the thermonuclear programme.194 
The problem became that the need to provide housing became ever more acute as 
Aldermaston needed to expand in order to deliver for the Grapple tests.195 As local labour became 
insufficient to fulfil AWRE’s needs, more unskilled labour had to be ‘imported’ into the area, which 
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placed further demands on housing. 196 In addition hostels proved an unsatisfactory long term 
solution for single men as higher grade staff demanded flats instead.197 In turn it was recognised by 
1957 that the building work itself (both of flats, amenities, houses and facilities in Aldermaston) was 
becoming self-perpetuating as contractors had to house “their imported employees” while the 
Aldermaston site continued to expand.198 This was an issue that AWRE never adequately solved as 
the problem expanded and waiting times remained considerable. 199 For example, in 1958, the 
waiting time for housing was 12-15 months so there was consideration put towards “restricting 
houses to scarcity classes” only.200 
 Although clearly a continuing cause for concern during this period, housing never appears to 
have become so acute as to entirely threaten recruitment. Nevertheless, at certain periods, lack of 
housing appears to have been the limiting factor to Aldermaston’s expansion and thereby 
progression to the Grapple tests. For example, a letter from Admiral Brooking to Donald Perrot 
complained that the “lengthy wait [9 months] is having a most unfortunate effect on our 
recruitment programme and moreover we are losing a steady drain of skilled men who cannot 
afford to maintain their families elsewhere.”201 In the end, “the housing programme at 
Aldermaston…[which progressed at] high speed” was eventually judged to provide sufficient 
authority housing, even if there was an extended waiting period.202 Nevertheless, the provision of 
housing posed considerable managerial demands upon AWRE as they were tasked with supporting 
the community that they had fostered. In practical terms, this meant provisioning schools, shops, 
churches, transport, medical services, etc. for the housing estates serving Aldermaston.203 As this had 
to be subsidised with public money, the Treasury sometimes proved a reluctant partner in the 
endeavour, with prevarications on approving spending meaning “valuable months were lost at the 
close of 1953” in building housing stock.204 AWRE also received little support from local authorities. 
Their disassociation from AWRE’s community building was “aggravated by the fact that the County 
boundary goes through our housing area,” resulting in neither taking direction over the situation.205 
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Given housing’s importance to recruitment (and the capacity that it drew from AWRE’s senior 
management), it is perhaps surprising the lack of help provided by either central or local government 
in coordinating the local community that emerged to support AWRE.206 
 
Conditions During Testing 
 
 The other area in which accommodation was an issue was for maintaining staff morale at 
the nuclear test sites in the South Pacific. Cook complained on 16th October 1957 “that the 
treatment at Christmas Island of the 30-40 junior AWRE staff was so bad as to jeopardise future 
trials.”207 Poor conditions included flu outbreaks, dysentery, swarms of flies, crabs, rats and ants, 
torrential rain, flooding and tropical heat on men kept in tents.208 Nevertheless, funding was not 
forthcoming for more permanent housing structures to improve conditions.209 After the Grapple X 
test in November 1957, an AWRE paper complained that “the health of the personnel who will have 
to stay on Christmas Island alone demands better accommodation than tentage.”210 It was noted 
that “accommodation for civilians at Christmas Island during the November operation had been poor 
and the AWRE would not be able to obtain the necessary staff for the March [1958] operation unless 
an improvement was made.”211 While AWRE wanted to improve conditions for its staff as a matter 
of priority, it was realised that this would be impractical unless conditions for the servicemen on the 
island also improved.212 More money was committed in late 1957 for improvements but the 
continuing poor conditions on Christmas Island led to two debates in Parliament in early 1958, which 
further highlighted the issue to the public.213 According to Arnold and Pyne, the new money 
committed in 1957 only covered “minimum repairs and improvements”; a request for an $800 ice 
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machine to combat tropical heat “was ruled out by Whitehall as too expensive.”214 Although not 
enough to halt tests, the true reprieve for those serving (either in the forces or with AWRE) was the 
halt to British nuclear atmospheric testing in the South Pacific in 1958.215 
 
Role of William Cook: Improved Management? 
 
 As highlighted as one of the hypotheses to be tested in this chapter, a factor highlighted by 
Arnold and Pyne in allowing AWRE to recover from its ‘crisis’ of morale in 1953 was William Cook’s 
co-leadership with William Penney.216 This section will therefore attempt to provide an assessment 
of Cook’s contribution as Deputy Director of AWRE during the thermonuclear programme. With the 
limited available archival material on the issue, it will find that rather than instituting a cultural 
change to British nuclear weapons development, Cook’s greatest contribution at AWRE was acting as 
a stabilising managerial influence when it was most needed for the programme. 
Cook’s established prowess as a scientific administrator was well known to Penney even 
before Cook joined the AWRE in September 1954. Penney had already attempted to recruit Cook as 
Aldermaston’s deputy in 1950, but this request had been bluntly refused by the Admiralty, from 
whom “he could not be spared.”217 Instead, Vice-Admiral Patrick Brooking was employed as 
Penney’s assistant, but was a “complement to Penney, rather than a substitute.”218 However, with 
the thermonuclear programme looming in late 1953-1954, the issue of appointing a Deputy Director 
“to share the load with Penney” returned to prominence.219 Contrary to Cook’s Royal Society 
biography and Arnold and Pyne’s official history, Oikonomou notes that it is unclear from the 
available archival material whether Penney willingly accepted that he needed a deputy at all at least 
by the end of 1953.220 Even if Penney did acknowledge his need for a deputy, Cook was only one of 
several (and potentially third choice) potential candidates to fill the role.221 
 
214 Arnold and Pyne, (2001), p.169 
215 Ibid., p.219. Minor trials (permitted under the testing moratorium) continued at Maralinga until 1967.  
216 Ibid., p.78 & p.81-82 
217 Cathcart, (1994), 264.8/673 
218 Ibid., 264.8/673. Brooking’s role was changed after the appointment of Cook to liaise with Whitehall and 
the Chiefs of Staff. TNA, AB41/514, Items 2, 3 and 4 of AEX 11th Meeting, 17/06/1954 
219 Penney and Macklen, (1987), p.50 
220 Oikonomou, (2011), p.121, Arnold and Pyne, (2001), p.77 & Penney and Macklen, (1987), p.49 




Despite Penney’s potential misgivings about anyone’s ability to fulfil the role of his deputy, 
Cook is given credit by multiple secondary sources for his work between 1954-1958 in reforming 
Aldermaston’s management and his personal contributions to the successful outcome of the 
thermonuclear project. 222 For instance, according to Arnold and Pyne, Cook’s main contributions to 
Aldermaston that enabled the successful completion of the bomb programme was instigating a 
cultural “transformation.”223 Prior to Cook, Arnold and Pyne suggest that a combination of security 
measures, the physical geography of the Aldermaston site and Penney’s style of personally 
overseeing many technical aspects meant that information became heavily compartmentalised and 
withheld on the “need to know principle.”224 They further add that Penney withheld information 
from fellow scientists as “he thought…[the data] too secret to share or because he did not realize 
their value to them.”225 This reportedly changed with Cook’s foundation of the Weapon 
Development Policy Committee in April 1956 which is claimed to have greatly assisted information 
sharing.226 
 As Oikonomou observes, verifying Cook’s contributions and impact from 1954-1958 is 
challenging as files pertaining to many technical developments of AWRE’s work remain classified.227 
Given the paucity of information, it would be difficult to challenge the weight of secondary material 
that praises Cook’s role, but some further comments are possible based on the available archival 
material. Regarding information sharing at Aldermaston, while the Weapon Development Policy 
Committee may have solved the problem for senior scientists, issues clearly remained. Charlie 
Martin, an Aldermaston scientists chiefly concerned with developing initiators wrote in November 
1959 that junior white paper grades still retained “only… the vaguest knowledge” of general 
weapons design concepts.228 This was reportedly due to the continuing strict application of the ‘need 
to know’ principle implemented after the “extensive security clamp down” after 1947; presumably 
as a result of the espionage activities of Fuchs and Maclean.229 This culture of secrecy apparently 
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starkly contrasted with Martin’s experience at the US Laurence laboratories, where young scientific 
grades were familiar with “the current [sic] ideas” on weapons design.230 
This sentiment for the need for nuclear weapons education for young scientists was shared 
with A.R. Bryant who further stated that the “most valuable thing the "old hands" can do at the 
present stage is to make sure that the new generation can in fact stand on their shoulders.”231 The 
solution proposed, that was accepted by Claude Pelley, was for a lecture and fast track training 
scheme for junior scientists to educate them on the history of weapons design. 232 Therefore it is 
clear that although Cook may have contributed to information sharing at a senior level, cultural 
problems remained, based on the ‘need to know’ principle at Aldermaston. The ongoing effect of the 
presiding culture was perceived to be significant enough as worth highlighting and reforming after 
1958. As will be seen in the next chapter, the perceived need to retain the elite senior scientists who 
were reportedly vital to sustain the viability of the establishment would dictate AWRE’s push for 
further nuclear work in the 1960s. Had junior scientists more freely enjoyed in the accumulation of 
knowledge and experience accrued in this period of high activity for AWRE, it is open to speculation 
whether AWRE would have asserted its ongoing fragility in the 1960s.  
 While the above challenges Cook’s ability to entirely reform Aldermaston’s culture during his 
tenure as Deputy Director, other pieces of archival material attest to the importance of his 
organisational skills. In a note to the Prime Minister dated 16th April 1958, Plowden details how the 
UKAEA had been “forced” to move Cook “to the Industrial group of the authority.”233 This came 
shortly after the Windscale fire in 1957 and as Oikonomou states, was presumably due to the need 
for “a strong managerial hand to head the Authority’s Industrial side, following…[Britain’s] first 
nuclear accident.”234 If that were not evidence enough for the UKAEA’s faith in Cook, the memo 
states how Cook’s services were partially seconded back to the Weapons Group to speed up the 
Grapple Z series of tests. In an April 1958 memo to the Prime Minister, it is conveyed that by “re-
arranging” and “dropping” some work, in combination “with the additional help…[Penney] now can 
get from Sir William Cook,” the test time table could be moved forward by two months.235 The 
essential role of Cook was restated in Atomic Weapons Trials Executive meeting minutes where it is 
noted that “to assist in this acceleration Sir William Cook had been loaned to AWRE from the AEA 
 
230 Ibid., 
231 TNA, ES1/1323, Problem of the “Need to Know” Principle, 26/11/1959 
232 TNA, ES1/1323, The Problem of Dissemination of Secret and Top Secret Information Amongst Junior 
Scientific Staff, 18/11/1959 & TNA, ES15/5, AWRE Management Committee Minutes, 23/03/1958 
233 TNA, DEFE7/923, Plowden to Prime Minister, 16/04/1958 
234 Oikonomou, (2011), p.123 




headquarters.”236 Having a competent deputy was especially important during the thermonuclear 
tests, as Cook’s physical presence in the South Pacific allowed authoritative decisions to be made on 
site.237 
 
Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude from the available archival information that Penney 
and the UKAEA relied on Cook to act as the Authority’s managerial ‘firefighter.’ While the specifics of 
his actions and measures remain unclear beyond what is provided in the official history, this 
supplementary evidence lends credence to his organisational abilities. Cook’s ability to deploy his 
reportedly “logical step by step method and… [refusal] to be panicked into a more pragmatic 
approach” could also not have come at a better time for AWRE.238 This became progressively more 
important as Arnold and Pyne note that after the failure of the first Grapple series, “Cook took a 
more personal grip on the H-bomb work as Penney took less part in it.”239 His success in driving 
AWRE progress forward from 1957-1958 with the looming pressure of a test ban likely merits the 
praise he received from his contemporaries, summed up by McIntyre who states that “the general 
feeling at AWRE was that the H-bomb could not have been achieved without Cook’s direction.”240 
 
Diversification: Technical Solutions to Social Problems 
 
 While providing housing and temporary pay increases was a method to attract staff in the 
short term, “the long term [solution]… to his [Penney’s] staffing problems” was to provide a 
diversified work portfolio for AWRE.241 Diversification meant transferring non-weapons work (from 
other UKAEA establishments or creating new work entirely) to AWRE: this less secretive work would 
potentially be less classified, possibly allowing AWRE scientists to publish for peer review and have 
less onerous security measures placed upon them.242 Diversification was explicitly linked with its 
intended “morale effect on staff and to ease the switch from weapons if such a change is ever 
required” as a result of an arms control treaty.243 It was also recognised that there may be a limited 
amount of work in the future: resolution of “the important developments being completed within 3 - 
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4 years” were hypothesised as being able to prevent AWRE from continuing “with a character of its 
own.”244 As a potential solution to the aforementioned crisis in morale that had been lingering since 
the transition to the UKAEA, Penney became convinced that diversification was the solution from 
late 1954 onwards.245 Following an AEX meeting held on the 13th January 1955 which agreed on 
diversifying AWRE’s research, Penney proclaimed that this “policy will have far reaching 
consequences.”246 Penney believed that “the broadening of the work in AWRE will gradually improve 
recruitment, will lower losses and may swing some present staff who intend to re-join the civil 
service into the AEA.”247 Such was Penney’s belief that diversification was the answer to the morale 
problem at Aldermaston that he preferred pursuing that course of action even at the expense of pay 
increases. 248 
 Rather than immediately providing an alternative stream of work, diversification was initially 
more of an effort to reassure staff, rather than provide a true alternative to weapons work. As 
envisaged by Penney in early 1955, only “a proportion of 10% on work outside the secret weapons 
field would be a reasonable aim.”249 This was projected at around “50-60” scientists being “allocated 
to this work.”250 Given the burden of work already imposed upon AWRE by the thermonuclear 
programme, this is unsurprising as few staff could be spared. Nevertheless, any diversion of staff 
away from their core work was seen as problematic and “might affect the programme.”251 This 
remained the case in the run up to Grapple; Cook acknowledged on 5th December 1956 that there 
was “very little allowance” for diverting staff towards a diversified research programme.252 
Nevertheless, “the Executive recognised… in the long run the balance of advantage clearly lay with 
the agreed policy [of diversification].”253 
 Penney’s first preference for the work that Aldermaston would take on was for a British 
designed naval reactor.254 In a letter dated 8th March 1955, Penney expressed Aldermaston’s need 
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for the work, despite “the severe load in addition to the very high priority weapons work.”255 Military 
related work was preferable as “we feel that Aldermaston should be the Services establishment.”256 
However, despite attempting to use Cook’s naval connections to secure the programme, by 16th May 
1955, Penney was forced to concede that AWRE was unable to develop naval reactors unless a delay 
in delivery was acceptable.257 The Admiralty could not accept this as they viewed the programme as 
“urgent”: the US already had their first nuclear powered submarine conducting tests and the Soviets 
were not far behind.258 Several years had already been lost by Harwell insisting on their favoured gas 
cooled reactor solution.259 While leaving the decision up to the UKAEA, the Admiralty expressed 
their “misgivings” in giving the project to the AWRE, fearful of further delays. This appears to have 
prompted Plowden into “re-examining the whole question,” eventually leaving the project with 
Harwell.260 
 With naval reactors effectively removed as an option, the alternative project was for AWRE 
to develop small ‘package’ reactors for army and air force use.261 Unfortunately, low demand 
resulting from an unclear use case kept the idea in a suspended state: not progressing, but not being 
cancelled either. This indecisiveness with the potential programme was expressed in 1955 with both 
“the specification for this reactor together with operational restrictions on design… not yet [being] 
clear.”262 As no operational requirements were forthcoming by April 1956, Penney complained that 
“so far there had been no clear indication of what the reactor was wanted for.”263 Nevertheless, 
AWRE completed a preliminary study in August 1956 for the MoD looking at various costs associated 
with the potential programme for a rocket, aircraft and army reactor, estimating it would cost £10 
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commitment by the services or establishing a firm need for such a reactor remained elusive, 
prompting Penney to write to Plowden in April 1958 of the need to have some reactor work or 
otherwise face “steadily decreasing morale and an increasing rate of loss of staff.”265 Although not 
fully realised in this period, diversification was an initial foray in attempting to resolve what Penney 
clearly realised would be a perennial problem at AWRE. The supply of nuclear weapons work alone 
would not be consistent over time and therefore a way of providing additional research programmes 
was required.  
 
The Cycle Resets: AWRE’s Second Morale Crisis 
 
Even though diversification was held as the solution to AWRE’s long term stability as an 
institution, what work this would compose of and when it would be provided were questions that 
were continually deferred. This became ever more pressing when in the midst of Grapple Y being 
concluded successfully and hasty preparations being made for Grapple Z before the test ban, the 
Macmillan government was able to reach agreement on the US–UK Mutual Defence Agreement by 
July 1958.266 Under the agreement, technical cooperation on nuclear weapons was encouraged 
between the two countries. As strengthening UK-US cooperation had been an objective of 
Conservative Party nuclear weapons policy, Harold Macmillan hailed the end of the McMahon act as 
“the great prize.”267 While Macmillan wrote a letter to Plowden crediting the American’s new found 
willingness to cooperate due to the progress made by Aldermaston, such cooperation would 
inevitably come at the expense of AWRE’s independent research and development efforts.268 Even 
as the agreement was being approved in July 1958, Penney was writing to Plowden that “the US/UK 
Bilateral Agreement and a possible international agreement to suspend trials, may well cause us to 
reverse our direction [of expanding AWRE], and begin a rundown of staff.”269 Due to the greater 
maturity of American weapon designs, it was decided between September and October 1958 that 
AWRE would produce an anglicised version of the American Mark 28 warhead (rather than any of 
the indigenously developed thermonuclear Grapple devices).270 The immediate need for further 
 
265 TNA, AB16/3362, Penney to Powell, 18/06/1958 
266 Unfortunately, the stages leading to the agreement are beyond the scope of this thesis but are covered by 
Walker, (2010) 
267 Macmillan, (1971), p.323 
268 Ibid., p.564-564 
269 TNA, AB16/3362, Penney to Powell, 18/06/1958 




nuclear tests or plans to develop an indigenous 500lb warhead were therefore rendered moot.271 In 
terms of reassuring the staff, Penney issued a statement transmitted across the AWRE that 
guaranteed that “steps will be taken by the Atomic Energy Authority to make full use of our staff and 
the magnificent facilities which we possess. There is a vast amount of work to be done over a wide 
field in the Authority’s Civil Programme.”272 
The Treasury had hoped to make quick savings at AWRE by reducing the work force as the 
establishment’s requirements for research would be lessened as they would now be producing 
copies of American designs.273 This was not the case as recreating localised versions of American 
weapons proved challenging: according to the official history, variations in materials and measuring 
standards had to be resolved to overcome the “extremely small variations…[which] could have 
significant effects on a product as unforgiving as a nuclear weapon.”274 Moore highlights how a less 
sensitive explosive was used in British variants due to differing risk tolerances.275 The role of 
interpersonal exchange in the transmission of tacit knowledge is highlighted by how many 
outstanding production issues were only resolved with the initiation of “stock-take” Joint Working 
Groups (JOWOGs) meetings between American and British weaponeers, that started in April 1959 
and have continued to the present.276 
The effort by the Treasury to reduce staffing at Aldermaston due to the receipt of American 
information was averted by a swift lobbying effort by Plowden and Penney in November 1958.277 
Plowden stressed that although American knowledge took Britain “as far as we need go along the 
nuclear weapons road,” the agreement “imposes upon us a moral obligation to pursue further 
research.”278 As a result, AWRE was saved from an immediate cut and instead received a further £10 
million for research; as Penney had argued, “the logical consequence is that we must have in the 
Weapons Group the facilities required to enable us to do whatever part of the work we agree with 
the U.S. should be done by us.”279  
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In addition to financial pressure, Aldermaston was facing increasingly vociferous protests 
from disarmament organisations. In 1958, Macklen complained that AWRE was feeling “somewhat 
isolated” with the lack of government support in the face of protests.280 In 1959, the Campaign for 
Nuclear Disarmament started annual marches from Aldermaston to London. 281 Although staff and 
union representatives denied that protests “had any noticeable effect on the morale of the 
establishment,” Penney was forced to reply to protest representatives.282 In June 1960, “staff at 
Aldermaston [raised to UKAEA administrators] the question of the future of the site in the event of 
political changes of policy.”283 Popular pressure within Aldermaston had led to the foundation of the 
“Penney Committee” which had been tasked to examine potential future work for potential 
redundancies.284 The fear of political decisions quickly removing work was not an irrational fear: the 
Labour party adopted unilateral nuclear disarmament as a policy position at their party conference 
in October 1960 before it was overturned the next year.285  
Rather than immediately contracting, AWRE continued to expand beyond 1958 “to meet 
urgent but short-term weapons programme needs.”286 The demands of anglicisation meant that 
total staff figures for March 1958 stood at 8273 but reached 8621 by August 1960. 287 The 
sustainability of this situation was a source of concern amongst senior AWRE figures.288 A 1959 
AWRE management paper noted that “from the [perspective of] staff morale alone, the oft reported 
assurance that ‘either work will be found’ is wearing thin, particularly in view of the failure of past 
attempts to diversify the programme.”289 The paper presses that there needed to be “an adequate 
solution to this problem… the Authority must, after consultation with the MoD, made [sic - make] 
appropriate provision in their forward planning for the utilisation of AWRE staff and facilities.”290 
This clearly highlights the dormant morale problems at the establishment related to diversification: if 
staffing levels were at an all-time high only to meet immediate needs, AWRE appeared likely to 
contract in the future unless further development work could be found. 291 
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 This chapter has traced several interlinked processes that led AWRE from one crisis of 
retaining skills to another. Although initially a boon, the first factor in this cycle was the considerable 
political commitment behind Britain’s thermonuclear programme. This meant that AWRE received 
all the resources that it needed to fast track completion of a megaton test. This was essential given 
that the prospect of an internationally agreed testing moratorium prompted the programme to be 
carried out at a tempo faster than intended. The urgency of the effort meant that significant 
investments were made to ensure that retention and recruitment of staff was improved between 
1954 and 1958. This was to the extent that the Treasury had difficulty providing oversight over 
spending at Aldermaston. While considerable political support mobilised in favour of the agent’s 
interests should have been the ideal conditions to operate under, AWRE’s rapid expansion created 
severe long-term knowledge management issues as it meant that the organisation had to 
significantly expand in a brief period.  
As raised by some secondary sources, contemporary documents concur that AWRE’s 
expansion intersected with and was further complicated by the recent transition to the UKAEA. 
Regardless of any long-term benefits, the timing of the transition assisted in the creation of a morale 
crisis wherein AWRE required extraordinary measures to retain staff with the perceived essential 
skills and knowledge necessary to conduct the thermonuclear project.  
Through a combination of these two processes, a major social development amongst staff at 
Aldermaston occurred. Conditions emerging from the 1954 morale crisis meant that contemporaries 
began to recognise their own (if disputed) tacit knowledge. Select staff with nuclear weapons 
specific skills began to refer to themselves as ‘weaponeers.’ This realisation had significant and 
lasting consequences. As a precursor to arguments over nuclear ‘uninvention’ at the end of the Cold 
War, the weapons establishment argued that retention of ‘weaponeers’ was crucial if the institution 
was to remain viable. 
Only through good leadership, offering housing and promises over the long-term prospects 
of the establishment were staff accrued at a rate that allowed AWRE to successfully deliver full 
thermonuclear tests before the imposition of a testing moratorium. The limited secondary literature 
on Britain’s thermonuclear programme cites the role of William Cook in improving the culture at 




Cook had in improving retention and recruitment mechanisms but notes that he still faced inherent 
limitations due to the secrecy imposed upon Aldermaston. Fears over Soviet espionage meant that 
AWRE restricted knowledge on a ‘need to know’ basis, so much so that contemporaries were 
concerned about the education of the next generation of staff. AWRE’s managers had intended to 
acquire ancillary projects (‘diversification’) to retain tacit knowledge and solve the staffing situation 
in the long term. However, due to the prioritisation of the Grapple tests, AWRE did not acquire 
additional projects during this period. 
While the conclusion of the Mutual Defence Agreement of 1958 initially brought new work 
with the anglicisation of American designs, concerns re-emerged over the long-term sustainability of 
the British nuclear weapons project. This left AWRE by the end of the decade acutely aware of the 
necessity of maintaining a skills base in order to practice its primary function of providing the 
deterrent but that it also had to be proactive in acquiring future projects. When Britain completed 
its Grapple tests, this meant that AWRE had to either find work to sustain its highest staffing levels 
or the establishment would lose employees with valuable testing experience. The processes that had 
emerged at AWRE in the 1950s would direct the institution to campaign for its interests ever more 













This chapter details how AWRE justified the early efforts of the Polaris Improvement Programme 
in terms of maintaining their conception of tacit knowledge. It will do so by tracing five interlinked 
mechanisms. Firstly, this chapter demonstrates that the threat of nuclear ‘uninvention’ via skill loss 
was first clearly invoked in 1962 as a continuation of concerns over the loss of ‘weaponeers’ as 
explored in the prior chapter.1 Secondly, despite temporary alleviation, it will be shown that fears 
over a ‘brain drain,’ exacerbated by the failure of diversification to reassure AWRE staff between 
1962 and 1966, resulted in a new morale crisis. Thirdly, it is argued that the initial proposal to work 
on a Polaris Improvement Programme in 1966 was justified on retaining expertise at Aldermaston. 
The chapter then analyses the Kings Norton Inquiry which was an attempt by those outside of AWRE 
to determine its minimum manpower requirements in response to skill-based arguments. It is 
demonstrated that due to a combination of the final two processes of weak external oversight from 
the Ministry of Technology or UKAEA and with AWRE justifying further research on the possibility of 
‘uninvention,’ the weapons establishment was able to prevent critique of what they suggested was 
their minimum complement of staff. These five prior processes created the necessary conditions 
that would allow the Polaris Improvement Programme to mature into the Chevaline project. The 
cyclical invocation of the ‘uninvention’ arguments in 1962 and again from 1966 onwards 
demonstrates that when a future plan of work for AWRE was lacking, potential loss of required skills 
was raised to politicians as a mechanism to secure the establishment’s institutional interests.  
Lobbying of this nature could only be expected according to a contemporary critics such as 
Zuckerman as “[AWRE’s staff’s] future depended on having Ministers and civil servants believe that 
their work was essential to the national interest.”2 Zuckerman’s belief that it was nuclear weapons 
laboratories that drove nuclear weapons innovations, rather than armed services or politicians has 
been interpreted as the “Zuckerman Thesis.”3 This was later examined by Spinardi, who discounted 
it in the British historical experience except in the case of Chevaline (the final product of the Polaris 
Improvement Programme).4 This chapter concurs, but will demonstrate that the effective use of the 
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nuclear ‘uninvention’ argument by AWRE in the 1960s was the key factor in securing Polaris 
Improvement through analysis of archival material. However, as this chapter will examine, the 
extent to which Aldermaston’s lobbying was successful in 1962 compared to 1968 is highly 
divergent. Factors such as oversight over the nuclear weapons establishment, the failure of 
diversification, the personal influence of select civil servants and the government’s overall 
commitment to defence reductions were highly influential.  
AWRE by 1962: On the Brink? 
 
 As outlined in the previous chapter, since 1954, AWRE had enjoyed considerable 
commitment from Whitehall as the nation embarked upon its thermonuclear programme. The high 
priority attached to achieving thermonuclear status before a testing moratorium and the 
practicalities of conducting atmospheric nuclear tests had created a large body of manpower within 
AWRE.5 Nuclear weapons research and production retained precedence beyond 1958 due to Duncan 
Sandys’ doctrine of nuclear deterrence.6 In addition, to secure the MDA (Mutual Defence 
Agreement) with the United States, Britain committed to an expansive sufficient independent 
deterrent programme which “resembled a long shopping list of items.”7 However, such a policy was 
immensely expensive and as seen in the previous chapter, AWRE had successfully argued against an 
immediate reduction to its budget following the conclusion of the MDA in 1958.8 While AWRE had a 
“formidable” workload, it was subject to uncertainty and cancellations; Sandys’ policy lacked firm 
Ministerial approval and pressure from within Whitehall built to reduce spending on both the 
nuclear deterrent and defence in general.9 Macmillan initiated a reassessment of Britain’s relative 
power with the ‘Future Policy Study’ on 7th June 1959.10 One of the working groups was the British 
Nuclear Deterrent Study Group (BNDSG), which deliberated what nuclear force would be sufficient 
for Britain’s needs between 1959 and 1962.11 While resolving upon a sufficient ‘future policy’, only 
short term funding to maintain existing research and development programmes was approved for 
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AWRE until 1962. This led to considerable uncertainty over the establishment’s future, but it would 
not be an immediate issue due to the tranche of work provided after the 1958 MDA.12 
Without clarification, the long-term prospects for AWRE were becoming increasingly 
threatened. Harold Watkinson, the then Minister of Defence highlighted to the Prime Minister at a 
Defence cabinet meeting in December 1959 that “AWRE...[was] faced with a serious problem…in the 
absence of a clearly defined programme they were experiencing difficulty in keeping together their 
highly skilled scientific staff… Every months delay…was liable to cause further losses of skilled 
staff.”13 Nonetheless, the Chancellor bluntly forwarded that he “would be unable to agree to any 
[commitments] but urgent and short-term requirements” until a longer term policy was agreed 
upon.14 The inability to fix upon a programme is best exemplified with the choice to replace the Red 
Beard nuclear weapon with a new generation device – although Operational Requirement 1177 was 
issued in 1960, development and production was only authorised in mid-1962.15 On the basis of 
accepting the findings of a BNDSG report in 1960, Macmillan moved to severely cut nuclear defence 
spending, reorienting Britain’s nuclear force to a political deterrent rather than a warfighting 
instrument.16 However, even this would prove an incremental stage, as deciding upon how to 
operationalise a programme of cutting spending on nuclear weapons would take a further two years. 
Fixing upon a definitive nuclear weapons development programme was challenging as major 
defence decisions were necessarily interlinked: determinations on overall force structure, fissile 
material production and the acquisition of new delivery aircraft (such as TSR2) all had to be 
concluded beforehand.17  
This lingering policy of reductions left both AWRE management and staff aware that 
imminent cuts to their programmes were always possible, but unclear on the timing or the extent to 
which they would be conducted.18 Zuckerman noted the early 1960s were a “worrisome time for the 
Aldermaston scientists and engineers;” in December 1960, Penney refused to advocate for the 
recruitment of an extra 300 staff to meet short term needs on the basis that they would soon be 
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surplus to requirements.19 Nonetheless, some new research continued; in 1961, the UKAEA 
Chairman actively advocated for new underground tests to be conducted in Nevada on new nuclear 
primary concepts. These tests were conducted in 1962 and proved successful and of interest to the 
Americans.20 Nevertheless, as Moore observes, the economies envisaged for AWRE in the early 
1960s were to the extent that Macmillan did not provision for any successor delivery system beyond 
the 1970s; for a time, according to Moore, this amounted to “unilateral nuclear disarmament in the 
making.”21 Watkinson was charged with the detailed practicalities of planning broad reductions in 
nuclear weapons research and production.22 Watkinson’s plans were being formulated during a 
period of economic turbulence for Britain, so it is unsurprising that Jones quotes Watkinson as 
stating that his reductions were being considered “not on the grounds of strategy and tactics but on 
the basis that we may be forced into it by budgetary reasons.”23 
If 1959 to 1961 had been a protracted period of uncertainty of AWRE, then 1962 saw the 
confirmation of the establishment’s fears over reductions in their programmes. The unpredictability 
of cuts to the nuclear weapons development agenda seemed to be enhanced by the replacement of 
Watkinson by Thorneycroft as Minister of Defence in July of 1962 following Macmillan’s ‘Night of the 
Long Knives.’ Thorneycroft appears to have been even more intent on seeing cuts for AWRE through: 
Zuckerman alleges that he cancelled the Blue Water tactical nuclear weapons programme with 
“practically no consultation” in August 1962.24 In terms of complying with Watkinson’s and then 
Thorneycroft’s plans, AWRE senior leadership estimated in 1962 that only “50 percent of the existing 
Establishment” staff would be needed to provide a “minimum complement” by 1967.25 This decline 
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was necessary due to a proposed year on year decline of the research and development budget at 
AWRE that would save £13 million by 1968.26  
Such a reversal in staffing levels at the establishment would be unprecedented and be in 
stark contrast to the “intensive” recruitment that had occurred before and after the Grapple tests in 
the 1950s, which had seen manpower at AWRE reach its zenith at 8715 staff by 1962.27 These 
staffing levels were fine as long as sufficient work of high priority was available, but with the process 
of anglicization of American designs and the design of a Skybolt warhead nearing completion, such 
work was coming to a close. When it had appeared that AWRE would have to support a defence 
policy premised on Sandys 1957 White Paper, further work appeared secure. However, the UKAEA 
Chairman noted that within a short period of time, “Blue Water has been cancelled”, “No nuclear 
warhead is required for Seaslug” and a range of tactical munitions for the army had been 
“dropped.”28 The cuts to tactical nuclear weapons were a particular blow as they would have 
provided new avenues for research at the establishment and had been ascribed a high priority in 
1958.29 While research on a replacement for Red Beard (what would eventually produce the WE-177 
series) and a high yield warhead for Skybolt had been authorised, the lack of a varied programme 
and a successor to Skybolt meant that the dearth of projects would “radically affect the future size 
and shape of AWRE” from spring 1964.30 Due to the “recent decisions on defence [which] have 
produced a large reduction planned warhead development and production programme,” 
management within the UKAEA and AWRE realised that further work was needed.31 Unlike in 1953-
1954, it did not appear that this was likely to be forthcoming, so further work had to be actively 
pursued to rectify the situation. 
 
Appeals for Assistance 
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 Impending work shortfalls prompted senior AWRE figures and sympathetic civil servants to 
lobby both from within the UKAEA and then to central government to stress the need for further 
work. For example, in resolving manpower issues, AWRE’s ‘Penney’ Committee meeting on 1st 
December 1960 called for direct representations to be made to the Secretary of State for Defence 
(SofS), the Minister for Science and the Permanent Secretary for the MoD to convey their needs.32 As 
previous chapters have seen, this had proven relatively successful in the past, for instance, with 
Portal staving off HER’s cancellation and Penney securing the initial diversification efforts.33 In 
contrast, the appeals made between 1960 and 1962 were largely unsuccessful. 
This was due in part to the firm commitment made by the Macmillan government to reduce 
defence spending, with a particular eye on nuclear weapons research and development.34 Macmillan 
was unlikely to prove personally sympathetic to these efforts; he reportedly advised Zuckerman in 
1960 that if research projects “are likely to be cancelled, kill them when they are no larger than 
sprats,” rather than allow them to grow to maturity.35 With Sandys replaced and Watkinson and 
Thorneycroft selected as Ministers of Defence to oversee reductions, AWRE would only find limited 
support at a Ministerial level.36 When the SofS and Chancellor of the Exchequer where both in 
agreement of the need to significantly cut defence spending across all branches, there was little that 
lobbying from AWRE could achieve when savings of £45 million from the nuclear weapons 
programme were envisaged.37 Even Sandys, now as Minister of Aviation in 1960, recognised that “he 
was concerned at the high rate of expenditure on nuclear weapons of all kinds.” Nevertheless, He 
rather impractically hoped that “there might be scope for making economies” that wouldn’t impact 
either the tactical or strategic effort.38 As both Moore and Jones observe, a further factor mitigating 
these appeals was that the connection that AWRE had periodically enjoyed to relevant Ministers was 
attenuated by the increasingly important role of the Nuclear Requirements for Defence Committee 
(NRDC) which asserted “greater ‘civilian’ administrative control over the detailed nuclear weapons 
agenda.”39 This attenuated the direct connection that Aldermaston had to ministers. Given the 
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reduction of AWRE’s influence, it is unsurprising that Moore rejected the ‘Zuckerman thesis’ (that 
weaponeers determined defence programmes) during this period.40 
 A further, less tangible aspect to AWRE’s influence on Whitehall during this period was the 
role of the ‘hidden Persuaders’ as termed by Oikonomou.41 As seen in prior chapters, the role of 
Cook and Penney to advocate on AWRE’s behalf in concert with sympathetic officials and Ministers 
had likely influenced decisions in the establishments favour.42 However, in the period from 1960-
1962, these two men who had clearly established themselves within government circles played more 
peripheral roles: Penney was no longer AWRE’s director and had instead become involved in 
directing arms control negotiations, being the executive for UKAEA Research and from 1961 was 
deputy chairman for the UKAEA.43 Although Penney was involved in advocacy on behalf of AWRE 
through the ‘Penney’ committee, these other commitments appear to have been his main 
preoccupation. Similarly, Cook after having help conduct the Grapple tests, increasingly devoted his 
time to reactor development policy within the UKAEA and then conventional projects within the 
MoD as Zuckerman’s Deputy. 44 
Zuckerman was perhaps at the zenith of his influence for defence policy as Chief Scientific 
Advisor at the MoD between 1960 and 1966. He was prominent in “the gradual move away from the 
massive-retaliation strategy of… 1957… [towards a policy based] more on conventional defence.”45 
In doing so, he agitated against further tactical nuclear weapons programmes that would have 
provided work for Aldermaston.46 In place of Cook and Penney, the principle advocates for AWRE’s 
interests were Roger Makins as chairman of the UKAEA and Nyman Levin as AWRE’s Director (after 
Penney’s departure in 1959). 47 While Moore credits Makins as being an “exceptionally powerful 
figure” and Levin as enjoying “considerable prestige within the defence establishment,” they do not 
appear to have had the same influence as Cook and Penney.48 Makins certainly advocated for AWRE 
at a cabinet level but it appears that Levin was not as able in this regard as his predecessor.49 While 
this almost certainly reflected the diminished influence of AWRE on government as a result of the 
foundation of the NRDC, Levin simply did not have the same high profile as his contemporaries. 
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According to the New Scientist in 1959, he was “little known outside the spheres in which he… [had] 




 Even with reduced influence, AWRE still attempted to make the case for retaining spending 
at the establishment. Several main rationales for retaining the staffing strength at AWRE were 
advanced. Although ultimately unsuccessful during this period, they would exert a powerful 
influence on the future of the UK’s nuclear weapons programme; as will be seen, these arguments 
would largely be repeated in the 1968 Kings Norton inquiry and the MoD’s justification for what 
would become Chevaline. This highlights the cyclical nature of AWRE’s sustainability issues in the 
1960s, where the establishment’s management pushed for further research on the grounds that it 




 The main argument cited by AWRE managers in favour of retaining a large cohort within the 
establishment in 1962 was that the accrued expertise within the programme was under threat.51 
Appeals made particular mention of the unique skills on offer by the staff and the suitability of the 
infrastructure of Aldermaston for civil work and how this could be lost if not utilised.52 Nevertheless, 
calls in favour of diverting resources to the weapons establishment premised on skills were not 
unprecedented. As previous chapters have seen, both during the HER programme and especially in 
1953-1954, similar arguments (such as those based on the unique skills of the ‘weaponeers’) were 
periodically marshalled to leverage better resources for the weapons establishment.53 
 However, a clear development on arguments premised on the retention of skills can be 
observed to have developed between 1959 and 1962 as the prospect of cuts became more 
apparent. As previously cited, in 1960 Watkinson warned the Prime Minister that delays in deciding 
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a defence policy “was liable to cause further losses of skilled staff.”54 Levin stated on 1st December 
1960 that even with a reduced staffing level, “so long as any weapons remained in service, there 
would be post-design problems and surveillance which would require a wide range of qualified 
people. It would consequently be necessary to keep a broadly-based team and to give this team 
enough general research and development to hold it together.”55 This was the first call for research 
to be diverted to AWRE based on maintaining the nuclear arsenal. Jones notes that the Minister for 
Defence cited a skills based argument in 1961 to forestall an immediate cut to the nuclear weapons 
research programme on the basis that severe cuts would be “irreversible” and without study, would 
be “cutting blind.”56 By 17th July 1962, it was reiterated at the highest levels by “Sir Roger Makins 
[chairman of the UKAEA]… [who] said that the design teams at Aldermaston must be able to look 
forward to a substantial programme of further development work if they were to be kept together 
and available for unforeseen tasks.”57 In this meeting of the Nuclear Requirements for Defence 
Committee, Makins therefore advocated an “Advanced Warhead Development Programme” 
expressly for the institutional interests of skill retention of the establishment, rather than the direct 
utility or deterrent value of the weapons that would be developed themselves. 58 It is notable that 
Levin’s call for further ‘general’ research had developed into calls for military work by 1962. 
Premised on fragility, the 1962 iteration of these arguments had matured into a clearly 
recognisable expression of the need to retain the somatic tacit knowledge imbued in the 
‘weaponeers’ as recognised by MacKenzie and Spinardi, but also on a collective level forwarded by 
Sims.59 For example, while not referenced to as ‘weaponeers’ to Ministers in documents from 1962, 
staff collectively and individually held “special skills." 60 In addition, for the establishment to function, 
these staff needed to be “kept together” for the weapons establishment to function.61 This novel 
arrangement of arguments premised on skills suggests a managerial awareness of AWRE being 
forwarded as a delicate socio-technical system where knowledge management was key.  
 Premised on AWRE’s fragility, a further development was framing disruption to its work as a 
near existential threat. Maximalist consequences were threatened if AWRE’s research agenda was 
disrupted by the NRDC’s proposals to the future of the establishment. For example, The UKAEA 
stated in a memorandum that rather than further research being degraded or the establishment 
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being limited to maintenance in the event of reductions, “it will be impossible [emphasis added] for 
the authority to provide continuing support to the Services on a post design basis without an 
appropriate research and development programme.”62 Along with previous quotes on the “virtually 
irreversible” nature of the potential reductions, such rhetoric served to convey the permanence of 
any reverse.63 Although more moderate, Makins noted that maintaining the quality of staff at AWRE 
would be “notoriously difficult to do in an establishment which is being run down.”64 This potentially 
differs from the prior warnings over the need for greater priority and diversification in both 1954 
and during the HER programme, where delays were threatened rather than the ability to complete 
the project.65 While it is impossible to tell whether the reductions foreseen in 1962 may have 
produced such effects, it is clear that both Makins, the UKAEA and AWRE wanted to convey the 
fragility of the body of skill needed to maintain any deterrent.  
A New Idea? 
 
When the conceptions of tacit knowledge, AWRE as a socio-technical system and the fragile 
maintenance of both were combined, a new argument for influencing policy was formed. This was a 
fundamentally novel argument that asserted the imperative for the maintenance of quality research 
in order to satisfy the above conditions, under threat of inadvertent future disarmament that itself 
would be near impossible to prevent. Although clearly not couched in the same terms, the concepts 
involved directly mirror MacKenzie and Spinardi’s “uninvention hypothesis.”66 While MacKenzie and 
Spinardi primarily based their argument on observations and interviews from the American nuclear 
establishment in the 1990s, this confirms the hypothesis offered in the framework that a similar 
process was used in 1960s Britain as a mechanism to lobby against staff reductions. 
 The logical conclusion of an argument premised on the fragility of knowledge management 
in AWRE was that more work would have to be found for the establishment to retain the current 
level of staff. This was clearly the line of argumentation forwarded by Makins in 1962, where in 
response to the proposed economies at Aldermaston, he stated that “the quality of research and 
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development work on nuclear warhead… technology must be maintained at a high level.”67 
However, as seen in the prior chapter and by recalling promises that had been made to the 
establishment and appealing to tacit knowledge skills and the strategic importance of AWRE (now 
framed around the MDA), AWRE’s response to the imminent crisis in 1962 can be seen as the 
culmination of prior trends rather than a revolutionary change. When faced with the cancellation of 
the atomic programme forwarded by Tizard in 1949, Penney and Portal had to actively lobby against 
cancellation.68 During the difficulties experienced by AWRE in 1953-1954, Penney had also called for 
clarification on government weapons policy and pushed for diversification work to be brought to the 
establishment.69 With the prospect of losing half its strength unless further work could be found, it 
was recognised from 1960 onwards that AWRE would have to be far more proactive in obtaining 
new work.70 A 1961 paper by Hitchman assessing the prospects for civil work for AWRE concluded 
that the establishment should “[smooth] out fluctuations in the Weapons Group defence load 
wherever possible, even to the extent of modifying the phasing of items in the Defence Programme 
if this is possible” and also that “the Weapons Group themselves will need to be the prime agents in 
seeking appropriate civil work.”71 The need to become heterogenous engineers had been fully 
realised. 
 
Promises of Diversification and Staff Morale 
 
If retention of skills formed the primary argument in favour of AWRE, and retention was 
based on the staff’s perception of the viability of their careers at the establishment, then a 
subcomponent of the skills argument was for fulfilling promises made to staff in the 1950s. 
Repeated promises had been made by multiple Conservative politicians about the security that 
would be enjoyed by the workforce at AWRE, regardless of the disarmament situation. As already 
seen, job security and staff morale had been a perennial issue with the establishment since the 
initiation of the nuclear project. This was noted in a 1962 paper by the UKAEA, where it was made 
clear that for AWRE staff, “the possibility of redundancy in the Weapons Group has long been in 
their minds and to maintain their morale, assurances at the highest level have had to be given that 
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the skills assembled within the Weapons Group would not be dissipated.”72 The potential morale 
crisis in the face of the planned reductions had not been realised by 1962 as “there has been no 
disclosure to the Staff or Trade Unions of the magnitude of the staff surpluses” envisaged.73 Prior 
promises compiled in UKAEA documents included those made by Anthony Eden, Harold MacMillan, 
Lord Cherwell, William Penney and the UKAEA board member for AWRE, Claude Pelly, as well as 
other UKAEA officials, ranging from 1954 to 1960.74 As the crisis was occurring during Macmillan’s 
second government, it appears that these promises were being cited as an implicit threat to the 
government’s reputation were they to be broken. 
 
Maintaining the 1958 MDA 
 
 The third argument employed in support of retaining as many staff as possible at AWRE 
which related to maintaining accumulated skills was by recalling the 1958 MDA. As highlighted 
heavily by AWRE, the MDA arrangement was predicated on “making substantial and material 
contributions thereto [sic].”75 It was clearly conveyed by Makins that without a further research 
programme, this agreement would be endangered.76 Makins pushed for cooperation and 
involvement in upcoming US nuclear weapons tests, both as a way to continue cooperation, but also 
to satisfy the need for further research at the establishment.77 Furthermore, the importance of the 
arrangement to the current weapons programme was emphasised through “the valuable help in 
weapon design and technology” it provided as well as design details and the influence it allowed the 
UK and AWRE to have on future American systems.78 Moore states that this citation of the MDA in 
conjunction with work at AWRE “appears to have been the first use of an argument which, by the 
late 1960s and early 1970s, would dominate Whitehall discussion of nuclear weapons.”79  
However, the previous chapter saw that the continuation of a British design programme was 
invoked almost immediately after the conclusion of the 1958 MDA by Penney to save AWRE from a 
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tranche of economies.80 When this possibility was again raised in 1959 with investigations into the 
future policy for deterrence, the BNDSG found that Britain would need to maintain its nuclear 
contribution “in terms of both skill and of power.”81 Brundrett (as chairman of the Defence Research 
Policy Committee) had attempted to argue in 1959 that it was the size of the arsenal itself that 
guaranteed American cooperation.82 Nevertheless, by 1962, AWRE were clearly linking skills, the 
MDA and the need for a sustainable future for the British nuclear weapons research and 
development programme more clearly than otherwise thus far expressed. The importance of 
effective cooperation with the United States for AWRE’s future was to be underlined mere months 
after Makins had made his case to the NRDC with the American cancellation of Skybolt and the 
subsequent need to acquire Polaris. 
Using Uninvention: Success or Failure? 
 
 While this section has presented the arguments used by AWRE to forestall planned 
reductions to the establishment, it must be highlighted that in 1962, they were largely unsuccessful. 
The plan for the development of nuclear warheads endorsed to Ministers by the NRDC through 
document ND(62)13 in October 1962 foresaw only the finalisation of a warhead for Skybolt and an 
eventual programme for replacing Red Beard.83 In addition, there would only be 90 Skybolt 
warheads and the number of approved Red Snow warheads was reduced.84 No significant new 
nuclear weapons research work was envisaged. Compared to previously imagined efforts, this was a 
highly limited programme that would necessitate the fifty percent reductions envisaged by the 
UKAEA at AWRE by 1967.85 Given the warnings that AWRE management had been issuing since late 
1959 as to the implications of reductions, this represented a significant failure in influencing policy 
towards the establishment’s institutional interests. 
Despite the pessimistic outlook, there were elements to the policy endorsed by the 
ND(62)13 document that appear to suggest the general acceptance of AWRE’s arguments in favour 
of retaining skills within the establishment. The “principles on which… [the] policy was based” 
included that “a post-design capability must be maintained,” “research and development work… 
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must be maintained at a high level” and that this had to be done to uphold the 1958 MDA.86 As will 
be shown, the acceptance of the arguments premised on a conception of tacit knowledge would 
prove extremely important to future programmes, as interested parties were able to cite this 
precedent in favour of further research. 
Ultimately, what allowed AWRE to limit major and rapid reductions beyond 1962 were the 
events surrounding the Skybolt Crisis and the subsequent Nassau Agreement. While beyond the 
scope of this study, these events necessitated the development of a British warhead for the Polaris 
missile and the creation of a high yield gravity bomb (in addition to a low yield variant) to fill the 
‘deterrent gap.’87 This new tranche of work was significant to AWRE as “up to mid-1966 the [nuclear 
weapons research and development] programme include[d] three new projects under preparation 
for Service use whereas the previous programme has only one such project after 1965 [low yield Red 
Beard replacement].”88 As the UKAEA document notes, “the stretch-out in development programme 
eases the problem of matching staff and programme requirements.”89 While the new programmes 
envisaged would still necessitate reductions in manpower compared to its heights in 1962, this 
process could now be done more gradually. 90 In the short term, Moore notes that Aldermaston was 
in fact nearly “overloaded” with work due to Nassau, rather than from its lobbying efforts.91 
 Nevertheless, the principles espoused by UKAEA and AWRE officials between 1958 and 1962 
and encoded in ND(62)13 appear to have been quickly used. The proposal paper ND(63)10 
submitted January 1963 by the UKAEA in favour of a “three-year research programme involving 
nuclear tests… was chosen as the basis for maintaining an adequate research and development 
effort at Aldermaston, and an adequate level of collaboration with the U.S.”92 Further proposals for a 
research and testing agenda for AWRE for 1965 to 1966 were further premised on citing “ND(63)10 
and previous papers.”93 Specifically, the need “not to prejudice… [AWRE’s] ability to deal with any 
problems that might arise in respect to current nuclear weapons projects” was recognised.94 
Therefore, it is clear that ND(62)13 represented the acceptance of AWRE’s skill based arguments 
which were subsequently used as precedent for expanding AWRE’s research agenda (in addition to 
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that precipitated by the Skybolt Crisis) after its near terminal decline in October 1962. This would 




 As Penney had argued and supposedly settled in 1954, the agreed long term solution to 
AWRE’s staffing problems was a programme of diversification where other military related nuclear 
research would be brought under the establishment’s remit.95 When faced with insecurity after 
1958, UKAEA officials noted in 1960 that the “staff side… [have] a great interest in this matter 
[diversification] and…[have] made no secret of its anxieties over the years.”96 As seen in the previous 
chapter, providing diversification work between 1954 and 1958 proved more aspirational rather 
than an achieved reality. This was not an imminent problem when AWRE had enough work but 
became increasingly important from 1958 onwards.97 
Post 1958, AWRE pushed for greater civil reactor work, packaged service reactors or other 
relevant scientific work to cover their impending shortfall in the early 1960s, it achieved mixed 
results.98 After explicitly lobbying the UKAEA for civil work between 1959 and 1960 in the face of 
MoD cuts, AWRE became involved in the development of technology and materials for the civil 
nuclear programme.99 This work programme initially expanded to include researching and 
fabricating fuel to be used in breeder reactors, but was dealt a blow by the transfer of controlled 
fusion work to another UKAEA laboratory at Culham. 100 By 1962, some 260 AWRE staff were 
employed on diversified efforts, but this only accounted for “about” 10% of AWRE’s strength 
engaged in “work in aid of the civil programme.”101 In the face of the cuts proposed to AWRE, it was 
recognised that “there… [was] no prospect of finding civil work to match the run-down,” either 
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through diversification or reallocation of staff to other UKAEA sections.102 Diversification had by 
1962 failed to make a serious contribution to retaining staff; if a cut in the weapons programme 
would result in a fifty percent reduction in staff, it was clearly falling short of its intended effect. 
These failures were recognised by AWRE, and further efforts were made under the Turnbull 
Committee which sat from 1962 to 1963. Turnbull’s findings were unsurprising given the prior 
rationale of the diversification effort. The committee’s report recommended that work was needed 
that presented a “compelling intellectual challenge” to stop the “higher quality men” leaving.103 
Further suggestions were that “Defence Departments” and any “new proposals for the expansion of 
civil research and technology” should preferentially consider AWRE as the institution to fulfil their 
research and development contracts.104 The Turnbull Committee’s recommendations led to the 
initiation of a programme of non-nuclear research for AWRE that through the 1965 Science and 
Technology Act, “officially approved” of the new work, then already underway.105 Although the 
Turnbull Committee had proceeded "on the assumption that it is not the intention to create work 
solely in order to keep people employed at Aldermaston and the other Weapons Group 
establishments," diversification’s primary goal had always been to retain staff.106 
 
Industrial Dislocation and ‘Brain Drain’ 
 
 The concern that AWRE would become unsustainable due to the loss of skill was further 
reinforced by the experiences of other defence institutions. This was best exemplified with the 
ramifications of the cancellation of both the Blue Water and Blue Streak nuclear rocket systems 
upon Britain’s rocketry industry. When the Blue Water programme was cancelled in mid-1962, there 
were warnings that “the firm’s [English Electric Aviation] guided weapons team would almost 
certainly have to… disperse.”107 When it came to Blue Streak, the concern was over “industrial 
dislocation” faced by the “sudden disruption” caused by cancellation.108 While the Cabinet believed 
that the scientists and engineers would find other employment, Simpson notes that “the effect [of 
the Blue Streak cancellation and Polaris purchase]… was that the teams initially created to build the 
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Blue Streak vehicle were dispersed, and a hiatus of a decade then ensued when little experimental 
work took place in the United Kingdom in this area.”109 As with diversification in the nuclear 
programme, an attempt was made to use these skills in a civil capacity under the European Launcher 
Development Organisation, but this atrophied away by 1971. Stoddart claims that the protracted 
failure of this effort informed “bitter” government and UKAEA scientists about the low likelihood of 
being retained in the absence of military work by the late 1960s.110 
 While not conveyed in tacit knowledge terminology, there was a pervasive sense in the 
1960s that institutional tacit knowledge was being lost to the “important and insidious threat” of a 
general UK wide ‘brain drain.’111 The belief, firmly established by a Royal Society report in 1963, 
suggested that British industry was suffering as highly qualified technical British professionals were 
going abroad (primarily to the United States), in the search for better conditions.112 Harold Wilson’s 
election campaign had explicitly pledged to react to this threat in his “white heat” of technology 
speech by establishing a Ministry of Technology to coordinate research efforts.113 Responding to 
‘brain drain’ concerns informed the context for which attempts to retain skills were made in across 
the UK in the 1960s. In December 1967 the Overseas Policy and Defence Official Working Party 
directly cited the potential for a “brain drain” in an explicit attempt to justify further work for 
AWRE.114 Therefore, the experiences of the decline of the rocketry sector and the pervasive belief 
that skilled engineers were leaving the UK amplified AWRE’s arguments in favour of retaining tacit 
knowledge in the late 1960s. 
 
The Cycle Repeats 1964-1966 
 
 While the outcome of the Nassau Agreement delayed severe reductions in AWRE with a new 
programme of work ensuring for a time that it would “once again [be] very busy,” what would 
happen when the current set of work was completed was an open question.115 Ironically, AWRE had 
been further buoyed by their inability to copy the American designed Mk.58 warhead to Polaris, 
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which necessitated further indigenous work.116 Several joint nuclear tests were conducted with the 
United States between July 1964 and September 1965 to verify the new derived design.117 
Nevertheless, staffing levels specifically for nuclear weapons research and development (as opposed 
to total staff of AWRE) had reduced by 20% by 1964.118 This was due to a deliberate policy of 
allowing wastage to outpace recruitment and was further increased by moving staff towards 
diversification work.119  
However, in a significant development outlaid in ND(65)1, a numerical figure was placed on 
minimum staffing requirements.120 In the context of keeping a “post design [AWRE] service” viable, 
the UKAEA asserted that “4500… [staff are] regarded as the minimum number required” for this to 
be upheld, with a further 1500 employed on ‘diversified’ civil work.121 This figure had apparently 
been determined by Levin and expressed in a letter in April 1964.122 This was clearly a warning at this 
stage, as the UKAEA had accepted that further reductions from the present staffing level at AWRE 
were agreeable and in terms of recommendations, only proposed that already approved testing and 
research be conducted.123 This ‘minimum’ was still 500 staff above what had been envisaged as 
necessary for the establishment before the Skybolt Crisis as the smallest viable complement.124 
Although modest at this stage, the 6000 figure would prove pivotal in future debates over hardening 
Polaris.  
The major event in 1964 that increased uncertainty for AWRE was the election of Labour 
with Harold Wilson as Prime Minister. Nuclear issues played a prominent part in the campaign; 
Wilson had claimed during campaigning that Polaris “will not be independent and it will not be 
British and it will not deter.”125 Wilson entered power threatening to cancel and renegotiate the 
Nassau Agreement and had a unilateralist contingent to his party. Nonetheless, he became mired in 
the reality of nuclear decision making with a split cabinet and the slimmest of majorities.126 Political 
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imperatives meant that little headway was made in dealing with future nuclear policy decisions 
during his first term. Protracted negotiations over the possibility of an ‘Atlantic Nuclear Force’ and 
then the potential for an early election delayed decision making, where forcing an issue would likely 
have negatively impacted Labour.127 Therefore, despite the Labour 1964 manifesto being expressly 
against spending resources on “endless duplication of strategic nuclear weapons,” little headway 
was made.128  
 However, Wilsons’ first government made several important nuclear decisions. Firstly, AWRE 
was transferred to the newly created Ministry of Technology (MinTech) in 1967. This could have 
provided greater civilian oversight of the nuclear weapons programme, but as will be seen, MinTech 
officials were deliberately deprived of information. A further decision that impacted AWRE was the 
reduction of the number of planned Polaris submarines from five to four. While not ideal from 
AWRE’s perspective, this would hardly have the same impact as the reductions envisaged in 1962 as 
research and development for Polaris warheads would have to continue irrespective of numbers 
produced.129 The most impactful policy change implemented by the Wilson government to AWRE 
was the suspension of nuclear tests which had been carried out cooperatively with the United 
States.130 Not only would this cut AWRE off from a source of work and testing experience, but would 
also undermine the US-UK nuclear relationship which was increasingly under strain over a lack of 
new information being provided by the UK. 131 In addition, the Labour government decided not to 
pursue acquiring America’s next generation SLBM, Poseidon, despite some prompting from the 
Defence Secretary, Denis Healey.132 
 As a result of these decisions, and the lack of a plan for a successor system under the 
Macmillan government, Zuckerman stated that from 1964, “the supply of new nuclear weapons 
information to us was then beginning to taper off… the annual Stockade meetings [with the 
Americans] had started to become an embarrassment.”133 Zuckerman later alleged in his 
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autobiography that this was a form of “blackmail” or “arm twisting” wherein “Aldermaston’s 
friends” encouraged the Americans to deny information to the UK in order to guarantee they 
received greater resources to renew the “special, even if ephemeral, relationship.”134 This explains 
why some sources relay how Zuckerman “gleefully” relayed the Wilson government’s lack of intent 
to develop new weapons in November 1965.135 Whatever the tone, as a result of the position, US-UK 
Joint Working Group (JOWOG) stockade meetings were suspended, indicating the precariousness of 
the MDA. 
 Therefore, by the start of 1966, AWRE was entering a position remarkably like the one that it 
had faced between 1960 and 1962. As Jones observes, as Polaris and the WE-177B were entering 
production by 1966, “the immediate and pressing question” once again became the ongoing viability 
of AWRE as it was once again “locked in little more than a holding operation pending a deeper 
Ministerial consideration.”136 As with the situation in 1960-1962, it was unsurprising that Zuckerman 
claimed that “Aldermaston was pressing all the time” for additional work in 1966, when faced with a 
“looming gap in nuclear weapons research.”137 Jones cites a letter from the Permanent Secretary at 
the Ministry of Aviation to the PS MoD from January 1966 where he highlighted the “obvious risk… 
that the scientific momentum of Aldermaston will diminish” without further work.138 Having called 
an election in February and winning an increased (and now workable) majority in the March 1966 
election, Wilson was now in a stronger position to consider the future of the nuclear weapons 
programme. In the coming Cabinet debates over the future of Aldermaston, the same ‘uninvention’ 
argument from 1962 was re-used to an even greater extent, where the fragility of tacit knowledge 
was raised as imperilling the nuclear programme. 
 
Another Morale Crisis? 1966 –1968 
 
 With the prior Wilson government having demonstrated considerable scepticism to further 
nuclear weapons developments, it appeared that AWRE would descend into a new crisis over the 
lack of work. This was clearly the view of the Operational Requirements Committee (ORC) (a MoD 
committee founded in 1965) who, according to Jones, advanced a “veritable ‘wish list’” of tactical 
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nuclear weapons specifically in reference to the need to uphold “the size and content of the 
programme at AWRE which is decreasing from the end of this year.”139 William Cook, former deputy 
director of AWRE and now Assistant Chief Scientific Advisor (Projects), advanced the committee’s 
conclusions. In recommending the findings of the ORC to the Chief of the Defence Staff, Cook 
highlighted how it was also found that work on strategic warheads was needed to maintain the 
“competence” of AWRE.140 The new work favoured for this purpose was “generally directed towards 
a capability by the early 1970’s to develop a warhead to replace that in the Polaris system,” in 
addition to completing an initial study of penetration aids.141 
Although the ORC’s report was not the inception of hardening work for Polaris, it was the 
first move to establish the effort as a full programme and was being suggested as a means by which 
AWRE could retain skills.142 Although this confirms the hypothesis that knowledge management 
concerns were partly behind forwarding Polaris hardening, this was not a sufficient cause. There was 
an awareness of the growing Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile capability and a strategic rationale for 
responding to it; charting the evolution of the technical, strategic and political responses is beyond 
the scope of this thesis, but it is necessary to highlight how the ORC’s initial drive for Polaris 
hardening was premised on retaining competence at AWRE. Cook would continue to press the Chiefs 
of Staff in August 1966 to endorse the ORC’s findings which featured hardening work to establish a 
baseline “programme… [that] would be sufficiently attractive to maintain the key scientific and 
technical skills at AWRE, without which no future capability – thermonuclear, fission, or 
recertification in Service of current warheads – is possible.”143  
Whatever the strategic rational, Polaris hardening, through Cook’s lobbying efforts, had 
become embroiled within AWRE’s running concern over ‘uninvention’ and the breakdown of the 
MDA. Such framing was important, as at the first meeting of the Ministerial Committee on Nuclear 
Policy, held September 1966, the assembled believed that the nuclear deterrent must be maintained 
to secure American nuclear cooperation on favourable terms to Britain.144 Hardening was therefore 
presented (by Cook, the ORC, UKAEA and MoD) in such a way as to be necessary for AWRE, which 
was needed in order to satisfy the overall policy objectives of the Wilson government. The UKAEA 
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were even clear about being agnostic towards the direction of the research; any sufficiently 
challenging work had to be provided or “the quality and momentum of the establishment would 
rapidly diminish until it ceased to be viable.”145 
 Such a conclusion was controversial. The Treasury and the new Department for Economic 
Affairs predictably placed themselves in opposition to the MoD from 1966-1968.146 The lack of 
originality and frustratingly circular logic of arguments in favour of further work premised on tacit 
knowledge retention were apparent to Treasury officials: Jones quotes an official’s letter wherein he 
complained of being: “back to the old chicken and egg argument” in 1966.147 Existing warheads had 
to be maintained by skilled scientists, skilled scientists had to be retained with interesting work, and 
therefore new projects were always needed even for basic maintenance in an ever ongoing loop. 
Even the proposed hardening work was acknowledged as a temporary solution that, if conducted 
promptly, would only serve until the mid-1970s and there were no subsequent plans for further 
research.148AWRE was estimated to account for £167 million over the next ten years, so major 
reductions were an appealing prospect given the economic turbulence of late 1960s Britain.149 Given 
the lack of plans to move beyond Polaris, it is unsurprising that economically orientated officials 
questioned the logic of protracting this process further and wanted the termination of the nuclear 
programme as soon as possible.150 This led to a polarisation between those who were in favour of 
continuing Britain’s nuclear programme and those against: as will be seen, it became a question of 
avoiding wasteful spending against those who framed it more positively as maintaining the scientific 
“momentum.”151  
 Nevertheless, the case for hardening partially premised on providing a programme for AWRE 
gained traction from 1966 onwards. Healey embraced these arguments in favour of AWRE and 
submitted paper ND(66)4 to the NRDC which was largely a replication of prior arguments premised 
on ‘uninvention’ (such as ND(62)13), updated to reflect the new preference for hardening.152 This 
later led to Zuckerman characterising Healey in his memoirs as having fallen under the influence of 
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“a small but powerful band of civil servants and military men who had a blind faith in anything that 
was nuclear.”153 While this is true to an extent, Jones highlights that Healey did not accept their 
arguments uncritically: in terms of ascertaining the true minimum effort required at AWRE, Healey 
tasked his PUS to establish whether the figures provided were “justified.”154 
The ND(66)4 paper that Healey subsequently endorsed claimed that in order to maintain the 
MDA and nuclear deterrent, “advanced work … in the thermonuclear field” was required to “retain 
the number and quality of staff required to maintain AWRE as a viable establishment.”155 In addition, 
the annex to the paper on ‘Manpower and Costs,’ attempts to establish a baseline and justification 
for the minimum manpower required by AWRE. In doing so, it prominently cites ND(62)13 for the 
lineage of its argument and goes on to reiterate the requirement for a staffing figure of 6000.156 The 
paper once again forwards a conception of fragile tacit knowledge being required as “the full 
spectrum of skills and disciplines… will be required for the military programme in the future.”157 This 
is further emphasised with its unique and privileged nature: “because of the special nature of 
nuclear weapons, very little of the expertise necessary exists outside the Weapons Group.”158 
In order to preserve these skills, the paper’s annex bluntly states that “the really high calibre 
staff will be lost unless appropriate new work is injected into the Group’s programme.”159 The 
ND(66)4 paper is also notable for its lack of a technical-strategic justification for developing a 
hardening capability. A rationale is provided for the retention of a nuclear capability, the means to 
retain it and cooperation with the Americans, but hardening is presented as being “adequate in 
American eyes, though no more, to justify continued collaboration and would be attractive enough 
to maintain the key scientific and technical skills at AWRE.”160 It would therefore not be unfair, in 
combination with Cook’s prior proposal, to conclude that Polaris hardening was initially offered as a 
solution to a social and diplomatic problem, rather than as a response to Soviet ABM capabilities.  
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A largely unchanged version of the ND(66)4 paper was presented to the Prime Minister in 
November 1966, and again to the Ministerial Committee on Nuclear Policy in January 1967.161 
However, the time delay between its drafting and its circulation had given a chance for opposition to 
be formed. The potential for this MoD paper to pass unchallenged apparently spurred Zuckerman 
into action, as he started to brief sympathetic officials and Ministers against these skill claims.162 
Callaghan, in his role as the Chancellor of the Exchequer, became an outspoken critic of a further 
commitment to nuclear weapons development as he suggested that new programmes were a 
“slippery slope in terms of expenditure.”163 Jones notes that in late 1966, Zuckerman was suggesting 
to Ministers that there was “little point in arguing detail,” but that they should question whether the 
premise of whether the UK should maintain a sophisticated nuclear capability at all.164 This was 
perhaps a tactical blunder as it further emphasised AWRE’s ‘uninvention’ argument: the outcome of 
the January 1967 meeting from Wilson’s perspective was that “’on balance’ the Committee was in 
favour of maintaining the capability to work on nuclear weapons, and therefore accepted the 
programme proposed by the Defence Secretary.”165 At this point, the choice between committing to 
hardening or abandoning the deterrent was too stark and it appeared that maintaining the status 
quo was leading. 
 With the possibility of hardening raised, spring 1967 and early 1968 saw a series of attempts 
to establish a clear government policy on the future direction of Britain’s nuclear weapons 
programme. For institutions such as the MoD and AWRE, this largely meant trying to establish the 
strategic and technical needs for a Polaris hardening programme.166 Key figures such as Penney and 
Cook attempted to add their “authority” to the Polaris hardening case.167 These moves conflicted 
with Zuckerman, the Treasury and the Department of Economic Affairs’ attempts to limit such 
moves.168 While AWRE was notionally under the Ministry of Technology as part of the UKAEA, they 
were unable to provide meaningful insight due to their institutional autonomy and sometimes active 
hostility to oversight. 169 The formulation of a coherent policy was initially limited by these 
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competing factions, but any resolution was dependant on what information the Americans were to 
provide, commensurate with a British effort.170 This entailed multiple meetings of the Ministerial 
Committee on Nuclear Policy in 1967, exchanges by officials and Ministerial visits to Washington and 
attempts to gauge the future extent of Soviet ABM defences around Moscow. Despite obtaining 
access to Antelope information and the technical paths forward being presented by Cook in 
November 1967, the overall deadlock on whether to proceed with Polaris hardening remained.171 
This was only enhanced with the November 1967 devaluation crisis: to the Treasury, this emphasised 
the need to cut (or at least limit) spending on a capability to which no replacement was planned, 
whereas for those in favour of hardening, it strengthened the case for a greater indigenous effort to 
reduce dollar spending.172  
 As the potential technical options became more apparent, the underlying tension between 
officials, Ministers and departments both for and against a hardening programme remained 
intractable.173 As had been the basis for Cook’s suggestion for hardening work, the main area of 
contention was over the future of Aldermaston and its staffing levels. This was raised in a Cabinet 
review of nuclear weapons policy in August 1967 where the issue of the need to maintain 6000 staff 
at AWRE came to the fore. As Jones highlights, AWRE’s contribution to the review, submitted via the 
UKAEA and the MinTech “argued… that ‘maintenance of a nuclear weapons stockpile requires the 
same range of resources and skills… as are needed for the original design and production.”174 The 
dogmatic nature with which the figure of 6000 had been adhered to with an apparent religious 
degree was noted at the time by financially minded officials.175 Treasury figures and even some 
within the MoD and Foreign Office were sceptical and it was reasonable for them to be so; the 
reasoning for the 6000 figure was not significantly expanded upon.176 However, as this chapter has 
noted, the argument that a range of skills were necessary for the maintenance of a capability had 
been expressed by Levin in 1960, itself stemming from AWRE’s historical experiences. The solution, 
since 1960 (or arguably 1954) had always been a continued programme of work which incorporated 
advanced research.177 Cook’s role in promoting this solution was clear, with Broadbent noting that 
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“CA(P) is perhaps too committed on the extent to which we need to do detailed work at AWRE, and 
to the view that there is no half-way house in the size of the establishment.”178 
By the end of 1967 there had been no improvement as Ministers and departments became 
entrenched in either pro or anti hardening stances. According to the Cabinet Secretary, there was 
however a general “tacit acceptance that, for the present at any rate, we ought to retain… [the 
Polaris] capability.”179 Nonetheless, in an attempt to gain immediate approval for a hardening effort, 
Healey once again offered AWRE’s views of staffing levels and concerns over uninvention in a 
Ministerial Committee on Nuclear Policy meeting held on 5th December 1967 .180 The now familiar 
line of argumentation expressed by UKAEA documents submitted to the committee stated that in 
the absence of new work, “key staff would in fact drift away to an extent which would endanger our 
nuclear capability as a whole.”181  
Given that the nuclear weapons lobby were threatening ‘uninvention’ and those against at 
least wanted to impose economies, the emergent consensus in December 1967 was that staffing at 
AWRE had to be examined in greater detail. As a result of this meeting, the Prime Minister was to 
arrange for an inquiry, with a rapidly produced draft terms of reference examining the “minimum 
scale of effort that would be necessary at the Atomic Weapons Establishment.”182 Given that 
Wilson’s “sympathies might be found to lie with the Chancellor,” it was suggested that the inquiry 
proceed in two phases.183 As the second phase was intended to identify economies, it somewhat 
presupposed the findings of the first phase on establishing the minimum scale of effort would be 
significantly below the current strength; in this regard, the inquiry would prove a disappointment.184 
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Kings Norton Inquiry: Oversight and AWRE 
 
 As it took time for the composition and terms of the inquiry to be finalised, the exact 
formulation was only agreed on 28th February 1968.185 One of the elements that had incurred the 
delay had been selecting mutually acceptable panel members that would be sufficiently qualified, 
but who would also be UKAEA outsiders. 186 While possessing considerable defence, business and 
leadership experience, none of the final members were intimately familiar with nuclear weapons 
research and development.187  
Given an approximate three month time frame to produce results, the first meeting of the 
panel was held on 11th April 1968 and reported on the 31st July 1968.188 Cabinet papers from June 
1968 highlighted that the desired outcome of the Inquiry was to “i) give… an estimate of the full cost 
of AWRE… ii) express… whether AWRE is… to remain viable [if confined to maintenance] … iii) … 
whether… reducing expenditure … at AWRE [is possible] if the military task is restricted to 
maintaining existing weapons.”189 While it was able to present a figure for the first point, the first 
conclusion of the report was that “it will be necessary to retain the strength of professional staff at 
close to the present level” if even only a maintenance role was intended for AWRE.190 With its 
inability to identify savings beyond a marginal reduction in support staff, the report failed to 
substantially satisfy either the pro or anti-hardening aligned institutions (perhaps with the exception 
of AWRE).191 The findings were divisive enough even amongst its panel members to produce a 
minority report penned by Lord Rothschild.192 While he went beyond the terms of the inquiry to 
argue against the strategic rationale of even the Polaris programme, he also took issue with the way 
in which the panel determined the ‘minimum effort’ required at AWRE.193 Despite cabinet 
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differences and attempts to restrict the circulation of the report, the agreed interpretation 
presented by the SofS and the Minister of Technology was for a reduction in staff from 6300 to 5600 
by 1975.194 Even this figure represented the upper bound of the minimum required according to the 





 The fundamental reason for the criticism levelled at the report was their inability to progress 
beyond the ‘uninvention’ argument offered by AWRE from 1960 onwards. This meant that the panel 
could only recommend superficial reductions to support staff. The fragility of special skills and the 
need to retain research momentum was once again used to threaten ‘uninvention’ of the nuclear 
capability and therefore reject economies. These arguments are advanced early in the report, where 
a new maximalist version was presented: The panel was satisfied “that nuclear weapons work is 
fundamentally different from other kinds of defence work because the consequences of failure or 
error are of a completely different order of magnitude.”196 This formulation granted nuclear 
weapons a special privilege that further limited enquiry. As a result of this modality, the panel 
“accept[ed] that the maximum safety and reliability must be preserved at all stages of the nuclear 
weapons programme including the maintenance of the stockpile. This requires the retention of high 
quality scientific and technological staff, and much complex capital equipment.”197 The extent to 
which the panel embraced this argument appears to have surprised Macklen who noted that “they 
seemed to be very impressed by the need for great care in this work.”198 Even in the event that 
AWRE was reduced to a maintenance only role, the panel concluded that the “complex and 
demanding nature of the work which could arise… [would be] as challenging as the original 
development.”199 Therefore, unless the nuclear deterrent was abandoned (which was beyond the 
remit of the Kings Norton Inquiry to consider), “it will be necessary to retain the strength of 
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professional staff at close to the present level.”200 Although a minor reduction in the level of support 
staff was countenanced, this logic effectively precluded any reductions at AWRE below the then 
current level.201 
The logic for this argumentation was reportedly provided by the “Director of Aldermaston” 
according to the Rothschild minority report.202 Given its reported origin from the nuclear 
establishment, it is unsurprising that the wording of the Kings Norton Inquiry’s initial section is 
strikingly similar to the December 1967 UKAEA’s annex within the Defence Review Working Party’s 
Report.203 This suggests that the panel accepted AWRE’s views without significant caveats and that 
the UKAEA’s annex within the Defence Review Working Party can be used to provide further context 
to the AWRE’s perspective in the period surrounding the inquiry. The annex from the 1967 paper 
suggested that “the serviceability, life and safety of the weapon can only be assessed by staff with 
experience of nuclear weapon design.”204 It was claimed that this assertion was based on AWRE’s 
prior experience in maintaining warheads. 205 However, due to the unpredictability of this process, it 
was allegedly “impossible to predict by how much” various different skills embodied within 
individuals would be utilised in the “peculiarly complex and demanding tasks.”206 
 As these arguments had been accepted, the possibility for suggesting economies amongst 
the professional grades had apparently been ruled out from the outset because of tacit knowledge-
based arguments from AWRE. As evidenced in this instance, these arguments are difficult to 
challenge as they allegedly stem from individuals’ non-communicable expertise. The inability of the 
inquiry to progress beyond this difficulty was highlighted from the outset; the report states that “it 
would not be feasible to examine the Weapons Group estimate of staff needs in detail without many 
months of continuous work. We have, however, been able to arrive at broad judgements which we 
consider sufficient to fulfil our remit.”207 Given this was one of the supposed purposes of the inquiry, 
it is unsurprising that this elusion proved to be highly controversial. Lord Rothschild’s minority report 
also took issue with this stance, but concurred that it could only be resolved with “a whole-time 
investigation which would take many months.”208 The acceptance of a tacit knowledge based 
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argument by the majority panel and the existence of Rothschild’s report suggested to the “suspicion 
of some in Whitehall that the Committee had swallowed the AWRE argument, based entirely on 
statements presented by Aldermaston scientists.”209 According to Zuckerman, the panel 
“immediately decided it could not… [enquire deeper into the estimated staff levels]… in the time 
available. As a result, Ministers are now presented with a white-washing report which carries them 
little further than they were at the start of the enquiry.” 210 Even the Defence Secretariat thought 
that the Kings Norton Inquiry provided “admittedly no more than a superficial judgement,” and 
could potentially be cited to block reasonable reductions.211  
Even for Macklen, often characterised as a consistently pro-nuclear partisan, supported the 
premise of the argument but was more determined to find efficiencies. He recommended further 
staffing reductions, but was careful to couch his suggestions as “opinion” and “personal views.”212 
No evidence or justification is provided for these further reductions and while the figures he 
provides are not elaborated upon in terms of the grades of staff that could be made redundant, his 
economies entailed closing AWRE outstations and presumably a 500 reduction from support staff at 
Aldermaston.213 Nevertheless, Macklen’s more immediate reaction to the report in July 1968 was 
that its “value… is perhaps reduced by the fact that it takes a much more extreme view than is 
realistic about the need to maintain the capability and the size of the present resources.”214 
 Although Zuckerman, Macklen and others were unhappy with the inquiry and that the panel 
thought they had not been granted enough time, what is notably lacking from their criticism is any 
suggestions for an improved methodology to find a satisfying answer. As highlighted by the 
majority’s response to the Rothschild report, the determination of an acceptable level of staffing 
should be continually revised as “the future situation in this field cannot be known with certainty.”215 
This also meant, that as far as the panel and AWRE were concerned, no determination could be 
made at the present as the technical challenges that would be faced would remain unknown until 
encountered. If this logic is accepted, it is difficult to see when these conditions would ever resolve 
themselves, thereby making any significant reductions impossible. Progressing beyond the argument 
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as presented by AWRE was challenging as the Defence Secretariat admitted that “we here have very 
little information to go on” to counter the assertions made in the inquiry.216 Whatever the sincerity 
of the argument as presented by AWRE, there was a view within the MoD that they “have tried to 
concede as little as they felt they could get away with.”217 Given the opacity of AWRE, the autonomy 
of the UKAEA, the sense of an argument of authority derived from tacit knowledge, a speculative 
proposition on the future of nuclear weapons maintenance and a divide between practitioners and 





 If the need to maintain a large cohort of staff to preserve a nuclear capability was 
unpalatable, the implications were even more unsettling for those who wanted to impose stringent 
reductions on the nuclear programme. The consistent argument from Aldermaston from 1954 was 
that if staff were to be retained, they must be encouraged to remain with a diversified research 
portfolio.218 As seen, efforts to expand non-nuclear research had been steadily increasing after 1962, 
with the introduction of non-nuclear civil work after 1964.219 By 1968, diversified work was 
employing approximately 1700 of the 6175 Aldermaston employees, but a 1967 Overseas Policy and 
Defence Official Committee paper noted that this transition had been done “with difficulty.”220 
Rothschild and Zuckerman were highly critical of diversification; if the purpose of the work was to 
retain scientists then they contended that 22% of AWRE’s operating costs were being used on “make 
weight” work to "keep the scientists happy."221 Rothschild’s question of “how much is the country 
prepared to pay to keep these experts happy” had some weight since £5.4 million was being spent 
on these efforts in a period of economic instability.222  
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Rothschild and Zuckerman were especially critical of diversification as they perceived that 
Aldermaston was not an efficient place to conduct civil research when compared to Harwell; intense 
security and a lack of a profit orientated model were cited as the foundation of their inherent 
inefficiency.223 This was strenuously denied by the UKAEA who claimed that such insinuations were 
“unfounded” and the work was done in “the national interest.”224 Macklen provided the example of 
nuclear test monitoring, fast breeder reactor research and nuclear forensics work which were done 
economically at AWRE and would be done anyway, “independent of nuclear weapons work.”225 
Nonetheless, he questioned “does it now matter that AWRE… is used for many other purposes; is 
this not just a normal process of time changing roles. This is not the first Establishment, 
Organisation, or Office which only spends half its effort on its original task.”226 This was somewhat 
contradicted by the Minister for Technology who believed that “other work had to be given to… staff 
which was of relatively low priority and which would perhaps be more suitably carried out in 
industry.”227 Therefore the suggestion that diversification came at no cost to the Exchequer by the 
Kings Norton Inquiry was questionable.228 There was however general agreement (including from 
the Kings Norton panel) that further relevant diversified defence work could be found by 
consolidating other government defence establishments and apportioning some of the work to 
AWRE.229 Nonetheless, if a major weapons research programme was not provided, the logic of the 





While diversified non-nuclear weapons work was a way of retaining staff at AWRE, it had 
been increasingly suggested since 1962 that this was insufficient; some advanced nuclear weapons 
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research programme was inherently necessary.230 As argued, this was the initial impetus for Cook 
bringing the possibility of Polaris hardening work to the fore in 1966. This argument was reiterated 
by the UKAEA in 1967 and again in 1968.231 The remit for the Kings Norton Inquiry also reinforced 
this supposition as its remit was based on the overarching concern that the ability to retain nuclear 
weapons capability was to be upheld. Maintenance required the upkeep of a suitable establishment 
with the skilled individuals it employed. These staff members were to be retained on the basis that 
they would be required for challenging maintenance issues. If staff levels were kept at the 6000 level 
as proposed by the AWRE and the UKAEA, there would have to be a radical increase in diversified 
work; with no major addition of work, one sixth of the capacity of AWRE would be unutilised from 
1972 onwards.232  
Had the Kings Norton Inquiry been able to recommend reductions significantly below the 
6000 figure (especially among white paper grades), then logically the demands for work to fill spare 
capacity would reduce, thereby nullifying this justification for the Polaris improvements as 
diversified work and stockpile maintenance could provide a more sustainable programme. Even if 
this were to happen, it was still argued that only nuclear weapons research was seen to provide the 
“sufficient challenge” that would maintain “interest and morale.”233 The clear contender being 
forwarded to fill this void was “the full programme of Polaris hardening [which] would provide the 
necessary challenge and stimulus [to AWRE].”234 In 1967 it had been alleged that without such a 
programme, its absence “would imperil the whole technical capability of AWRE.”235 
Although not privy to the full technical and strategic insights of the PRESSG report, the logic 
of finding challenging work meant that the panel “[felt] that the first preference in selecting 
additional work to utilise this capacity should be military nuclear work.”236 Given their remit to 
consider hardening and the lack of other contenders, this was a clear endorsement for using the 
‘spare capacity’ for Polaris improvements.237 This was affirmed by the Minister for Technology and 
the SofS, who declared that “if we decide on anything less than an advance programme of 
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improvement, spare capacity at AWRE will rise sharply.”238 To nuclear weapons sceptics, the need to 
constantly develop new technologies to even maintain present capabilities was unacceptable. The 
above logic was criticised by Rothschild as pledging the UK to an “open-ended financial 
commitment,” which was not unfair, given that the report acknowledged that the UK would also 
have to find further nuclear weapons work beyond 1975.239 Cook and Macklen’s response was that 
“all R&D is to some extent open ended;” this serves to highlight the polarisation between those in 
Whitehall who thought that the expenditure was worthwhile, compared to those in favour of 
nuclear disarmament.240 
 A logical extension of the argument for hardening premised on retention of skills was that 
any new system would have to be developed in the UK, rather than bought from the US, even if this 
would prove the better value proposition. This was for two reasons: firstly, if the intention of 
hardening was to fill the ‘spare capacity’ gap, then a bought system would provide no benefit.241 In 
addition to highlighting savings for reducing US dollar expenditure, the Kings Norton panel also 
framed the benefits of indigenous production in terms of tacit knowledge: “where a new field of 
technology such as hardening is concerned, Weapons Group does not [sic] gain real technological 
understanding if a U.S. system is adopted.”242 Once again, while not couched in present terminology, 





 In terms of continuity of arguments from 1962, the role of staff morale was minimised. 
Whereas Conservative promises made to the establishment in the 1950s created the expectation 
amongst staff of secure employment, the gradual reduction in staffing from 1962 and Labour’s 
nuclear sceptic campaigning prior to 1964 meant there was no such belief.243 Nonetheless, this did 
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not prevent the UKAEA briefly highlighting in their contribution to the Defence Review Working 
Party in 1967 that “a large number of staff… have in the past received repeated assurances of 
continued employment.”244 Although the argument for retention of staff was predicated on 
suggesting that they would leave without a further programme, little attention was given to 
assessing morale.245 The Kings Norton panel cited “representations from the Staff Side of the Whitley 
Council that the long period of uncertainty about the future of the Weapons Group, dating back to 
1962, has brought an undesirable state of low morale.”246 Somewhat contradictorily, in a follow up 
meeting between the Minister of Technology and Kings Norton, Kings Norton highlighted that he 
had only seen “some anxiety… and he would imagine they would continue to speculate about their 
future. Morale among the industrial staff had seemed to him to be excellent.”247 Rather than more 
systematically inquiring as to the state of morale at the establishment, Zuckerman instead insisted 
that “make-weight” diversified work reduced confidence in AWRE’s future.248 
That no attempt was made to more accurately survey morale at AWRE is surprising, given 
that morale had been cited repeatedly by AWRE in relation to attempts to change policy in the 
past.249 While officials suggested the need for further work to ensure retention, evidence for the 
then current state of morale at AWRE was anecdotal. The previous chapters have seen the detailed 
attention given to housing, amenities and wages in order to recruit and retain staff, but specific 
discussion of staff concerns are notably lacking from Cabinet papers and the Kings Norton Inquiry.250 
Given that the proposition of the UKAEA was that the most skilled scientists could only be retained if 
their “interest and enthusiasm” was kept through new, challenging and diverse work, not examining 
their present conditions or ability to retain them with remedies other than with (or in combination 
with) new projects appears to be an oversight.251 As this argument was sometimes leveraged to 
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justify expressly military projects (rather than civil diversified research, as only military work would 
do), it does leave questions over the internal logic of the argument.252 
 
Mutual Defence Agreement 
 
 The use of the Mutual Defence Agreement in justifying staffing at AWRE to Ministers 
appears to have diminished in the Kings Norton Inquiry, compared to 1962.253 Discussion of the MDA 
and American cooperation appears briefly in the third annex of the Kings Norton Inquiry report.254 
While cooperation with the United States was still essential for the maintenance of Polaris, the value 
of further exchanges was dependant on whether the UK continued nuclear weapons 
development.255 This was contingent on a political decision from a Labour government which was 
hesitant to commit to such moves.256 This confusion was compounded by the extent to which the UK 
would potentially upgrade its Polaris systems being dependent upon information it gained from the 
US to determine the viability (and cost) of particular approaches; although this information was 
increasingly available from 1967, obtaining it proved a protracted process.257 Therefore, while the 
Kings Norton Inquiry noted that further collaboration with the United State was dependant on the 
UK providing “a real contribution,” which was presumed to be “further weapon development,” the 
issue of the MDA was subsumed into a wider debate over foreign policy, disarmament and the 
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future viability of the nuclear weapons establishment.258 The role of the MDA in staffing levels and 
future nuclear policy was perhaps dictated earlier in 1966, when Cook and other MoD officials had 
argued that tactical nuclear weapon work alone would “not suffice to maintain AWRE at a level of 
competence and activity that will give us continued access on an exchange basis to American 
information.”259 
 
Kings Norton: Oversight Failure? 
 
 Many contemporaries viewed the Kings Norton Inquiry as a failure, despite its eventual 
acceptance by Ministers in December 1968. It proved unsuitable for providing justification for 
meaningful savings at AWRE, which was the motivation for its initiation.260 As a result, the report did 
not serve to break the Cabinet deadlock as it had been hoped, so decisions on the future of the 
nuclear programme were further deferred.261 Inaction on what the future of AWRE should be was 
delayed pending receiving the PRESSG report, a wider restructuring of the twenty three government 
research establishments and the UKAEA, the ongoing SALT talks and the upcoming US presidential 
elections.262 
Given the apparent acceptance of long developed arguments forwarded by AWRE, the 
inquiry failed to provide further insight into establishing a ‘minimum effort.’ Zuckerman bluntly 
stated that “the Kings Norton report uses the AWRE claims to justify continuation of the status quo 
[sic].”263 This is accurate given the panels initial acceptance that “maximum safety and reliability 
must be preserved at all stages,” and when combined with the panel deciding not to explore AWRE’s 
staff estimates, these decisions limited its ability to contradict AWRE from the outset.264 This was 
only reinforced by the lack of a serious attempt to quantitatively or qualitatively gauge morale or 
staff retention efforts beyond simple enquiries to AWRE’s Whitley council. As a result, it is not unfair 
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that Moore characterises the inquiry as presenting “fairly bland conclusions.”265 On the other hand, 
Stoddart characterises the Cabinet’s acceptance on the inquiry’s findings as a “turning point in 
working-level British nuclear weapons policy,” as it eventually enabled what would become 
Chevaline.266 
Both representations do not fully capture the reality of the outcome of the inquiry. What the 
Kings Norton Inquiry represented was the greatest external scrutiny that the nuclear weapons 
establishment had, until that moment, ever been subject to. Given the unilateralist tendency of 
some of the Labour Cabinet and the intense pressure to impose savings, it was perhaps the greatest 
existential threat faced by AWRE since Tizard’s attempt to cancel the HER programme in 1949-
1950.267 However, apart from Rothschild, the inquiry accepted the tacit knowledge arguments 
presented to them by AWRE without alteration. Whether this was an endorsement of AWRE’s 
arguments or an incapability for those external to the programme and without the prerequisite 
technical knowledge and security clearances to provide meaningful oversight is difficult to say. With 
the panel’s inability to examine staffing figures provided by AWRE in the time available (and no 
suggested method to do so even if more time were given), limitations on the technical information 
available to them and acceptance of speculative arguments based on the future retention of staff 
and the arsenal without substantive evidence, it strongly suggests an inability to do so. In a 
September 1968 letter to the Prime Minister, Zuckerman summarised this criticism as follows: “[the 
panel] accepted the highly dubious statement that the maintenance of a stockpile of nuclear 
weapons necessitated as highly skilled a scientific and technological staff as was required to design 
and engineer such weapons in the first instance.”268 Without better options, given with what 
Zuckerman perceived as the inquiry’s failure, he suggested that “Ministers… impose an immediate 
arbitrary cut in the annual budget of nuclear weapons work at AWRE… of the order of 20 per cent 
would enforce that reassessment of staff structure which no one outside the establishment has yet 
been able (or willing) to carry out.”269 While not conducted, the fact that control and oversight over 
AWRE had been reduced to this extent is notable. Even when recommending the inquiry’s findings, 
officials from the MoD, MinTech & UKAEA said that there were “no grounds for doubting” the need 
for the current level of staff, but no further affirmative defence of the finding was issued.270 This 
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raises the question: who, other than those intimately involved in the production of nuclear weapons 
(and therefore from AWRE), was in an authoritative position to dispute staffing requirements? The 
answer appears to be no one. 
 The inability for external parties to overcome this challenge despite their scepticism over 
AWRE’s claims is unsurprising. As highlighted in previous chapters, Sims and Henke have observed 
how tacit knowledge-based arguments have been useful rhetorical devices to post-Cold War nuclear 
weapons establishments, effectively used to justify further resources.271 This thesis has traced how 
AWRE developed a conception of skill that it then expressed to policy makers. Their argument 
shared the essential elements of Polanyi’s conception of tacit knowledge, which was then articulated 
by MacKenzie and Spinardi and used by nuclear weapons establishments in the 1990s. The ongoing 
rhetorical potency of the argument in its various iterations can be attributed to how Polanyi’s 
conception of personal knowledge was “developed as the cornerstone argument in a principled 
rejection of the very idea of managing the production of scientific knowledge.”272 The independent 
conception of a similar logic by AWRE through its historical experiences does not diminish how it 
was used to the same effect in the Kings Norton Inquiry. The argument was premised on identity and 
authority (as ‘weaponeers’) to which external parties had little hope of matching. This is not to 
dismiss the accuracy or sincerity of the argument; as will be seen, there was a reality to maintaining 
the necessary skills in the establishment, but it instead highlights how it was utilised and the 
difficulty in scrutinising its claims.273 
Oversight and Autonomy 
 
 Therefore, what the Kings Norton Inquiry represented was the inability of parties outside of 
AWRE to provide meaningful oversight over the nuclear weapons programme. Although this 
mechanism was hypothesised in the framework, this failure was fundamentally a product of the 
argument used by AWRE, premised on epistemological authority and enhanced by institutional 
secrecy. This thesis already noted the repeated inability of the treasury to provide insight into what 
constituted reasonable spending at the weapons establishment. This continued throughout the 
1960s and was a source of frustration to Wilson, even after the Kings Norton Inquiry, as he 
“expressed his dissatisfaction with the situation… [that] the Treasury… seemed incapable of 
subjecting the demands of organisations such as AWRE to the same exhaustive scrutiny as was 
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devoted to relatively minor and detailed matters in certain departments.”274 The institutional 
autonomy provided by the UKAEA separated AWRE from the same review mechanisms as other 
government departments.275 Oversight over AWRE was meant to be provided by the MinTech, but 
their officials were frequently denied technical and financial information; according to “Dennis 
Fakley, deputy chief scientist at the Ministry of Defence at the time: ‘From the point of view of the 
nuclear weapons programme, MinTech was an irrelevance.’”276 The official secrecy surrounding the 
nuclear weapons establishment was rigidly maintained by MoD officials who created a virtual 
“monopoly of knowledge over the field of nuclear policy.”277 Visits to AWRE by officials from other 
departments were only “reluctant[ly]” facilitated by the MoD.278 Zuckerman observed that 
reluctance to share information helped preserve the inscrutability of nuclear weapons, as “the 
Aldermaston scientists worked in strict secrecy on mysteries which the ordinary civil servant or 
politician could not begin to understand.”279 
This process extended to a wider culture that limited the distribution of papers; this 
“skulduggery” most notably included preventing access to both the findings of the Kings Norton 
Inquiry and PRESSG papers to Ministers.280 The denial of technical information was perceived as “a 
deliberate attempt within the Ministry of Defence to at best delay for a long time and at worst 
sabotage… the AWRE enquiry.”281 The situation was so dysfunctional that according to Jones, the 
Cabinet Office “hoped to put a ‘ferret’ into the MoD” to discover if they were intentionally 
withholding information.282 With Zuckerman outside of the MoD after 1966, the provision of 
technical information to government and the inquiry was left to individuals such as Cook, Macklen 
and Newley.283 Contemporaries such as Zuckerman and later academics such as Spinardi and McLean 
& Beyer noted that this was unlikely to result in impartiality when the officials involved all 
“instinctively shared Aldermaston’s aspirations.”284 Zuckerman still played an influential role as CSA 
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to the Cabinet Office and continued to oppose a hardening programme with an “intermittent rear 
guard action,” but did so with limited insight and authority.285 Even after the change of government 
in 1970, the established dynamic of Cook and Macklen providing information favourable to a 
hardening programme, with Zuckerman playing his role as the sceptic would continue.286 According 
to correspondence received by Walker, “Zuckerman had initiated this enquiry with the aim of 
emasculating AWRE” in 1968.287 While perhaps one of few options left to significantly diminish 
AWRE, it was unlikely to succeed. With no external party qualified to oversee the provision of advice 
regarding skills and staff retention at AWRE, it is unsurprising the inquiry made no more headway in 




Given the delays in decision making in the last two years of the Wilson administration, the 
Kings Norton Inquiry was the last major impetus for economies to be imposed on AWRE. The report 
had suggested the need for hardening work because of spare capacity, but this was not committed 
to. The Labour government of 1966-1970 never positively affirmed that a Polaris hardening 
programme should take place; the “continually and intentionally delayed” PRESSG report 
recommended that a feasibility and definition study should take place when it was finally made 
available in March 1970, but this was only approved of by the incoming Conservative government in 
October 1970.288 Nonetheless, due to the lack of oversight and autonomy afforded to the weapons 
establishment, “bureaucratic momentum” continued to be accumulated in regards to Polaris 
hardening.289 AWRE were able to expand the resources available to the endeavour through its ‘self-
initiated research’ budget.290 By 1969, AWRE were already spending “£3.5 million per annum” on 
Polaris hardening on the grounds of testing “feasibility.”291 This would rise to £4 million per year by 
1970, meaning that a considerable amount of money had been spent on Polaris hardening before 
any decisions beyond exploratory research had been made.292 Zuckerman was already complaining 
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in 1968 that “although AWRE had had no new programmes since the present Government came into 
office, they had nevertheless spent around one million pounds annually on capital equipment.”293 
This momentum was not only monetary, but also diplomatic; Polaris hardening involved extensive 
negotiations with the Americans for information which peaked with the covert UK participation in 
radiation tests in Nevada for nominal payments.294 Terminating the programme abruptly would have 
been a humiliating volte-face. Although yet to be convinced of the strategic case for Polaris 
hardening, the Wilson governments attempt at keeping “options open” was proving highly 
expensive.295 The existence of the programme became self-justifying on the basis of continuing 
research at AWRE and sunken costs.296 This continued into the Heath administration where a 1973 
document exploring options for improving Polaris where an indigenous programme, on “which a 
considerable amount of money has been spent,” was the only viable option “if we wished to 
continue to preserve our strategic deterrent expertise.”297  
 
Why was a Skills-based Argument Successful in 1968 but not 1962? 
 
The skills-based arguments forwarded in 1962 and 1968 were both unsuccessful in 
immediately obtaining further work. Nonetheless, given the similarity of the arguments used by 
AWRE in 1962 and 1968, it raises the question of why did tacit knowledge-based arguments forestall 
reductions only in 1968, but not 1962? Many of the same mechanisms for limited oversight of the 
nuclear weapons establishment had been present throughout the 1960s. For instance, Maguire 
notes that in 1963, “Zuckerman did not attempt to conceal his belief that the scientists at 
Aldermaston were under too little control, arguing that lack of ‘executive authority’ meant that the 
direction of ‘long term research... is left almost completely to [AWRE]’.”298 While Zuckerman was 
clearly a partisan observer, AWRE would go on to explicitly assert their autonomy from potential 
sources of governmental oversight such as MinTech in the intervening period.299 
Perhaps the simplest explanation for this discrepancy was that the AWRE of 1962 was 
overstaffed to such a degree that the expenditure it incurred made it impossible for it to be 
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continued at its then rate; 8715 staff were employed by AWRE, compared to 6370 by 1967.300 The 
elevated level of staffing was sustained on the basis of the Sandys’ conception of nuclear based 
deterrence and the short term requirement of expanding and anglicising the nuclear arsenal. 
Arguing that the 1962 figure represented a minimum staffing complement was not attempted (and 
untenable given 7590 were employed in March 1958, at the height of the Grapple tests); the 
argument justified the retention of a core cadre of around half of the then staff that would be then 
necessary for maintenance. 301 From this perspective, the need for a minimum complement of 
around 4500-4800 required for post-design challenges was remarkably consistent throughout the 
60s; the 6000 figure included staff employed on diversified work.302 With the figures in 1968 
approaching what AWRE had therefore maintained was approaching a minimum, the weapons 
establishment was credibly able to raise “threat uncertainty” over the risk posed by nuclear 
weapons ‘uninvention’ through skill loss.303 
 Although reducing expenditure on nuclear weapons was important to the governments in 
power in 1962 and 1968, the second clear factor was the differing political commitment to changing 
the role of nuclear weapons within British defence policy. The move away from Sandys’ conception 
of nuclear deterrence to a more flexible defence policy, while imposing economies necessitated 
reductions under the Macmillan government. Therefore, an affirmative political decision had been 
made to reduce nuclear weapons research and development spending. Both Watkinson and 
Thorneycroft were raised to their roles as SofS to oversee reductions, so were unlikely to be swayed. 
In contrast, Labour was split several ways over unilateral disarmament (for moral or financial 
reasons), internationalisation or maintenance of the status quo.304 A lack of political consensus 
lowered the function of the NRDC which had provided a ‘civilian’ check to nuclear ambitions during 
Macmillan’s tenure, which in the Wilson administration “met too infrequently to perform the 
function of continuous oversight that was required.”305 With Healey supporting arguments 
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forwarded by MoD officials and Wilson being notably pragmatic, it was easier to defer decisions, 
rather than force the issue.  
Within Saunders’ framework on the domestic politics of nuclear weapons decisions, the 
differences between Macmillan’s and Wilson’s commitment to their nuclear weapons policies could 
be characterised as ‘mobilisation’ versus ‘delegation.’306 To obtain consensus on defence reductions, 
Macmillan expanded the circle of actors involved in discussing nuclear issues under the Future Policy 
study. The NRDC provided further civilian oversight over AWRE, which allowed the principal to 
enforce their will after firmly establishing their intentions. Wilson handled the combined threats of 
improving Soviet ABM systems and the potential for nuclear uninvention. In contrast, Wilson was 
unwilling to divide his polarised cabinet over nuclear weapons issues so delegated them to the 
defence bureaucracy. The Kings Norton Inquiry was a further symptom of delegation and it lacked 
mechanisms to interrogate information provided by AWRE. Wilson’s strategy of delegation 
exacerbated principal-agent issues over information asymmetry as the core issue was that of 
incommunicable skill.307 Only the weapons establishment was in an authoritative position to provide 
answers. 
It is also hard to deny the role of personal dynamics in influencing nuclear policy in the 
1960s: Healey and Zuckerman did not get along, speeding Zuckerman’s move to the Cabinet Office 
and away from a position of greater oversight over AWRE.308 The combination of Macklen and Cook 
within the MoD, with Penney, Newley and later Peter Jones at AWRE dictated the terms on which 
information was provided. This influence over defence policy had perhaps been amplified by the 
centralisation of the MoD in 1964.309 Frank Cooper (in 1968 Deputy Under-Secretary (Policy), MoD) 
stated to the Public Accounts Committee in 1980 that the role of Macklen in particular was “an 
inheritance of the early days of nuclear work. It was kept for a very long period of time within an 
exceptionally limited circle of people who were privy to the innermost details of nuclear thinking and 
nuclear technology.”310 Clearly, those outside of this circle faced immense difficulties gaining access 
to nuclear weapons information, further exacerbating the information asymmetries inherent in the 
nuclear weapons principal-agent relationship.311 
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Based on previous experience with retaining staff, Nyman Levin suggested in 1960 that 
AWRE needed high levels of skills to solve post design challenges. Aldermaston’s representatives 
continued to develop these arguments in the face of unprecedented reductions to nuclear weapons 
research and development by 1962. The skills’ ‘special’ nature, fragility and the irreversibility of their 
loss was suggested to the government. Although the use of this argument is noted in some of the 
secondary literature, the process of Aldermaston’s management increasingly acting as heterogenous 
engineers is underappreciated. 312 However in the early 1960s, due to firm political commitment to a 
reduction on high levels of spending on nuclear weapons and limited AWRE influence on the cabinet, 
attempts to obtain an ongoing research programme were unsuccessful. Nevertheless, the Skybolt 
Crisis and the Nassau Agreement provided several new projects, which temporarily alleviated the 
situation for Aldermaston. 
Despite the efforts to further diversify work at Aldermaston, this chapter has demonstrated 
that AWRE was concerned about a ‘brain drain’ throughout the 1960s. This was a common concern 
for British industry and research establishments, but particularly worrying for Aldermaston because 
of the difficulties in acquiring enough ancillary research to retain ‘high quality’ staff. The overall 
perception of ‘brain drain’ led to Prime Minister Wilson’s call to unleash the ‘white heat of 
technology,’ suggesting that he may have been uniquely susceptible to concerns over loss of 
knowledge and skills from the weapons establishment. This process ensured that the pause in 
arguing for new projects between 1962 and 1966 was only temporary.  
When the renewed need for further projects reoccurred, William Cook was well placed in his 
role at the MoD to advocate for new weapons projects to the new Labour government in 1966. As 
this chapter has evidenced from primary sources, Cook initially suggested Polaris hardening as a 
method to retain skills within the establishment. This proved to be highly controversial within the 
Wilson government, with some ministers in favour of unilateral disarmament. With finding a 
consensus proving elusive, the Wilson government delegated finding a resolution to the Kings 
Norton Inquiry. Although intended to determine the minimum level of staffing at AWRE, the panel 
reiterated information provided by AWRE and therefore only recommended superficial reductions.  
 




While the inquiry was censured for failing to critically examine the limited information it was 
provided, it was unclear how it could have succeeded. The conception of tacit knowledge presented 
by AWRE meant that assertions of their expertise stemmed from their identity as ‘weaponeers.’ 
Given the technical and secret nature of nuclear weapons work, the panel were not able to credibly 
challenge the needs of AWRE, despite Rothschild’s efforts. Nonetheless, the Kings Norton Inquiry 
was perhaps the best opportunity under Wilson’s first government for nuclear weapons and 
economic sceptics to denude the establishment of resources. It had failed to do so, and the 
subsequent years of the Wilson administration were occupied with considering wider reform to 
government research establishments and the UKAEA; a decision on Polaris hardening was deferred 
beyond the next election. No affirmative decision was made by the Wilson government either way 
regarding Polaris hardening, but due to the autonomy of AWRE within the UKAEA, continually 
greater resources were directed towards the project. Polaris hardening was not provided as ‘make-
weight’ work for Aldermaston, but the value placed upon AWRE’s skills in the Kings Norton Inquiry 
proved a defence against staff reductions, which in turn proved a strong justification for further 
weapons research. 
The failure of the Kings Norton Inquiry to determine a minimum staffing level for AWRE 
reflected the established inability of the Ministry of Technology and the UKAEA to scrutinise the 
British nuclear weapons establishment. This has already been noted in the secondary literature, but 
while this chapter concurs, it also suggests that this was a systemic problem due to the secrecy 
surrounding Aldermaston. As only those with a close connection to the weapons establishment were 
qualified (and permitted to develop such expertise) to comment on the tacit knowledge 
requirements of the work, individuals with a favourable view of AWRE’s institutional interests were 
best placed to argue from a position of authority. Therefore a select few individuals, such as William 
Cook and Victor Macklen, had a uniquely important role in influencing policy. 
In conclusion, throughout the 1960s, AWRE developed an independently conceived notion 
of the ‘uninvention hypothesis,’ which was used to justify ongoing weapons developments. This 
belief established a reoccurring process where in periods when AWRE was near the end of its 
assigned project work (1954, 1958, 1960-1962, 1966-1968), arguments over the need to retain skills 
came to the fore. This reflects the cyclical nature of morale at the establishment and the search for a 
sustainable workload. Although the argument was not successful in preventing cuts in 1962, it was in 
1968. This was important given the political climate; Hennessy states that the outcome of the Kings 
Norton Inquiry was that “Aldermaston survived.”313 As demonstrated by this chapter, this was 
 




enabled by delegation of nuclear decision making away from the principal; Wilson continually 
deferred on nuclear weapons issues as his cabinet was split between unilateral disarmament and 
ongoing modernisation. This allowed AWRE to maintain the status quo, whilst the scientific 
momentum cited in primary documents was converted into Beyer et al.’s “bureaucratic momentum” 
as more spending was accrued on Polaris hardening.314 The tacit knowledge of the scientists and 
engineers at Aldermaston was ‘sold’ to the Wilson government, rather than Polaris hardening.315 
These early efforts are therefore distinct from either a ‘technology out of control’ or a ‘politics in 
command’ model of technological development.316 While it could be deemed that this effort was 
simply an exercise in retaining resources at the establishment out of simple institutional interest, the 
next chapter will assess further measures taken in the aftermath of the Kings Norton Inquiry to 
retain skills in an effort to avoid ‘uninvention.’
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 This chapter traces the development of AWRE from after the Kings Norton Inquiry in 1968 to 
contractorisation in the 1990s. The first mechanism examined is how both Labour and Conservative 
governments attempted to exert greater oversight on Aldermaston by reorganising the weapons 
establishment away from the UKAEA and into the MoD. This centralisation diminished AWRE’s ability 
to advocate for its institutional interests, contributing to an austere period for Aldermaston, wherein 
staffing levels reduced. This chapter demonstrates that centralisation of AWRE under the MoD led to 
staffing reductions, which in turn contributed to several plutonium contamination cases in 1978, 
which necessitated remedial work. Although extending beyond hypotheses drawn from the 
secondary literature, it is argued that the incoming Thatcher government had its nuclear ambitions 
limited by AWRE’s capacity; Aldermaston’s inability to recruit and retain staff periodically even 
threatened the Trident programme. This prompted moves towards introducing private management 
of Aldermaston in 1989, which (like the foundation of the UKAEA in 1954) was an attempt to provide 
the organisation autonomy, free from civil service restrictions. Throughout this period, AWRE 
attempted to improve knowledge management practices internally. This manifested with the 
introduction of trickle production, simulation facilities and a bid to produce a new generation of 
tactical nuclear weapons. The chapter will conclude with Aldermaston making a final failed use of 
the tacit knowledge based ‘uninvention’ argument in 1993. After CTBT negotiations halted live 
nuclear tests, Britain’s nuclear weapons project undertook a rapid transition away from associating 
the credibility of the deterrent with the experience of scientists and technicians, and instead 




In seeking to trace Aldermaston’s more recent history, the limitations on the available 
sources become ever greater. As with previous chapters, many of the archival documents on the 
subject remain classified or unavailable due to an ongoing security review at time of writing. Due to 
the period involved being closer to the present, few files have been released to the National 




20-year rule, many files are still restricted on national security grounds.1 However, this is somewhat 
offset by the greater availability of public information provided by parliament’s Defence Select 
Committee, which was established in 1979. Even so, there are no official histories of this period 
available at time of writing and many of the secondary sources are limited to citing interviews and 
confidential correspondence. Stoddart’s series on British nuclear weapons history grapples with 
these challenges, but he only covers the programme until 1983. 
Despite these limitations, this chapter attempts to trace the impact of the Kings Norton 
Inquiry and how the pressure to preserve tacit knowledge within AWRE continued to be a perennial 
concern. It does not seek to generate a definitive history of this period, both due to necessary 
brevity and the availability of sources; wider political and strategic debates are cited only when 
relevant. Instead, this chapter will focus on how concerns over knowledge management were 
handled within Aldermaston, influenced its organisation, were communicated with the MoD and 
government and how these in turn effected nuclear policy. 
 
Impact of the Kings Norton Inquiry 
  
Institutional Development: Implementing Oversight 
 
 While AWRE was able to forestall immediate staff reductions after the Kings Norton Inquiry, 
this proved to be a pyrrhic victory. The ability to resist oversight demonstrated in the previous 
chapter ensured that a counteracting process was near inevitable. Measures were contemplated 
that would ensure greater principal control over the establishment. Even the usually sympathetic 
MinTech and MoD had reached a consensus in 1969 that while the Kings Norton Inquiry had 
believed that “nuclear weapons work ‘is fundamentally different from other kinds of defence 
work’…We believe this view to be mistaken.”2 Despite the inquiry, AWRE was still deemed inefficient 
as it was spending more than three times as much on supporting research and development (such as 
material science, health physics and experimental physics) than it was on warhead work for the 
MoD.3 The perpetuation of this situation was deemed the result of “[the] management of A.W.R.E., 
[which] the Authority has in practice a large measure of autonomy with little challenge from 
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Government Departments about the validity of its technical judgement or the detailed efficiency of 
its management.”4 The consequence of this was that “A.W.R.E. cannot be subjected to detailed 
oversight.”5 It was suggested that research autonomy had benefits in the 1950s, but now the 
maturity of nuclear weapons technology meant that more control over research was now deemed 
necessary.6  
Due to the repeated inability to impose economies on AWRE since 1966, there was strong 
support within Government and the civil service to reorganise the establishment so that it would be 
more firmly under government control.7 David Owen, then a Defence Minister believed that 
“Although responsibility for… [AWRE] was nominally shared between the Ministry of Technology and 
the MoD, this had little practical effect.”8 To correct this, the Wilson and then Heath government’s 
objective was “to bring AWRE within the MOD organisation.”9 Given the multiple stages of removal 
between meaningful technical or contractual oversight, it was believed that “benefits would flow 
from an early and firm decision on future responsibility for the control of the establishment.”10  
Although the merits of a reorganisation of AWRE were recognised, their implementation was 
delayed by wider considerations of how best to reorganise other government research 
establishments and how to structure the remaining UKAEA civil programme. Wilson favoured 
creating a singular large British Research and Development Corporation, but AWRE was perceived to 
be unsuitable as part of this commercially minded venture.11 As Polaris Improvement and further 
economies were “closely tied” with AWRE’s restructuring, a definitive decision on whether to 
progress was also delayed.12 A working party had been formed to study the future of AWRE.13 While 
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 The Heath administration adopted and proceeded with the research rationalisation 
agenda.15 Heath tasked Derek Rayner with generating proposals to reorganise UK defence 
procurement. Rayner was a prominent businessman and was brought in to introduce modern 
financial management practices into the sector.16 His report, which was quickly accepted by the 
government, was delivered in April 1971 and recommended that the MoD establish a single 
Procurement Executive. All the previously disparate research establishments would report to this 
new organisation.17 The transfer of AWRE to the MoD was viewed as “an essential pre-requisite to 
an economical rationalisation” of defence research and was “urgently necessary.”18 Neither in the 
Rayner report or policy documents was the objective of asserting more control over AWRE expressly 
stated. The word “control” had been deliberately removed from an initial draft, but the intention 
was still to “ensure that objectives are set by customers [i.e. the MoD].”19 
The proposal faced resistance. AWRE management believed that their transfer to the MoD 
would threaten its future supply of civil work.20 Given that reducing extraneous spending was the 
intention, the fear was grounded, but likely to be rejected. The UKAEA also raised the objection that 
it would disrupt the cooperation between Harwell and Aldermaston on civilian reactor work 
(particularly on the fast reactor programme) at a “critical time.”21 Their other argument was that it 
would further erode the confidence of their staff as the organisation progressively shrunk with the 
splitting off of the British Nuclear Fuels Ltd and Radiochemical Centre Ltd in 1971.22 However, the 
UKAEA had also resisted these efforts in 1969 on the same grounds, stating that “disintegration of 
the nuclear effort would be most disadvantageous technically at the present juncture.”23 The 
repeated allusion to technical matters to defer bureaucratic reform was ironically what hiving AWRE 
from the UKAEA was intended to overcome. While the plan had been to settle the “absorption” of 
AWRE into the MoD by 1st April 1972 “in order to prevent the discussion dragging on indefinitely,” 
the practical difficulties of the “legislative timetable” ensured further delays.24 Changes to the law 
were necessary in order to transfer the existing AWRE workforce back into the civil service.25 The bill 
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proved relatively uncontroversial (being framed as a mundane administrative matter), with the 
process complete by mid-1973, AWRE was hence part of Procurement Executive under the 
Controllerate of Research and Development Establishments and Research.26 
 In a retrospective assessment, a 1980 Treasury review of the organisation of Britain’s 
nuclear weapons programme made clear that “the need to ensure closer MOD control over and 
regulation of the executive management of the nuclear weapons programme was a major 
consideration leading to the setting up of the present organisation in 1973 – There is no doubt that 
this has been achieved and was a major advantage of the 1973 reorganisation.”27 It had been 
apparent to both the Wilson and Heath administrations that AWRE was too freely able to control the 
flow of information to influence policy decisions towards the establishment’s desired outcome. 
While the transfer to the MoD would rectify this problem, it helped contribute to a crisis at 
Aldermaston in 1978 to 1979 that threatened the continuation of Britain’s weapons programme. 
 
Reducing Personal Influence 
 
 Given that asserting more government control over the weapons establishment was one of 
the objectives of transferring AWRE to the MoD, the impact that this had on the influence of key 
officials must be examined. A legacy from the foundation of the British nuclear weapons effort was 
that scientists and civil servants involved in nuclear issues had a close relationship with senior 
government members, although this had somewhat waned with the departure of figures such as 
Cook and Penney.28 
Nonetheless, the consolidation of the MoD in the 1960s had given the Chief Scientific 
Advisor (CSA) and/or Chief Advisor (Projects) (CA(P)) in the MoD significant influence over nuclear 
policy, without a responsibility for auditing AWRE’s performance.29 The personal influence wielded 
by William Cook as Chief Advisor (Projects) and Macklen amongst others, combined with the 
weakness of the Ministry of Technology and UKAEA in auditing the establishment was seen by 
Zuckerman to have allowed for parochial interests to dictate nuclear policy and spending to increase 
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unchecked.30 Zuckerman complained that the nuclear weapon establishment had acted as a “’free’ 
agent” and strongly advocated that when AWRE was transferred to the MoD, further reforms should 
be made as “a simple transfer… would just not do.”31 Zuckerman’s proposal to the Prime Minister, 
which was implemented, was that the MoD CSA must have a “direct link” to the establishment to 
influence the “directions and purpose” of nuclear weapons developments but “the execution of 
already agreed policy” would be controlled by the new Procurement Executive.32 
The ability of Aldermaston to conduct discretionary research was to be severely curtailed as 
all projects would be approved of by the CA(P) who would “finally decide the programme of work he 
wishes to have executed.” 33 The director of Aldermaston would be firmly subordinated to the CA(P), 
who in turn would answer to the MoD CSA and SofS. The Procurement Executive would “make 
informed judgements on resource allocation problems,” making sure that AWRE would conform to 
the agreed agenda.34 
 While this separation of responsibilities was the theoretical settlement from 1973 onwards, 
it was swiftly undermined by the delegation of the financial oversight responsibilities of the 
Procurement Executive for the Chevaline programme back to CA(P).35 Given the objective of the 
reforms to the management of AWRE, this seems odd. In an attempt to explain why this occurred, 
Frank Cooper stated in 1980 that it was “normal” for nuclear work to be overseen by a small number 
of individuals as it “was an inheritance of the early days.”36 While it was alleged that this contributed 
to the increase to the cost of Chevaline during this period, select officials influencing weapons policy 
remained an ongoing issue.37 For example, even after Macklen’s retirement in 1979, his influence 
continued as he gave advice on nuclear matters to subsequent MoD CSAs.38 
 Although influence over nuclear policy remained invested in select MoD officials, AWRE’s 
sway on policy through its directors did diminish because of the 1973 reforms. While Cook and 
Penney had enjoyed direct access to the Prime Minister during their tenure at AWRE, the 1973 
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reforms subordinated the director of Aldermaston within and under the MoD. This was clearly 
demonstrated in 1978 with the appointment of David Cardwell as the establishment’s director.39 
Spinardi highlights how Cardwell (and his successor Colin Fielding) was a “career civil servant 
brought in from outside.”40 Cardwell’s AWRE biography in 1980 makes no mention of nuclear 
experience before 1978.41 Cardwell still advocated for AWRE, but unlike Penney or Cook, it does not 
appear that he was consulted or cited by ministers of senior civil servants to the same degree as his 
predecessors.42 
 
Effect of 1973: AWRE in Decline? 
 
 One of the main objectives of the defence rationalisation agenda was to improve the 
efficiency of British defence research efforts by removing duplicate capabilities across multiple 
institutions. 43 The closure or downsizing of other defence research establishments was meant to 
provide compensatory work to AWRE to offset the loss of its civil diversified research programme. 
Civil work had consistently been viewed as cost inefficient and was set to be curtailed as AWRE was 
moved out of the UKAEA.44 With defence work intended to make up for civil shortfalls, it was 
important for it to be transferred promptly.45 While some work was transferred, the process had 
“not been implemented to any significant extent” by 1980.46  
The problem this posed can be shown through the proportional increase of man years 
devoted within AWRE to the Defence Nuclear Programme (DNP) compared to civil diversified 
research and non-nuclear defence research, despite the DNP’s absolute decline with the completion 
of Chevaline research and development.47 In 1970, the DNP was 70% of the effort, 22% to civilian 
diversification and 8% to non-nuclear defence work. By October 1979, “about 18% of AWRE’s… 
[effort was] deployed on defence non-nuclear work” while “some 4%” was still on civilian 
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diversification work, with the DNP presumably accounting for at least 78% of the effort.48 This 
declining proportion of work other than the DNP was worrisome as 1979 represented a relative lull 
in the development activities at Aldermaston; while Chevaline was in production, no major 
development project was underway.49 This indicates that the total amount of work available to the 
establishment had significantly declined. While the rationalisation agenda continued to be slowly 
implemented (such as with the transfer of high explosive research to AWRE from 1979), civil 
research at AWRE continued to decline, with it reaching 3% of AWRE’s workload in 1980.50 Although 
the reduction of work allowed for economies at AWRE, the perception of the establishment in 
decline further convinced staff to seek employment elsewhere, which in turn contributed to the next 
process of fears over safety at Aldermaston in the late 1970s.  
 
Reusing Uninvention: Simulations and Initial ‘Black Boxing’ 
 
Even with Aldermaston’s subordination to the MoD, AWRE continued to use the 
‘uninvention’ argument to acquire further projects. A reiteration of the arguments used to justify the 
Polaris Improvement Programme were deployed in favour of acquiring experimental laser plasma 
fusion facilities at AWRE in 1976. As with Polaris Improvement in 1966, the re-emergence of these 
arguments came with the imminent completion of a campaign of work. In this case, AWRE’s role in 
the “theoretical” development of Chevaline was “due to be completed” with the Anvil nuclear tests 
in 1976.51 This would mean AWRE would lack a main research and development project. This could 
also mean a renewed suspension of nuclear testing. According to Macklen, when this had occurred 
between 1965 and 1974, it had resulted in “the effectiveness of AWRE… [deteriorating] 
considerably.”52 
Unsurprisingly, the question of what work would sustain the establishment’s future returned 
to the forefront of Macklen’s agenda. While the preferred candidate was a new strategic nuclear 
system, the Labour government refused to discuss a successor system for Chevaline in 1976 “for at 
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least two years.”53 It is within these circumstances that AWRE launched a bid to acquire new laser 
facilities for itself in 1976, that would allow for the simulation of fusion reactions in warheads.54 
Early efforts to use lasers for fusion simulations had begun in 1971, and these experiments 
offered “the prospect of investigating some facets of nuclear weapons design without nuclear tests,” 
if larger, more powerful facilities could be deployed.55 Nonetheless, tentative approaches to secure 
further funding were rebuffed by a “distinctly sceptical” SofS in May 1976.56 A further barrier to 
AWRE was fierce competition from Harwell over where to base fusion research given intense 
budgetary pressures.57 To secure AWRE’s case, a report was delivered by both Victor Macklen and 
William Cook to the MoD CSA.58 Macklen opened that “the current programme of nuclear research 
work on Chevaline is nearing completion… [and] the time has now come to formulate the policy for 
the future research programme on which the highly skilled teams at AWRE should be re-deployed.”59 
He further claimed that “the report is written on the assumption that Ministers will wish to retain a 
worthwhile nuclear capability.”60 To do this, “approval for a future warhead research programme is 
necessary.”61 With the Labour government’s reluctance to approve a continuing test programme or 
firmly commit to a new nuclear system, new laser facilities were held to ease the need for progress 
with “weapon design without nuclear tests” and progress tentative research into advanced design 
concepts.62 In order to support this argument that some programme was necessary, Macklen 
highlighted how AWRE was operating below the minimum manpower and financial requirements 
that had been specified in 1966.63 In a further similarity to prior iterations of the same argument, 
consultation offered by William Cook offered “that a positive UK programme would open the doors 
in the USA to information.”64 
 Although the above report made clear appeals to the possibility of nuclear uninvention, 
these warnings would only get stronger in September 1976. The MoD CSA, Hermann Bondi 
suggested to the SofS that “the nuclear field does not differ from any other field of defence 
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capability in so far as the possibility of future development depends on the existence of an active 
research programme.”65 Macklen additionally forwarded to the SofS that the “basic question” for 
Ministers to consider is “whether to stay in the nuclear weapons business against a hypothetical 
future requirement plus an actual requirement to refurbish certain warheads in the 1980s, or 
whether to let our capability run down.”66 The invocation of the uninvention argument appears to 
have succeeded as in October 1976, the establishment acquired permission to proceed with capital 
spending for laser fusion facilities.67 This approval was maintained even in the face of further price 
increases to the project in February 1977.68 Nonetheless, by 1979, the new HELEN laser facilities 
were in operation.69 
 This incident clearly demonstrates the continuing use and potency of the ‘uninvention’ 
argument to justify further research commitments at AWRE to retain skills embodied within people, 
who needed a constant supply of work to keep them in post. On the other hand, the acquisition of 
fusion simulation facilities at Aldermaston was an early indication of the establishment in transition. 
Instead of placing the emphasis of retaining the credibility of nuclear weapons through tacit 
knowledge, the laser facilities were a clear move towards a more technically based process, 
guaranteed by scientific data rather than design experience.70 
In 1978, Macklen praised this approach in a presentation to American colleagues, believing 
that it would allow for new meaningful data to be exchanged with the US (thus satisfying the MDA), 
allow for a CTBT to be implemented while retaining nuclear weapons capability and increase the 
economic efficiency of the nuclear weapons programme by reducing the demands for live nuclear 
weapons testing.71 The importance of adopting this approach was highlighted by the resumption of 
negotiations towards a CTBT in 1977; simulations and a few last tests were necessary to obtain a 
“stock of proven technical knowledge….[to ensure] really fruitful and deep US/UK collaboration on 
stockpile maintenance problems in the event of a CTBT.”72 This approach was promptly continued 
with the commissioning of the MOGUL X-ray radiography facilities. The use of simulation and 
experimentation facilities to generate weapons maintenance relevant data became known to the 
Americans as “The English Concept.”73 As pressure to invest in the HELEN facility had been in explicit 
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response to the possibility of a renewed suspension of British nuclear testing, it is unsurprising that 
similar arguments increased in frequency in 1990s with renewed negotiations towards a CTBT.74 
There were the amongst first tentative moves of repositioning nuclear weapons credibility away 
from being embodied within people towards a ‘black boxed’ technical process.75  
 
Pochin and AWRE: Uninvention Manifest? 
 
Situation before 1978 
 
Despite raising the potential for uninvention, AWRE had its staffing levels reduced 
progressively from 1968 to 1978. This was not a new trend; during the 1960s and early 1970s, staff 
reductions had disproportionately fallen on skilled labour rather than scientists.76 A halt to the 
gradual reduction of staffing levels at AWRE was meant to be implemented in 1975 but did not occur 
due to the transition to the MoD in 1973.77 Thereafter, general reductions in overall defence 
spending meant that further reductions were made at AWRE; once again disproportionately fell on 
skilled labour rather than scientific grades.78 Subject to further defence budget cuts, government 
policy was for reduced staffing levels across all MoD defence establishments in 1974.79 As a result, 
the agreed complement for skilled labour at AWRE was reduced in 1975 and again in 1976.80 The net 
result was that while the total strength for scientific grades at AWRE was at 75% compared to its 
1961 level, skilled labour was at 50%.81 
Why AWRE retained scientists over other skilled technicians is unclear. Although often vague 
in terms of referencing broad ‘skills,’ arguments since 1962 favoured of preserving research rather 
than technical capacity. For example, fears over a ‘brain drain,’ the justification for diversification 
and the terms of the Kings Norton Inquiry were all made in reference to “retaining good scientific 
staff.”82 This bias may have been dictated by AWRE’s composition: in 1961, scientific staff 
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outnumbered craft strength by nearly 2:1.83 This makeup likely reflected the UK’s attitude to nuclear 
weapons prior to 1958 which was progressively changing from favouring a varied nuclear arsenal 
towards retaining a select few weapons systems, kept in service longer.84 An acknowledgement of 
this previous bias and subsequent realignment is present in a 1978 civil service briefing on AWRE 
that states “although AWRE has a research programme of high technological content, a major task is 
engineering design, development and fissile material component fabrication requiring engineers and 
industrial craftsmen of high skill.”85 
 Retaining the remaining highly skilled craftsmen proved challenging; from early 1977 
onwards, skilled labourers were leaving at a faster rate than planned reductions.86 Even when the 
agreed complement of skilled labour for AWRE was rapidly raised in October 1977, staff continued 
to leave, and this trend accelerated in 1978.87 This meant that while AWRE was meant to employ 
678 skilled labourers by 1979, it was more than 100 below strength, and already at a comparatively 
low level.88 As the events of 1978 would prove, this was a dangerous situation. 
 The trend of skilled labour leaving appears to have been the result of declining relative pay 
at AWRE for industrial grades after the 1973 transition to the MoD. At the time of the transition 
from the UKAEA to the MoD, pay for skilled labourers was substantially lower in the civil service than 
in the Authority, to the extent that the transition threatened industrial action that could have 
derailed Aldermaston’s design and production schedules.89 While pay for labourers who moved to 
the civil service regime was maintained at prior authority rates, any new labourers were paid at the 
lower civil service rate.90 It was noted that Industrial Civil Service pay had “fallen behind outside 
employers since 1975.” 91 When measured in 1977, the comparable “general level of earnings” was 
20% below equivalent private industrial positions.92 Finding better paid work compared to their 
“uniquely onerous responsibilities” would likely prove trivial given the prevailing “high employment” 
in the surrounding area.93 Pay at AWRE even declined relatively compared to the UKAEA; extra 
bonuses paid to Authority workers had persistently been raised throughout the 1970s. In contrast, 
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the bonuses paid to AWRE labourers had been fixed since 1973 and never renegotiated since AWRE 
had been transferred to the MoD.94 As a result, pay for skilled labourers at AWRE was significantly 
below either alternative UKAEA or local private sector work and it was unsurprising that workers 
were leaving at an increasing rate.95 
Plutonium Contamination 
 
In 1978, the safety situation at Aldermaston exacerbated the ongoing problem of skilled 
industrial staff retention to a new degree. In August 1978, three laundry workers at Aldermaston 
were measured to have levels of plutonium contamination higher than international standards 
agreed by the International Commission on Radiological Protection.96 Understandably, “[this] 
discovery caused considerable anxiety among those working at the establishment.”97 This spurred an 
inquiry into “Health and Safety at the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment at Aldermaston” 
(known as the ‘Pochin’ report as it was led by Sir Edward Pochin), which examined the radiological 
safety of the organisation. Pochin’s report, produced in two months, recommended a series of 
improvements to safety at AWRE. Amongst the most important of these was that “an increase in 
maintenance staff is urgently [sic] required.”98  
 Pochin identified that one of the major contributing factors for the decline of safety 
standards at AWRE were the reduced staffing levels; it was noted that in 1960 there had been 59 
health physics staff at Aldermaston, but in 1978 there were 43 and in 1975 it had been as low as 
38.99 This reflected wider reductions at AWRE where staffing levels had declined to 4000, their 
lowest since the early 1950s.100 These low staffing levels meant that safety considerations were 
neglected in the face of operational priorities.101 In addition, the persistently low staff complement 
curtailed any safety improvements: AWRE management noted that “certain modifications to safety 
precautions identified in 1971 have still not been implemented.”102 The arbitrary reductions after 
Kings Norton therefore appear to have contributed to these events. 
 
94 TNA, DEFE19/163, Skilled Industrial Labour at AWRE, 25/05/1978 
95 TNA, DEFE19/163, Industrial Labour at AWRE Aldermaston, 05/1978 
96 TNA, DEFE24/1346, An Investigation into Radiological Health and Safety at the MoD AWRE, 30/10/1978 – 
This number raised to 12 after further investigation. 
97 Michael McNair-Wilson, HC Deb 21 December 1979 vol. 976 cc1102-4 
98 TNA, DEFE72/450, The DCP and Downey Procedures, (n.d.) 
99 TNA, DEFE24/1346, An Investigation into Radiological Health and Safety at the MoD AWRE, 30/10/1978 
100 Urban, (1988). 4191 at Aldermaston, 357 at Foulness - TNA, DEFE19/155, Background Information on AWRE 
for PS Civil Service Department - Biographies, 09/1979 
101 McGinty, (1978) 





Effect on Chevaline 
 
Poor safety standards highlighted by Pochin meant that AWRE temporarily closed some 
facilities. Warhead production, already strained due to staff shortages, would be further delayed; 
remedial upgrades to fissile material handling facilities were required before they could be 
reopened.103 Even the immediate closure of facilities deemed hazardous would produce serious 
short term demands in terms of manpower required to mothball them until they could be 
improved.104 Fixing issues was also problematic; AWRE management noted in 1979 that despite “the 
contamination…[being] minor,” the extra work burden to improve safety standards by the 1980s 
would place a “disproportionately great” strain on capabilities.105  
These factors posed a serious situation for AWRE – the establishment had to take time away 
from production to improve safety, which threatened to derail the progress of the Chevaline 
programme. Problems with producing Chevaline were explicitly linked by officials to “Aldermaston’s 
staff shortages,” which included being “135 industrial grades short, many of whom could make a 
direct contribution to Chevaline.”106 This was despite a conscious effort to protect the Chevaline 
programme from the effect of staff reductions during the 1970s.107 Nonetheless, management 
documents noted that in 1978, “AWRE had move from generally meeting…[agreed progress] dates, 
to generally not.”108 In mid-1979, AWRE noted that due to the safety concerns of the fissile material 
handling facilities, “fissile component production for all warheads including Chevaline has been at a 
standstill since August 1978.”109 Without rectification, it was noted that safety standards at AWRE 
would continue to decline, but also “a drastic reduction in the Military Programme” would be 
necessary.110 
The shortages and reallocation of staff towards vital production or safety improvement was 
also affecting other areas of AWRE’s work. For instance, even the production of documentation for 
Chevaline was falling behind schedule, which would delay its introduction into use; AWRE’s 
management noted that “the fact remains that Coulport [main naval base for the UK’s deterrent] 
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have [sic] to have this documentation before they can handle our ‘products.’”111 The problem 
extended to the tactical nuclear weapons programme; in a report to the heads of the civil service, 
AWRE concluded in September 1979 that they “cannot support even one project adequately.”112 The 
situation was serious enough for it to be monitored routinely by Callaghan in 1978 and Thatcher in 
1979.113 
 Rather than gradually improving, the safety situation was creating a vicious cycle. Skilled 
manpower was being lost as workers left for other employment, so safety conditions were further 
deteriorating.114 This process was readily identified by David Cardwell, then Director of AWRE, who 
stressed that “the emphasis on Health and Safety legislation, the pressure on Chevaline and the 
need to refurbish many of the critical radioactive facilities at Aldermaston have all come together… 
just at a time when we need more staff we are forced into an accelerating loss rate which we judge 
will continue unless something positive is done to improve the situation.”115 This was placing the 
remaining staff in situations “completely outside any conditions of service which they would 
normally have expected to encounter.”116 This in turn would encourage the remaining workforce to 
leave, further exacerbating the maintenance problem. Cardwell complained on 2nd August 1978 to 
the MoD “that the industrial situation at AWRE is very serious indeed and unless the wastage in 
skilled labour can be reversed or at the very least reduced, the Establishment will become 
progressively less able to fulfil its forward commitments on the [Chevaline] programme.”117  
AWRE’s advocates once again framed the situation as an existential crisis through 
‘uninvention’ by skill loss. As Macklen noted, this was not simply a situation of balancing recruitment 
with wastage as “the plain fact is that we cannot recruit to replace wastage.”118 This was because 
work on “nuclear warheads is unique in that it is entirely dependent on intermural resources for 
production as well as R and D…. I cannot call on Industry for help or put AWRE… nuclear work out to 
contract.”119 By highlighting the singular and irreplaceable nature of the skills being lost, Macklen 
was once again appealing to wider tacit skills and ‘uninvention’ based arguments.  
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 As with previous problems with morale and retention, one of the main considered solutions 
was to offer better salaries.120 However, in this respect, AWRE was constrained since it had 
“transferred from [the] UKAEA to MOD in 1973… [and was therefore] subject to Civil Service pay 
policy.”121 This meant that it was subject to the same pay restraint of the rest of the civil service and 
could not offer extra allowances then being offered by BNFL and the UKAEA to workers at Windscale 
to retain their own staff.122 
As with recruitment in the early 1950s, AWRE had to promote other employment benefits 
that could potentially offset below average salaries. In 1978-1979, these included the provision of 
housing, applying price controls to rent, an assisted travel scheme, emphasising the civil service 
pension and the recreational facilities available to AWRE staff.123 In addition, a recruitment campaign 
was advertised through “local and national newspapers, local radio and job centres.”124 However, 
the result of this effort was judged to be “almost total failure… despite strenuous efforts to gain 
recruits.”125 The offer of housing, which in the 1950s had been the key factor in AWRE recruitment 
was now judged to be “disappointing,” even when targeted in areas of high unemployment.126 It 
appeared to management that only a substantial pay increase to the base salary of the staff would 
rectify the situation.127 
The proposed reform to improve retention and recruitment at AWRE was for an additional 
£15 per craftsmen per week to be paid to those working in the plutonium handling areas of 
Aldermaston.128 However, as with other periods when attempts were made to improve the pay of 
sections of the industrial and scientific civil service, resistance was met.129 This came from officials 
who wanted to retain pay restraint, other establishments that would not benefit from targeted 
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bonuses, the UKAEA and other sections of staff at AWRE (such as non-industrials), who would not 
receive bonuses.130 In terms of the arguments used by those against privileging AWRE, officials 
highlighted how “other establishments have comparable recruitment and wastage difficulties…[and 
it was therefore part of a] wider problem."131 Even when implemented, the application of 
“extraordinary measures” to improve recruitment was recognised to come at the “expense” of other 
MoD research establishments, and was therefore deemed not sustainable in the long term.132 
A widely held opinion of many officials was that they did “not see any way of solving the 
general problem without an overall substantial improvement in Civil Service pay and… [they did] not 
envisage this coming about.”133 This was not unfounded, given that any pay increase for industrials 
would likely have to be matched with a commensurate raise for non-industrials to avoid strikes. 
Management was acutely aware of “the need to produce terms that will be acceptable to [the] 
Trades Union Side… on which the majority voice lies with the non-craft unions.”134 Half measures 
could therefore be counterproductive - a minor pay increase could be rejected by the industrials’ 
union, while inciting “the non-industrial side [who] are refusing to cooperate.”135 A further fear from 
some MoD officials was that the safety situation at AWRE was being cynically exploited by the skilled 
labourers to extract better terms.136 As a result of the above factors combined, the Treasury proved 
reluctant to approve additional funds to remedy the situation as John Biffen (newly appointed Chief 
Secretary to the Treasury) wanted to be “absolutely certain that all other possible avenues for 
resolving the problem have been fully examined” before extra capital was committed.137 
 While the idea of paying an increased salary to workers handling fissile material within 
AWRE gained traction, it faced its greatest resistance from the UKAEA. From the UKAEA’s 
perspective, it was unfair that their workforce would not benefit from a special pay increase for 
handling fissile material, whereas AWRE’s workforce would. Despite clarification it was for handling 
metallic plutonium (a niche nearly exclusively fulfilled by AWRE), the UKAEA claimed that nearly half 
of their 13000 strong workforce should receive the benefit.138 Given that it was already difficult for 
AWRE to obtain approval for its own proposed pay increase, which even by the Treasury’s 
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commentary was “minimal in relation to the importance and size of the programme,” expanding the 
proposed benefit to such a degree would make it even more unpalatable to the government.139 
Resistance within government to AWRE’s pay increase was therefore rightly premised on the idea 
that once special nuclear related allowances were afforded, “they tend to spread, both in scope and 
geographically.”140 
In terms of countering these objections, the repeated position of AWRE was that the 
situation was so serious as to require extraordinary measures. From May 1978, officials noted that 
“an early general solution is imperative if AWRE is to remain viable… [and] there is every indication 
that the position is deteriorating further.”141 Macklen repeatedly asserted the fragility of the 
deterrent. He stated that “if HMG wants a deterrent… they must be prepared to pay the ongoing 
rate for skilled labour in the Reading area. We would have been better off had we left AWRE in the 
UKAEA.”142 Macklen insisted that “maybe a very special look should be taken at the allowance 
position” at AWRE.143 This was mirrored in AWRE management documentation from July 1979 that 
stated: 
“If the loss of craftsmen cannot be reversed, and if the essential recruitment to implement 
Pochin cannot be met, then the continued operation of our present strategic deterrent will be 
at risk: the Chevaline improvement programme cannot be continued at all and all ideas of 
TNF modernisation and successive Polaris system work must be abandoned. Once the AWRE 
radio-active facilities can no longer be operated we cannot produce new warheads, nor can 
we investigate maintenance problems in the existing warhead stock. The situation could 
arise where we are not able to guarantee the reliability or safety of the stockpile. The option 
of using industry or contract labour is not open to us in the nuclear warhead field.”144  
In addition, the “unique” nature of the Aldermaston facilities was stressed, and how the “best” 
workers were being lost.145 The starkness of these warnings came as AWRE approached a critical 
time in the Chevaline production programme. If delivery of the complete system (submarines, 
missiles and warheads together) was to occur on schedule in 1981 then production had to be 
resumed immediately. Officials’ warnings conveyed that “there is absolutely no time in hand.”146 As 
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a result, any negative consequences for the wider civil service, UKAEA or even the rest of AWRE had 
to be discounted. AWRE management warned that “we cannot wait for such theoretical possibilities 
to be resolved: we need to advertise now with higher rates of pay.”147  
In terms of countering the UKAEA’s objections, Macklen retorted that “the brutal fact is that 
unless we re-start the AWRE production line we might as well cancel Chevaline and all other plans 
for nuclear warheads. Again brutally it wouldn’t matter much if the AEA had a long industrial 
dispute.”148 David Cardwell, Aldermaston’s Director was in agreement; in June 1978 he warned that 
“we thus live on the edge of a precipice and it would be all too easy for some incident to push us 
over.”149 Despite these warnings, the MoD was still warning in July 1979 that the situation was 
“critical,” and if work did not resume within fissile handling areas by September 1979, delays would 
be inevitable.150 
These repeated citations for the potential for nuclear weapons ‘uninvention’ were clear 
attempts to overcome civil service intransigence. Rather than happening gradually with the slow loss 
of scientific expertise, the loss of production capability posed the greatest potential for Britain’s 
nuclear capability to become inoperable in a relatively brief period. By highlighting the loss of these 
‘unique’ facilities and the loss of the particularly ‘skilled’ workers, their irreplaceable nature was 
highlighted. Nonetheless, without immediate remedies, the situation continued to deteriorate into 
1979: on 1st July 1979, the craftsmen deficiency was 38% below the “required” complement to 
continue the warhead programme and raise health and safety standards.151 In September 1979, 
AWRE had to recruit 950 extra staff just to rectify the “current situation.”152  
 
Solutions: Recruitment & Retention  
 
 In terms of alleviating the present situation, Aldermaston returned to improving recruitment 
and retention, iteratively repeating a cycle that had occurred since the 1940s. This first manifested in 
1979 with the recognition that “the industrial situation…[was] intractable until, or unless, the 
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Government comes with some reasonable pay offer.”153 This resulted in a near 30% increase of civil 
service labourers’ wages in July 1979, but this was still below average pay in the private sector.154  
To compensate, a second extra “Aldermaston Special Allowance” was authorised in April 
1979, amounting to £15 per week for workers handling fissile material.155 While this benefit was 
seen as a positive measure by AWRE’s management, it was judged that “by itself, this allowance was 
clearly inadequate to stop the manpower drain.”156 The idea of ring-fencing this additional bonus to 
only plutonium workers was intended to incentivize labourers already working at AWRE to internally 
transfer.157 Promoting internal transfers of staff was important as improving recruitment would not 
remedy the situation fast enough. Recruitment was never a quick process at AWRE due to security 
clearance processing taking time.158 Nonetheless, this fissile material handling bonus appears to 
have had a negligible effect as it “resulted in only one [internal transfer] applicant” by June 1979.159 
A further proposed initiative was a productivity scheme, wherein efficiencies introduced by 
labourers could be rewarded “by up to £6.50” a week, but this was still under negotiation.160 Even 
with all of these benefits combine, MoD officials noted in September 1979 of the need to “recognise 
recruitment realism” due to the ongoing economic situation and manpower shortage within the civil 
service.161 Francis Pym believed that the only effective solution in the long term was a “bigger basic 
pay packet” at Aldermaston.162 
 In addition to remedying the pay situation, AWRE considered triaging its production efforts. 
This would involve “spreading the available effort more thinly over most of the Establishment's tasks 
with consequent delays and omissions.”163 Ironically, management noted that “It is disturbing that 
some of these items relate to the current safety improvements of the operations at AWRE.”164 In 
1979, Peter Jones, then deputy director of Aldermaston noted that “we will consider “campaign” 
working of A.45 and A1.1.”165 Other less essential areas of work were to be halted if required.166 In 
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terms of the order of reductions considered in 1978, it is unsurprising that AWRE’s non-nuclear 
programmes would be reduced first, followed by lower priority nuclear work, such as work on 
tactical nuclear weapons.167 
 Through a combination of the above factors, the staffing situation at AWRE appears to have 
gradually improved in 1980. Francis Pym wrote to Margaret Thatcher on 18th March 1980 that while 
the situation at Aldermaston “remains an area of concern… [and] of critical importance,” “there has 
been some improvement in the staffing situation.”168 By November 1980, the Assistant Chief 
Scientific Adviser (Nuclear) briefed the Cabinet Defence Committee that “In fact we are recruiting 
quite nicely at the moment. We have begun to turn the corner as far as net increases of effort are 
concerned in the relevant skills in the establishment.”169 
Nonetheless, the closure of fissile material handling facilities at Aldermaston for three and a 
half years due to safety concerns had caused considerable delays to production and the subsequent 
fielding of Chevaline.170 This had been evident from 1979 onwards, when Francis Pym informed the 
nuclear weapons sub-committee MISC 7 on the in November that it was “now clear that production 
delays due to shortage of staff at Aldermaston and Burghfield make it impossible to hold to the 
outload dates [of Chevaline] as originally planned.”171 While progress was made with the staffing 
situation at Aldermaston in 1980, the plutonium handling facilities only resumed operation in 
“January 1981 and even then, some of the remedial work was still in progress.”172 Given the safety 
situation had only been expected to last several months initially, it was unsurprising that the delays 
incurred in combination with the staffing situation meant that continuous deployment of the 
Chevaline system was delayed until late 1982.173 
 
Greater Autonomy: Back to the UKAEA? 
 
Given the tumult in AWRE because of its apparent inability to retain its skilled workforce, the 
SofS revisited the question of how to administer Aldermaston. While the transition to the MoD had 
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been to increase the political control that could be exerted on the weapons establishment, the 
processes that had led to the skilled labour crisis of 1978-1979 through the reduction in employment 
flexibility under the MoD were evident to contemporaries. For example, on 25th May 1978, Macklen 
bluntly stated that it would have been better if AWRE had been left in the UKAEA.174 The issue was 
raised on 22nd September 1980 by the incoming Conservative SofS, Francis Pym, who asked 
“particularly in light of the decision… [to procure] Trident, how we can most efficiently carry out our 
defence nuclear programme.”175 He tasked his officials to study whether AWRE should be placed 
back under UKAEA control amongst other options.176  
Aside from retaining AWRE in the MoD or returning it to the UKAEA, this review raised the 
possibility of contractorisation – that the private sector would operate the establishment’s 
management. Consideration of this approach appears to have emanated from partially replicating 
the US model, wherein the Department of Defence specified their requirements to the Department 
of Energy, whom in turn tasked their privately operated non-profit laboratories delivering nuclear 
weapons.177 It was noted that this approach was not without critique and that there existed multiple 
sub-options to contractorise or privatise AWRE if that was the preferred option.178  
The apparent attraction for these more privatised models of management was to introduce 
new expertise on overseeing complex production lines. A focus on production rather than research 
was believed to have become increasingly important with every successive generation of nuclear 
weapons systems.179 This consideration was of particular importance, as from August 1979 onwards, 
the Director of AWRE also became Deputy Chief of Defence Procurement (Nuclear). With this new 
role, he also controlled the two Royal Ordinance Factories (Burghfield and Cardiff) which 
manufactured nuclear weapons components. Although Burghfield and Cardiff were not officially 
integrated into AWRE until 1987 (henceforth renamed AWE – Atomic Weapons Establishment), it 
marked a further rebalancing away from research and towards production and stewardship.180 
A reality recognised in the 1980 review of Aldermaston’s management was that since the 
1960s, AWRE had to deal with unpredictable “fluctuations in the flow of work.”181 As a result, AWRE 
had to “remain viable” by “accommodating… peaks and troughs” by expanding and contracting the 
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workforce in a sustainable way.182 This could be achieved through one of the key benefits 
contractorisation potentially offered: departing from the civil service would allow greater flexibility. 
Salaries could be allocated on an individual basis, rather than being restricted to prescribed bands.183 
According to contemporaries, this could “prove more expensive than at present but needs to be set 
against… reducing the risk of delays in projects.”184  
Despite the potential benefits of moving towards a privatised model highlighted by the 
Study Group, Pym decided against proceeding in 1981 with any of the examined alternatives. The 
potential to disrupt Trident development early on proved decisive. In addition, the privatisation of 
the nuclear programme was judged too politically costly and would have recently contradicted the 
Conservative’s decision to move AWRE to the MoD.185 Ultimately, with the staffing problems 
seemingly mostly alleviated by 1982, these difficulties were dismissed as a temporary industrial 
dispute, so no systematic change took place during the early period of Thatcher’s administration.186 
As will be seen, many of the institutional problems linked to staffing issues would return to 
prominence in the 1980s. 
 
A New Project: Trident 
 
Labour’s 1974 commitment not to replace Polaris and decision to produce Chevaline in 1978 
may have been expected to introduce a pause in acquiring new strategic systems into the 1980s.187 
However, given the timeframes of development involved and the belief in the need to ensure the 
ongoing deliverability of the ‘Moscow Criteria,’ a ‘Restricted Group’ of Cabinet Ministers examined 
potential future nuclear systems from November 1977 onwards.188 This process resulted in the 
production of the Duff-Mason Report, which recommended the acquisition of the US Trident C4 
system.189 Although the contemporary history of AWRE/AWE from 1978 to 1993 is poorly covered in 
the secondary literature, the following section will test hypotheses inductively generated from 
primary sources. It will demonstrate through the interlinked processes that concerns over 
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at Aldermaston posed lingering problems in the 1980s and that the Thatcher government’s solution 
was to privatise AWE’s management. 
 
The Challenge of Uniqueness 
 
In the 1960s, AWRE’s advocates used the need to retain skills to justify the Polaris 
Improvement Programme. In contrast, from 1978, successive governments’ nuclear weapons policy 
decisions were limited by AWRE’s capabilities (in both capacity and expertise). Both the Labour 
government of 1978-1979 and Thatcher’s new Conservative government, policy emphasised 
avoiding acquiring a system that only Britain would use. This was based on the expense of producing 
Chevaline and retaining Polaris missiles in service alone; ‘uniqueness’ was highly expensive and to be 
avoided if at all possible.190 Not only did this diminish the appeal of Trident alternatives (such as a 
cruise missile option advocated by David Owen or an indigenous ballistic missile programme), but 
also provided the “principle argument” to pursue the D5 rather than C4 missile. The decision to 
acquire a system that was beyond what was “sufficient for our deterrent need” was seen as 
necessary to “retain commonality with the US, and thereby avoid the penalties of uniqueness.”191 
However, this upgrade to the D5 posed a further dilemma for nuclear policy based on the 
capacity of Aldermaston. On the one hand, acquisition of the D5 avoided the potential need to 
upgrade a C4 based capability half way through its life cycle to ensure its future effectiveness against 
ABM defences.192 This was a serious concern that was countenanced, and one to be avoided due to 
the aforementioned risk of uniqueness and technical risk.193 On the other hand, how many warheads 
to produce for the D5 was also an issue. Each D5 missile had the capacity to carry 14 warheads, and 
with three submarines with 16 missile tubes in operation, this could require up to 672 warheads to 
fully equip the proposed Trident programme.194 Although such a large number of warheads would 
be excessive for British deterrence needs and hugely costly, R.A. Miller noted that certain officials 
were briefing for a high warhead figure on the basis of the “maximum insurance against ABM 
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defence.”195 The potential for such a programme prompted concerns over Aldermaston’s capacity.196 
The number of warheads to equip Trident had to be matched against Britain’s future ambitions for 
other nuclear systems. This was because “maximum AWRE output for 1987/88” was “60 warheads 
per year.”197 To produce a new sub-strategic weapons system, capacity had to be available at 
Aldermaston in the 1990s, before the WE-177 became inoperable.198 Given the above warhead 
figures, Trident production alone would preoccupy Aldermaston for a decade. 
The fact that Aldermaston may struggle with Trident production was public knowledge; the 
safety problems raised by the Pochin inquiry had already revealed the staffing and capacity 
problems at Aldermaston. Peter Hennessy wrote an article for the Times in May 1980, titled “Trident 
Deterrent may be Toothless” that highlighted how a lack of recruitment could endanger the Trident 
Programme. 199 John Cartwright, a Labour MP, stated his belief in July 1980 that Trident warhead 
production “would strain [the] manufacturing capability [of Aldermaston]… very considerably,” but 
the challenges were not insurmountable.200 The Defence Select Committee concurred, concluding 
that producing numerous MIRV warheads “will indeed cause difficulties over the next 10 to 15 
years,” but they too believed that AWRE could manage.201 
Despite the problems that AWRE had experienced in 1978-1979 due to a lack of staff, the 
establishment’s advocates did not utilise the uninvention argument to the same extent as during the 
1960s. Nonetheless, with the nearing completion of Chevaline, it was inevitable that Aldermaston’s 
leadership had given some thought to new projects. Colin Fielding (Director of Aldermaston and 
successor to Newley) testified to the Defence Committee in 1980 that the “generation of…[nuclear] 
capability is a very difficult thing to generate and it probably could never in practice be re-generated 
once taken away.”202 With the committee accepting this logic, the maintenance of even the present 
capability once again justified further developments.203 This was apparent to Miall, who on the basis 
of this testimony claimed in 1987 that “directors of Aldermaston have persisted in presenting the 
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government with a choice between developing new nuclear weapons and the gradual atrophy of 
Aldermaston's capabilities to make new weapons.”204 
That the weapons establishment needed a further programme to sustain itself may have 
been implicit; Lawrence Freedman wrote in 1981 that “without a Trident programme or something 
similar, it is difficult to see how the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment at Aldermaston, 
responsible for warhead design and development, or the Royal Ordnance Factory at Burghfield, 
responsible for warhead production, could be kept in existence with a qualified staff.”205 A further 
limitation on citing the vulnerability of AWRE was that it had to present itself as being able to 
conduct the Trident programme. Rather than reflecting Fielding’s “known pessimist” beliefs on the 
capacity of AWRE, on the basis of presented testimony to the Defence Select Committee, the panel 
believed in 1981 that “as far as the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment at Aldermaston is 
concerned, it does not appear that shortfalls in skilled labour will hold up the programme.”206 
 
An Ongoing Staff Crisis 
 
 With negotiations with the Reagan administration and subsequent Cabinet discussions 
concluded, the decision to proceed with Trident D5 was announced to Parliament in March 1982.207 
Despite this public commitment and earlier protestations of AWRE’s capability, problems of 
adequately staffing AWRE to fulfil the Trident programme re-emerged from 1983 onwards. From 
“the inception of the monthly report[ing to the SofS] in August 1983” on the progress of the Trident 
programme, delivering the nuclear warhead and re-entry body “aspect of the programme [by 
AWRE]…[had] been…[categorised as a] minor weakness.”208 This was because a large recruitment 
effort was needed to rebuild the establishment’s manpower from its nadir to levels necessary for a 
new major research and development project.209 As with previous recruitment efforts of the period, 
the rate of staff increase “barely kept pace with… natural wastage.”210 As a result of these early signs 
that progress was not proceeding smoothly at AWRE, the MoD’s Controller of R&D Establishments, 
Research and Nuclear (CERN) took an increasingly proactive but unwelcome role in imposing new 
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practices at the establishment. This resulted in an increasingly tense dispute between CERN and 
AWRE in 1983 and 1984 over the “needs of sound… project management practice” to be effectively 
implemented at AWRE.211 CERN wanted AWRE to implement their interpretation of the 
recommendations of the 1966 Downey Report, which advocated splitting defence projects up into 
phases and incremental deliverables, with the results passed back to a headquarters, then being 
used to monitor and evaluate progress.212 This was intended to provide greater oversight to the 
MoD, which would help improve “the position compared to Chevaline… [where there was] no 
network… to control [the] intramural programme” at AWRE.213  
 Although implementing greater external oversight was reasonable given the Chevaline 
experience, the discussion returned to the issue of staffing levels at the establishment. AWRE 
“rejected… [the move as] in their opinion the scheme could not be implemented without 
unacceptable disruption to the project.”214 This was due to a “real world lack of resources,” but also 
because the fundamental cause of the problems at AWRE was a disproportionate loss of engineering 
staff, for which no readjustment in project management would fix.215 In turn, CERN believed that 
AWRE’s dysfunction in meeting Trident goals was due to it being unable to match recruitment 
“realism” with plausible deadlines.216 Targets produced by AWRE and provided to the MoD had been 
set on where the establishment would have reached had they had their full complement of staff, 
rather than the strength they had in reality.217  
This raised the prospect of significant “slippage:” if key milestones were missed, AWRE 
would hold up other areas of the programme such as underground tests and the outfitting of 
submarines, which would prove extremely expensive and delay Trident’s entry into service.218 
Although AWRE exhibited an apparent “blatant disregard of [Trident] HQ needs,” CERN conceded 
that the inability to apply better practices was exacerbated by the “outflow of experienced staff” 
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needed to effectively manage the project.219 Therefore, from both CERN and AWRE’s perspectives, 
the inability to recruit and retain staff across the establishment at all levels and roles was eroding 
AWRE’s ability to conduct the Trident programme. 
 By December 1984, an apparent consensus had been reached between CERN and AWRE that 
there was now a significant risk for Trident ‘slippage’ due to the staffing situation.220 Between 
September 1984 and February 1985, “only 40% of the trials [experiments at AWRE] scheduled for 
completion had been completed and 48% of the trials scheduled to start have started.”221 These 
delays, attributed to “facility constraints and staff shortages” contributing to the postponement of a 
major milestone in development of the programme - the warhead design ‘freeze.’222  
By February 1985, Admiral John Grove (then acting as Chief Strategic Systems Executive - 
CSSE) was warning the SofS that the status of the AWRE component of the Trident programme was 
close to being considered a “major weakness” due to the “deteriorating situation” in regard to 
recruiting and retaining manpower.223 Grove warned that “the longstanding concern regarding the 
recruitment of personnel at the AWRE is assuming a more serious threat to the Trident warhead 
production programme and the matter is now being handled at the highest official level.”224 This was 
because a significant increase in staffing was needed at Aldermaston to commission and operate the 
plutonium component production A90 facility, in addition to continue to develop the warhead. In 
February 1985, AWRE was understaffed by nine percent for “Technical grades, science grades and 
craftsmen;” In some “critical” areas, the manpower shortage was “near 30%.”225 This staffing 
shortage “was despite intensive use of Civil Service recruitment methods and internal management 
action.”226 In terms of the impact of the staffing situation on the timetable for the programme, the 
original schedule had to be abandoned; AWRE was tasked with redeveloping their warhead 
programme based on their actual rather than specified strength.227 
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 Without amelioration, the situation was deteriorating. In March 1985, AWRE delayed a 
review stage for the Trident warhead by a further two months, so that it was five months behind 
schedule. The CSSE’s report stated that “these delays have been caused by a combination of 
equipment problems and staff shortages at AWRE.”228 To rectify the situation, the Minister for 
Defence Procurement (then Adam Butler), submitted a series of recommendations in April 1985 to a 
Treasury review that included “a number of administrative measures and financial inducements to 
improve the attractions of AWRE both to existing staff and to encourage external and internal 
recruitment.”229 While these were under consideration, the manpower situation at AWRE remained 
“virtually static,” which given the existing deficit, was a worrisome sign.230 Nonetheless, this situation 
persisted; in July 1985, the CSSE’s report noted that “very soon the manpower shortfall will have a 
direct effect on the Trident Warhead development programme.”231 
 The seriousness of the situation meant that Special Pay Additions (SPA) received prompt 
approval for scientists and engineers in 1985.232 However, the Treasury prevaricated in granting 
awards to industrial grades, generating “intense ill-feeling” and strike action. 233 When this situation 
was rectified with a small pay award, administrative staff also protested their omission producing 
“some very ugly scenes indeed.”234 Despite the relatively small amounts of money involved, 
industrial strife persisted until 1987, generating “a most deplorable effect on… morale… recruitment 
and retention.”235 Nonetheless, Michael Quinlan stated in 1988 that the SPA programme “helped 
AWE in a substantial recovery from a dire situation.”236 While there had been a specialist shortfall of 
9% in February in 1985, this had been reduced to 4.7% by April 1987.237 In addition to SPAs, AWE’s 
management specifically “identified 60 vacant posts considered critical to the Trident Programme” 
in 1986 and heightened their recruitment efforts for these posts. 238 By April 1988, all but five of 
these posts had been filled, ensuring there were no critical skill shortages affecting development of 
the Trident warhead.239  
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 Although the SPA awards “initially… [had] a most beneficial effect on recruitment… of 
engineers and scientists,” this was not the case by late 1987.240 CERN noted that “Aldermaston and 
Burghfield manpower peaked (below target) in late 1987 and has been declining rapidly ever since, 
with high turnover exacerbating the net loss.”241 This level of turnover at the establishment was seen 
as unsustainable, as new staff were leaving before they were competent to handle fissile material 
and veteran staff were continuing to retire too.242 This was because any pay increases to staff 
between 1985 and 1988 were deducted from the SPA; as result, private industry became more 
attractive to staff as the local economy thrived. 243 This was a grave situation for AWE as it was 
delaying the construction of the A90 facility which would be used to produce plutonium components 
for the Trident warheads.244 
In January 1988, the situation became public knowledge when the Independent ran two 
articles highlighting how Trident was falling behind schedule, with “staff shortages… [being] the 
main constraint on production.”245 This was critical as production of fissile components began in 
January 1988 at Aldermaston, two years behind the initial schedule offered to the Defence Select 
Committee in 1980.246 Michael Quinlan noted that on 11th May 1988, the Prime Minister had “said 
that the growing shortfall of staff at AWE was disturbing, and that urgent consideration should be 
given to means of redeeming the situation.”247 
 As a result, the Chancellor and SofS were tasked under the direction of Quinlan to find 
solutions. At a minimum, staff were needed to fill “179 Specialist and 100 Craft posts” ‘hard’ 
vacancies “assessed by AWE as being necessary for Trident.”248 Through the course of 1988 and 
1989, a number of measures were suggested and implemented in an attempt to rectify the situation. 
Of interest to this study is that many of these schemes were remarkably similar to those first offered 
to rectify issues with the HER project between 1947 and 1952.  
The primary measure to improve the manpower situation was the “urgent” need to improve 
pay at AWE.249 Although other paths to improve recruitment and retention were concurrently 
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pursued, Quinlan acknowledged that the “urgent and growing” risk of delay meant that “we cannot 
responsibly wait for… non-pay measures… [to] yield dividends on a scale beyond experience or 
likelihood.”250 The acknowledgement that it had to be through both generous and universal SPAs 
was acknowledged by Michael Quinlan who believed that the MoD had “learnt the hard way in 
1985-1987.”251 This was resisted by the Treasury who believed that “management weaknesses” 
were being “temporarily camouflaged by an extravagant use of pay additions;” to overcome this 
intransigency, AWE had to pledge to conduct and implement manpower efficiency studies.252 Other 
government research establishments were concerned that the SPAs would allow AWE to “poach” 
their staff.253 Nonetheless, by October 1988, a range of bonuses had been agreed with the Treasury 
with varying awards dependant on grade and skill scarcity.254 As early as November 1988, AWE 
believed that “there is some slight evidence… that the… Special Pay Additions may be beginning to 
produce the desired effect.”255 
With pay awards addressed, recruitment efforts were redoubled. This included extensive 
advertising campaigns in print news, radio and open days to advertise vacancies at AWE.256 
Unfortunately for the establishment and despite many replies, the results were “frankly 
disappointing… for the money and time invested…. The quality of those who actually applied was, 
overall, very poor.”257 Other measures that had previously been used included recruiting defence 
service personnel approaching retirement for AWE.258 Similarly, approaches were made to UKAEA 
and Royal Ordnance Factory staff who were set to be made redundant.259 One major innovation was 
to increase the flexibility of employment conditions at AWE; these included offering part time or 
short service contracts and the possibility of extending employment five years beyond the normal 
retirement age of sixty.260 These changes were important as AWE had identified a “bulge” in its “age 
profile” as many of its highly experienced staff were nearing retirement. There was clearly a concern 
that if new recruits were not found soon, this cohort would retire without transmitting their 
knowledge to the next generation.261 
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 As with the HER project in the early 1950s, the MoD was “aware that the availability of MoD 
houses is one of our best recruitment aids…It is essential that AWE should continue to have houses 
available to offer prospective recruits.”262 In direct contravention of general Conservative policy, 
publicly owned housing was retained in the Aldermaston area to ensure that this offer could be 
upheld.263 Due to acknowledging that many of the new staff would have to move into the area, 
providing a reallocation bonus and correcting “the non-availability of housing” was essential as it 
was “becoming a constraint on recruitment.”264 In another similarity to the 1950s, further complaint 
from AWRE’s management was that the process of acquiring security clearances for new staff was 
frustrating recruitment efforts.265 Retaining and recruitment issues were proving to be persistently 
cyclical. 
 
Contractorisation – An Enduring Solution? 
 
 The measures introduced in 1988 to improve recruitment and retention at AWE were 
enough to prevent a delay in introducing Trident into service. However, the “serious problems” at 
Aldermaston relating to staff shortages were threatening to undermine the projected 1992 second 
production batch of Trident warheads unless resolved.266 Given that industrial problems had 
persisted at AWE throughout the 1980s, and that SPAs were temporary solutions, it is unsurprising 
that the Conservative government’s view was that the establishment’s “inefficiency had reached the 
point” where it had to be addressed.267 As had already been considered in 1980, a further cycle of 
institutional development was considered. 
Reforms within the civil service framework appeared inadequate. An agreement was 
reached between the Institute of Professional Civil Servants Union and the MoD that theoretically 
allowed for some deviation from specified pay bands for recruiting staff with required skills at 
AWE.268 However, as each case had to be passed onto the Treasury for approval, a MoD official 
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testified to the Defence Select Committee in 1988 that this requirement meant that “we have no 
freedom.”269 A further effort to reform Aldermaston came with the appointment of Dr Thomas 
Mclean at Aldermaston, who reportedly was referred to by some staff as “slasher” for his efforts to 
drop ancillary projects to improve efficiency.270 This move was further bolstered by a commitment 
made as a concession to the Treasury in 1988 in order to obtain the SPA, wherein AWE was to 
conduct further efficiency studies. 271 This resulted in a proposal for an “arbitrary” reduction from a 
titular strength of 7100 to 6400 in February 1989 based on an external review by the Industrial 
Society.272 As with the Kings Norton Inquiry, although the report was able to make 
recommendations, the exact figures came without “detailed credibility to them.”273 Without enough 
guidance, Margaret Thatcher tasked Francis Tombs (chairman of Rolls Royce) to examine the 
organisation of AWE.274 
After an investigation lasting from July to September 1989, Tombs central recommendation 
was that “if the deadlines for the Trident programme were to be met, Aldermaston must get away 
from a situation where the workforce were in control to one where management was in control. The 
warhead programme needed professional manufacturing management and action to detach the 
work force from old practices and rigid pay-scales.”275 The report identified this management 
weakness stemming from “production in AWE…[being] run by scientists.”276 This reportedly 
manifested in a disinterest in the practicalities of warhead production, but also “low expectations of 
effectiveness… in industrial relations issues…[which gave rise to] unsatisfactory practices including: 
lateness and early leaving; unauthorised tea breaks and visits to the canteen; exploitation of trivial 
safety issues… and opposition to contractor presence.”277 
With the report readily accepted by Thatcher’s government, implementation proceeded. 
Although it had initially been intended to institute contractorisation without legislation, this was 
found to be legally untenable.278 Therefore, in December 1989, the initiative was announced in 
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Parliament.279 The justification was “the need for increased production from 1992 for later Trident 
deliveries against the background of the keen demand for skilled labour in the Thames valley area, 
poses an increasing challenge, and one for which a greater production management capability is 
required.”280 Transition to contractorisation would provide the “greatest possible freedom to offer 
the terms and conditions needed to attract and retain the work force [they required].”281 With the 
passing of the Atomic Weapons Establishment Act in 1991, management of AWE was transferred to 
Hunting-BRAE Ltd. in 1993.282 As with the first transition to the UKAEA in 1954, another restructuring 
of the weapons establishment had been implemented based on retaining skill through more flexible 
employment. 
 
Trickle Production: An Alternate Skills Based Approach 
 
 While Chevaline and Trident were the major concern of Aldermaston during this period, 
stockpile stewardship became an increasingly important preoccupation. The need to maintain 
nuclear weapons in the event of unforeseen technical problems was one of the key justifications for 
a large complement during the Kings Norton Inquiry.283 Corrosion, radiolysis, the “out-gassing” of 
hydrogen isotopes and the obsolescence of electronics within warheads would mean that weapons 
would have to be constantly monitored, repaired and possibly replaced over time.284 As the age of 
the weapons stored within the British arsenal increased, so to would the challenges involved in this 
process.285 This was pertinent to the WE-177 system, as it had a “design life… [of] 8 years… 
subsequently doubled to 16… extended first to 20… [and then] 30 years is currently assumed for all 
weapons [in the 1980s].”286 Entering service in 1966, the last WE-177s were only been withdrawn 
from service in 1998. 
In order to overcome unknown problems involved in stockpile surveillance, all aspects of 
AWRE had to “maintain their skills at a high level” according to arguments forwarded in the late 
1960s.287 These anticipated but unpredictable problems could only be overcome if tacit knowledge 
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was maintained, so skills “must be fully exercised and new men must be trained on the job.”288 
While major project work (such as Chevaline) was clearly one source of this exercise (and as seen in 
the previous chapter, a partial justification for the initiation of the project), it was recognised that a 
cheaper and more consistent source of maintaining tacit knowledge had to be found. This could also 
be achieved by up keeping a “steady trickle of production” of existing components to refurbish 
existing warheads. 289  
In explicit response to the Kings Norton report and the “need to keep a certain minimum 
range and quality of staff and facilities” in an operational state necessary for stockpile maintenance, 
a new work stream for WE-177 was introduced in 1970.290 Even while new warheads for the WE-177 
A and B variants were being manufactured, a process of continual refurbishment was initiated. This 
involved “trickle production of all key components and then destroying them, or… replacing old 
ones…from the stockpile.”291 However, the initial tranche of trickle production work “only operated 
for three years,” before all resources were diverted back towards the Polaris Improvement 
Programme.292 At this stage, the first tranche of WE-177s were still relatively new, so “trickle 
production was to keep up our expertise and had no [immediate] connection with stockpile 
reliability.”293 When a level of trickle production (alternatively referred to as ‘continuous relifting’) 
for WE-177 was resumed in the late 1970s, maintaining reliability was a greater concern. With WE-
177 now expected to be in service until 1985, “specialised expertise” such as “tile filling” (a 
particular skill involved in casting the explosives used in the multipoint primary) had to be exercised, 
otherwise it would be lost.294 Gradual refurbishment was therefore revived in “what Aldermaston 
called the ‘Trickle philosophy’.”295 This involved replacing “about one tenth of the stockpile per year 
for final weapon assembly” for the WE-177 systems.296 
 There were however drawbacks to this approach. It was recognised that: “The copy will not 
be exact in a perfectionist sense. No specification can entirely exclude the need for skill and 
interpretation; people and facilities change. Although these are exercised on old designs to some 
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technical judgement that the changes from the version originally tested are not significant, rather 
than a faith that the processes and materials are identical.”297 Therefore, while a trickle approach 
retained expertise, it threatened degradation due to the “accumulation of change.”298 While for the 
most part, these would prove minor, such as new “bridge wire materials” and new “techniques for 
uranium welding,” more substantial changes such as more inert explosives would prove 
problematic.299 Accumulated changes could also build quickly; for the non-nuclear components of 
the system, a 1973 document noted refurbishments had resulted in “over 1000 modifications to the 
weapon as a whole.” 300 While Macklen noted that only changes in the physics package mattered in 
this context, replicating the original specification would also eventually become problematic too.301 
Trickle production and refurbishment would also prove costly and difficult to implement as all the 
original manufacturing capabilities had to be retained at some level, but also that different 
components would age differently and must be replaced at varying times.302 Nonetheless, this was 
seen still as preferable to periodic campaigns of ‘deep refurbishment’ where a more substantial 
fraction of the inventory would be reworked all at once; a deep refurbishment approach would 
involve “an expensive and complex start-up procedure” and risk the “non-availability of components 
and materials.”303 
 Keeping WE-177 in service for as long as possible was preferable for the government for the 
principle reason that life extension was far cheaper than acquiring a replacement system. On the 
basis that a new design would involve a new physics package that would require “twice as much 
plutonium,” the potential expense made one MoD official “shudder at the thought.”304 This was 
borne out by an MoD estimate in 1984, which predicted that a successor warhead would cost nearly 
twenty times over ten years more than keeping WE-177 in service (1.20 million vs 20 million 1984 
GBP), not included any standoff delivery vehicle which would also likely have to be acquired.305 
However, indefinite life extension was thought to come at the expense of the weapons 
reliability. Even with stockpile surveillance, in 1976 it was estimated that multiple internal warhead 
components would be aged to the extent that they would need replacement between 1983 and 
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1986.306 While a campaign of ‘deep refurbishment’ was considered periodically in the late 1970s, this 
was largely rejected on cost grounds as “nearly all the major items” would have to be replaced with 
modern alternatives rather than original articles.307 This was an area of concern for the WE-177Bs, 
where deep refurbishment would involve “stripping down and re-designing and re-making the 
electronics” if it were to be kept operable.308 While replacing WE-177 with a modern alternative was 
the services preferred option, cost imperatives and the limited ability to replace WE-177 with 
Aldermaston at work on Trident meant that a further life extension to 25 years was countenanced in 
1983.309 In 1984 it was recognised that “degradation [would occur] during this period [and] would be 
[in] terms of reliability,” but “deep refurbishment has been ruled out as a very costly way of 
maintaining outdated technology.”310 Even so, this was an uneasy position: internal MoD documents 
from 1986 noted that “as each day goes by, there is an increasing risk that deterioration within the 
weapon could result in them no longer being able to be stored safely, or… that they would detonate 
with their planned effect.”311 
 
TNW Modernisation: Renewing Uninvention 
 
 Although the focus of the weapons establishment was on replacing obsolescent technology, 
the institutional interest that AWRE/AWE had in replacing the WE-177 system can be observed 
throughout this era, with Macklen in the MoD championing the cause. In February 1977, the 
momentum for new tactical nuclear weapons systems clearly came from the weapons establishment 
and the MoD – Macklen and Fakley talked of the need to “sell a new weapon to the Services” and 
the need to “be consulting more widely than just at AWRE.”312 Other officials noted that “if the UK is 
to remain in the atomic weapons business, then every opportunity should be taken to get new 
designs into service.”313 By October 1977, Macklen chaired a meeting “to take sounding on the 
machinery which would be required to process actions to determine our future UK tactical nuclear 
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weapon capability.”314 This culminated by 1979 in the formulation of the Naval and Air Staff Target 
(NAST) 1231; a specification for a successor to WE-177, agreed amongst service chiefs and MoD 
officials within the ORC(N) committee, but which had yet to be granted political approval.315 
The advancement of institutional interests based on the need for new nuclear weapons to 
prevent ‘uninvention’ and halt progressively declining reliability left some members of the Callaghan 
administration sceptical about the establishment’s arguments. This was not helped by the nuclear 
testing it would involve contradicting Labour’s role in negotiating a comprehensive international test 
ban treaty.316 David Owen, a Defence Minister and then Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs during Wilson and Callaghan’s late 1980s administrations believed that “the 
shelf life argument was a deliberate diversion, the protection of a vested interest by the nuclear 
testing laboratories.”317 
With no decision over a new TNW in the late 1970s under Labour, the issue re-emerged 
under Thatcher’s new Conservative administration. “A major factor” dictating whether to proceed 
with NAST 1231 work was whether Aldermaston had the capacity to work on Trident and a 
secondary project simultaneously; if not, the project would have to wait until the 1990s.318 The SofS, 
Francis Pym, briefed the Prime Minister that “the problems at Aldermaston are such that we cannot 
in any event plan to carry out more than one new nuclear project at a time. Decisions on new 
theatre weapons must wait.”319 This also ruled out the possibility of a UK built intermediate range 
ground launched nuclear cruise missile in response to the Soviet SS-20s (in addition to NAST 
1231).320 This was reconfirmed by “the Director [of] AWRE Aldermaston [who] has emphasised that 
due to resource constraints we shall be capable of producing… warheads only sequentially, and not 
in parallel.”321 Nonetheless, the RAF were keen to ensure that NAST 1231 did not “take too much of 
a back seat… [as they believed that] a TNW capability is more valuable than the UK strategic 
force.”322 Without the ability to immediately initiate a new warhead project, further consultations 
were made. A policy steering group were tasked by the Chiefs of Staff Committee to consider a 
successor system in April 1983.323 While this precipitated a wider discussion over the utility of TNWs, 
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similar arguments to those posed by the weapons establishment in the late 1970s resurfaced; a new 
TNW was needed as it “maintains national nuclear expertise in business” and that WE-177s were 
reaching obsolescence.324 
With the production situation at Aldermaston in the 1980s imposing a bottleneck on 
production and development of TNW, timing became a key issue. It became apparent in 1981 that 
Trident needed to progress quickly so that a new TNW could be developed before the WE-177s 
became inoperable. Therefore, officials noted that “we must keep the costs and timing of our 
strategic nuclear deterrent within bounds so that they do not threaten… the WE 177 replacement 
programme.”325 With the problems at Aldermaston highlighted in this chapter, this scenario 
appeared to unfold; the Defence Select Committee was concerned in 1988 that any delays would 
hinder the WE-177’s successor programme to provide a replacement in time.326 While a definitive 
decision on replacement was not forthcoming, it was clear that the WE-177 situation was becoming 
untenable in the early 1990s. Life extension could not be carried out indefinitely. Malcolm Rifkind 
relayed to the Prime Minister in 1992 that “WE-177 could not be refurbished to modern safety 
standards without in effect building a new weapon.”327 
 With the Trident programme progressing beyond its development phase by the early 1990s, 
government reconsidered what programme could sustain AWE thereafter. As Thatcher had not 
made an affirmative decision on TNW modernisation, replacing the WE-177 re-emerged during the 
Major administration. Once again, AWE’s advocates framed the issue of providing a new research 
agenda to avoid knowledge loss at AWE. In 1991, the cost of not proceeding with a new TNW was 
estimated to Cabinet at “1000 job losses at AWE” and that “[they] would lack a development task 
after Trident… The absence of a warhead programme until Trident replacement could call into 
question the viability of AWE and our role as an independent nuclear power in the long term.”328 The 
Defence Select committee believed in 1992 that “research… [for] the successor to the WE-177 free-
fall bomb is integral to operations at Aldermaston.”329 New work was again being justified as 
fulfilling the cycle of renewing skills at the Atomic Weapons Establishment. 
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1993: Rejecting Uninvention 
 
With the end of the Cold War in 1991, there appeared little imminent need for new nuclear 
weapons systems. NATO rapidly began to “significantly reduce… sub-strategic nuclear forces” in line 
with the Alliance's New Strategic Concept of 1991; the future of TASM as a WE-177 replacement 
therefore seemed precarious.330 In addition, the prospects for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
being agreed significantly increased under sustained international and NGO pressure from 1991 
onwards, especially so after the inauguration of Bill Clinton in 1993.331 The possible cancellation of 
the next nuclear weapons development project and imposition of a CTBT posed a dual threat to the 
weapons establishment, which would once again invoke the possibility of nuclear uninvention. 
 Although most archival material from 1993 remains classified, officials used the 
‘uninvention’ argument at a cabinet level. For instance, in regards to TASM, the then Head of the 
Defence and Overseas Secretariat advised the PM’s private secretary that “the work programme of 
AWE (Aldermaston)… is already diminishing fast in content and where it may be hard to keep the 
team of scientists together without a major new warhead project - which in turn has implications for 
the long-term viability of a national deterrent.”332 As Trident was “so US dependent, some 
Americans would also conclude that the UK had taken the first step on the road out of the nuclear 
business.”333 In addition, Malcolm Rifkind was aware that “access to… American cooperation will 
depend upon continued significant UK contribution to… [information] exchanges” and this would be 
“even more important if we face a testless world.”334 In the absence of a new weapons programme 
for AWE, the few remaining nuclear tests allotted to the UK by the US gained an increased 
importance as they were necessary to “palliate” Aldermaston to allow for “the best chance of 
retaining the ability to maintain our stockpile in the long term and preserve the option of replacing 
Trident.335 This was because “the continued underwriting of weapons’ reliability and safety depends 
in the long term on the competence and experience of our design teams. Without a test programme 
it would be difficult in the long run to retain design teams with the necessary expertise.”336 This 
quote emphasises that until 1993, the predominant view was that nuclear weapons reliability was 
dependent upon a social process of knowledge transmission. 
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Despite these attempts to justify both further testing and the TASM project, neither 
proceeded. SofS Malcolm Rifkind’s memorandum to the Overseas Policy and Defence Nuclear sub-
Committee in May 1993 noted that this was because “TASM is not affordable” considering the 
improving security situation.337 In addition, the need for TASM was further diminished as it was 
argued that Trident had the additional capability to act as the sub-strategic deterrent too.338 The end 
of the Cold War necessitated defence spending reductions, and TASM “was the only discrete, big 
defence equipment project remaining as a candidate for cuts in the longer term.”339 Therefore, In 
October 1993, Rifkind publicly announced that the TASM project had been cancelled.340 The 
‘uninvention’ argument was an insufficiently clear nuclear threat to overcome the mobilised 
consensus for nuclear defence spending reductions. Nonetheless, Rifkind noted that whatever the 
TASM decision, “we will also need to safeguard our nuclear design and production capability at AWE 
for the future.”341 As highlighted, emphasis in this regard had been placed on the final three British 
nuclear tests, but these were also not forthcoming. 
The final three British nuclear tests which had been argued to be necessary were likely 
halted due to the political impracticality of breaching the American testing moratorium which had 
been extended in June 1993.342 Rifkind acknowledged In November 1994 that these developments 
would “change the focus of some work at AWE, but there will still need to be a challenging 
programme of research in order to sustain our ability to underwrite the safety and reliability of the 
warheads we have in service, and to maintain the capability to develop and produce warheads as in 
the future, circumstances may make this necessary.”343 Without a new weapons programme or the 
prospects for new tests, combined with the major reorganisation involved in contractorisation, it is 
unsurprising that fears of nuclear weapons uninvention were expressed by MacKenzie and Spinardi’s 
1995 article, which would draw from interviews with AWE scientists.344 However, just as this 
argument was reaching public consciousness after having been used within government in various 
forms since at least 1960, a transition was underway due to the CTBT that would place the emphasis 
of retaining nuclear credibility within impersonalised technical processes, rather than through the 
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 Despite initially appearing as a failed attempt to determine the staffing needs of the 
weapons establishment, the Kings Norton Inquiry cast a long shadow over AWRE. This chapter 
traced how frustrations over oversight of AWRE led to the establishment’s transfer from the UKAEA 
to the MoD. This was intended to reduce the establishment’s autonomy. This restructuring was then 
linked to staff problems experienced by the establishment in 1978 due to deprioritisation under the 
MoD. Reorganisation limited Aldermaston’s ability to exert its influence; the establishment declined 
in line with overall economies in defence spending and reductions in civil research at Aldermaston. 
Furthermore, the transition back to the civil service meant that pay continued to fall in line with 
inflation as it was tied to civil service pay bands. This meant that the staff complement at AWRE was 
reduced and often under strength while development and production work for Chevaline and WE-
177 proceeded.  
The impact of these reductions became evident in 1978 with the plutonium contamination 
incidents that plunged the establishment into crisis. Poor safety, bad pay and chronic understaffing 
threatened the continuity of the British nuclear weapons effort. These factors threatened staff 
recruitment and retention, which in turn would make fissile material handling facilities inoperable. 
Through a series of pay improvements, triaging staff and recruitment campaigns, the situation was 
stabilised at the expense of a year’s delay in bringing Chevaline into service. Although nuclear 
weapons uninvention did not occur, a lack of capacity at Aldermaston restricted the Thatcher 
government’s subsequent decisions over whether to pursue British nuclear cruise missiles or new 
tactical nuclear weapons in the 1980s. Trident acquisition was necessitated through the aging of the 
Polaris system, but questions were raised over Aldermaston’s capability to conduct the work, even if 
it was simultaneously argued to be needed to guarantee the institution’s future.  
 Although not covered by the existing secondary literature, this chapter inductively tested 
whether Aldermaston struggled with knowledge management in the 1980s. Even though staffing 
issues had been an apparent problem with AWRE in the 1970s, the incoming Thatcher government 
in 1979 only investigated reorganisation. Without change, it is unsurprising civil service pay bands 
again noticeably threatened the progress of the Trident warhead programme from 1983 onwards. 
The setting of unrealistic progress objectives and then a wave of industrial disputes conveyed a 




recruitment campaigns and improving conditions for AWE’s workers was the staffing situation once 
again ameliorated. Nonetheless, the Thatcher government’s frustration with the establishment’s 
perceived inefficiency led towards implementing contractorisation. The similarity in pre-existing 
processes and subsequent justifications for the transitions to contractorisation and the UKAEA in the 
1950s is striking and highlights the establishment’s cyclical trajectory. 
 Despite any organisational issues, the weapons establishment had been proactive in 
attempting to retain necessary skills and expertise. Based on the need for skills portrayed in the 
Kings Norton inquiry, AWRE established ‘trickle’ production to maintain skills on a more continuous 
and sustainable basis. In addition, the ‘uninvention’ argument was used to acquire laser simulation 
facilities in 1976 and continued to justify the expansion of a wider experiment and simulation 
programme that complimented nuclear weapons testing.  
Nonetheless, by 1993, the issue of how to sustain AWE into the future returned to the fore 
as the developmental work on Trident reached completion. While officials put the ‘uninvention’ case 
for TASM to government, the end of the Cold War ensured the lobbying attempt failed. Similarly, the 
warnings made over the importance of continuing nuclear testing went unfulfilled as CTBT talks 
proceeded. This represented a final rejection of retaining nuclear weapons knowledge at AWE 
through ongoing weapons programmes and tests. AWE substituted social knowledge gained through 









 In 1993 Spinardi predicted the possible “death” of the British nuclear deterrent through the 
combination of private management, the end of live nuclear testing and the cancellation of TASM.1 
Spinardi additionally claimed that whether “morale and expertise will wither away… may be the 
ultimate test (for Aldermaston) of the 'Zuckerman thesis.'”2 This proved a momentous year for AWE 
and many of these sentiments were conveyed to the Overseas Policy and Defence Nuclear sub-
Committee. Nonetheless, AWE’s work continues to the present. So far, British nuclear weapons have 
not been uninvented. This raises several questions: How has Aldermaston sustained itself? What 
changed from 1993 onwards, and what trends have remained the same? 
The main discontinuity was a shift in heterogeneous engineering; rather than ‘selling’ skill, 
after 1993, AWE placed emphasis on establishing a scientific process for maintaining nuclear 
credibility. This in turn meant that rather than retaining personally embodied skills, through 
upholding ‘momentum’ with the continuity of work and a focus on recruitment and retention of 
staff, the process of guaranteeing nuclear weapons credibility became one wherein the emphasis 
was placed on a technical process of physics simulations rather than upon peoples’ judgement of 
what constituted a viable physics package based on experience. This was later observed by 
MacKenzie and Spinardi, who witnessed efforts in the US and UK to ‘black box’ as much formally 
tacit nuclear weapons expertise into an explicit knowledge based scientific process as possible.3 The 
importance placed upon this transition by AWE, MoD and the Cabinet Office is evident in UK Cabinet 
documents from 1993, where there was an immediate “need to invest heavily in… alternative 
means” of verifying nuclear weapons credibility for both potential future designs and aging 
stockpiled warheads.4 This meant placing a great emphasis on “developing the AGEX [(Above Ground 
Experiments)] work.”5 
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From 1993 onwards, the function of work at Aldermaston has been to develop a “new 
scientific methodology…[which] without further nuclear tests, [is] aimed at underwriting the safety 
and performance of the ageing Trident stockpile with continued high confidence.6 As this would 
have to “be done without the support and knowledge of the staff who actually designed, tested and 
put into service the British Trident warhead,” this capability would be based on non-nuclear 
hydrodynamic experiments, computational simulations and plasma physics research.7 This 
necessitated immediate investment into new computer simulation capabilities with the purchase of 
both CRAY and IBM supercomputers, which became operational in 1996 and 1998 respectively.8 As 
all future simulations would be based on previously acquired data and increasingly without the 
experience of staff who had conducted live testing, an effort was made in conjunction with the 
United States to archive and make accessible as much historic nuclear weapons relevant data as 
possible.9  
 This process continued under New Labour, who despite electing to relinquish the remaining 
WE-177 systems in inventory in 1998, sought to retain a “robust capability at the Atomic Weapons 
Establishment to underwrite the safety and reliability of our nuclear warheads, without recourse to 
nuclear testing.”10 In addition, “a minimum capability to design and produce a successor to Trident 
should this prove necessary” was also to be retained.11 In “discharging the undertaking… [given] in 
the Strategic Defence Review,” a significant initiative undertaken by Labour was a £100 million joint 
investment into the US National Ignition Facility.12 This signposted how investments in physical 
infrastructure were replacing the prior emphasis on retaining tacit knowledge skills.  
Despite these pledges, by “the late 1990s…the AWE budget and workforce…[was down] to a 
level of about 50% of the levels of the early 1980s.”13 The proportion of government research and 
development spending at Aldermaston was in steady decline during the 1990s.14 According to 
documents obtained by Burt, the degradation of the capability of AWE led “the MoD’s Chief 
Scientific Advisor [O’Nions]… [to recommend] an ‘urgent and substantial increase to the UK’s 
warhead capability’” in 2002.15 In turn, the MoD’s CSA study of Aldermaston’s capabilities led to the 
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initiation of the Nuclear Warhead Capability Sustainment Programme (NWCSP), which was endorsed 
by a Cabinet committee in 2004 and announced to the public in 2005.16 In a written statement, the 
then SofS John Reid announced that “it is necessary to invest in the facilities at AWE which will 
provide assurance that the existing Trident warhead stockpile is reliable and safe.”17 In line with this 
objective, the NWCSP (which continues to the present, with a predicted end in 2025) has seen a 
significant increase in capital spending at Aldermaston to build new physical infrastructure.18 
Nonetheless, the MoD were both concerned over the fragility of technical knowledge at 
AWE in 2004 and the possibility of nuclear uninvention. Kevin Tebbit, a former Permanent under 
Secretary of State for the MoD provided justification for the NWCSP in 2007 and reflected on the 
history of the British nuclear weapons programme when he stated that:  
“Often political decision-makers are insufficiently sensitive to the reality that unless you are 
prepared to invest in sustaining technological and scientific capacity throughout a period, the option 
to go for a new system may no longer be there when politicians finally decide that they want it. 
One of the really important bits of the history is the sustainment of the scientific and engineering 
base that has been needed throughout this period. I mention this because it nearly hit us very 
recently before the Government took the decision to invest in warhead sustainment in 2004. That 
background may not feature in the political history… but actually has always been a very critical 
aspect. I think the first thing we should say is there were times when this was very fragile, and we all 
owe a huge debt to the people at AWE and other places that kept it going in the quiet times.”19 
As noted by Price, the initiation of the NWCSP “did not represent any change of policy” for 
Labour, and has since continued to the present under multiple governments.20 The programme 
incorporated the AWE Site Development Context Plan, which has continued to see major capital 
spending diverted to AWE, which enjoyed in 2015 “five times the level of spending in the year 
2000.”21 The MoD announced in 2012 that they would be “investing £1bn a year in facilities at the 
Atomic Weapons Establishment… until 2020.”22 This investment has manifested in the construction 
of a range of new facilities and infrastructure. Major works include the new Orion laser facility, that 
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became operational in 2013, Circinus, a new high explosives fabrication facility and ongoing work on 
the Mensa warhead assembly facility.23 Supercomputer facilities used for simulations have been 
continually upgraded with new hardware installed in 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014 and 2015.24 The timely 
delivery of this new infrastructure within the NWCSP is critical to the completion of the improved 
Mk4A warhead “in line with…the programme imperatives” and for the initial planning for a Trident 
“Replacement Warhead programme.”25 
If the future of the British nuclear programme increasingly rests on the utilisation of 
advanced infrastructure rather than the transferred skills of designers with experience, then the 
ability to complete capital investment programmes takes on a new importance. Unfortunately, from 
AWE’s perspective, many of these projects have experienced delays and cost overruns such as 
Project Hydrus. Despite having to write off nearly £120 million, the construction of a new 
hydrodynamics facility was cancelled in favour of sharing a joint facility (Project Teutates) with 
France.26 Similarly, work on the Pegasus replacement uranium handling facilities at AWE are 
“currently suspended” for unknown reasons and it is uncertain if the project will ever resume.27 A 
recent NAO report also revealed that “a lack of skills” in the Defence Nuclear Enterprise was 
contributing to the risk of delay or non-delivery of infrastructure by its inability to challenge 
contractor’s “over-specified designs.”28 This apparently significantly “contributed to cost increases 
and delays” at the Mensa warhead assembly facility.29 Mensa was reported as running “six years 
late, with a 146% (£1.1 billion) cost increase, arising in part because the Department started to build 
with only 10–20% of the design complete.”30 If the continuity of the British nuclear weapons 
programme is reliant on new infrastructure that generates new explicit knowledge relevant to 
stockpile maintenance, then the record of its delivery is concerning. 
 Even if the emphasis of maintaining Britain’s nuclear weapons credibility has transitioned 
from people to an impersonal scientific process, this does not mean a similar uninvention argument 
cannot be made. While primary sources are lacking, The MoD CSA’s argument for the NWCSP in 
2002 appears to invoke potential uninvention, thereby providing justification for new infrastructure 
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spending.31 This poses the same problem as witnessed in previous chapters – how does the rest of 
government determine the minimum requirement of AWE to remain sustainably functional? In an 
attempt to determine the establishment’s requirements, the SoS and MoD CSA are advised by the 
Nuclear Research Advisory Council, which was founded in 1996 and is “responsible for reviewing… 
the [AWE] nuclear warhead research and capability maintenance programme.”32 Given their 
institutional role in determining AWE’s AGEX and international collaboration requirements, their 
apparent solution to perceived deficiencies has been to invest in facilities intended to ‘black box’ the 
previously socially based process of nuclear weapons design.33 However, this course of action is 
reliant on the delivery of these new projects, which has apparently proven challenging for the 
Defence Nuclear Enterprise. 
 
Continuing Relevance of Tacit Knowledge 
 
 Sims and McNamara observed that within US labs, the belief in the importance of tacit 
knowledge (still expressed in terms of skill) transitioned from being held by experienced individuals 
to being held on an institutional level, dependent on ongoing transactions between practitioners.34 A 
similar process of epistemological reorientation can be seen at AWE; communications from 
Aldermaston and government clearly identify the belief for the need to sustain nuclear weapons 
relevant skills within AWE as a centre of practice and collaboration, rather than as a site that 
employed skilled individuals.35 For instance, after identifying the need to invest in physical 
infrastructure at AWE 2002, it was equally acknowledged that staffing levels would have to be 
increased from historic lows.36 This was also in recognition of the fact that the staff who had 
conducted “the Chevaline and Trident programmes [were] near the end of their careers.”37 Rather 
than emphasising the continuity of transferred skills, these new staff would be “of the highest 
intellectual calibre” to conduct AWE’s new science based approach.38 A 2004 MoD document made 
an even more optimistic case for the post CTBT programme, suggesting that the NWCSP could 
“maintain and replenish as necessary AWE’s key skills and intellectual capability.”39 Similarly, the 
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NAO expressed the MoD’s aim to “develop” rather than retain “an appropriately skilled workforce 
and improve infrastructure by the mid-2020s” in 2018.40 This indicates the belief that the skills 
needed to operate the establishment can be regenerated internally through a collective process 
without dependency on an inherited knowledge base generated through weapons design validated 
via occasional testing. 
 AWE demonstrates its view that it can develop and retain tacit knowledge through 
knowledge transactions by the increased importance placed upon peer review and collaboration 
outside of the establishment. In terms of international collaboration, Cabinet documents expressed 
the need in 1994 to establish as much peer review of nuclear weapons stockpile science as possible 
between the UK and US and even potentially France.41 This initially manifested with a reformation of 
the UK/US JOWOGs in 1995 to allow for better information exchange.42 More recently, the 2010 UK-
France Defence Co-operation Treaty, which was later expanded upon in a joint 2014 Declaration on 
Security and Defence, led Harries to speculate that the exchange of classified information and the 
joint Teutates facility will allow the partners to “share and converge in working practices, 
assumptions and practical knowledge, similar to the ‘peer review’ dynamic between the United 
Kingdom and United States.”43 According to O’Nions et al., “performance assurance” of British 
warheads is further enhanced through “working ever more closely with British academic and 
industrial communities, and benefiting mutually through international collaboration.”44 One example 
is how AWE allows academics access to the ORION laser facilities for civil experiments.45 Inexplicable 
tacit knowledge ‘special’ skills appear no longer the basis of nuclear weapons development, but it 
now appears a collaborative approach is now needed to support AWE. 
 Although the above programmes suggest an entirely new model for knowledge retention at 
the establishment, some modes of practice at AWE are more in keeping with their pre-1993 
methodologies. For instance, as with WE-177, it appears that trickle production for Trident warheads 
continues to ensure production and fabrication skills are routinely practiced.46 In addition, while full-
scale live nuclear testing has been halted, the UK has conducted joint sub-critical nuclear 
experiments with the US in 2002 and 2006 and continues to support the ongoing US sub-critical 
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testing programme.47 The 2006 test in particular raised questions as to whether the UK was 
developing an equivalent of the US Reliable Replacement Warhead (called the High Surety 
Warhead).48 The MoD subsequently described any work conducted for the High Surety Warhead as 
only an “’academic study’ intended to ‘show that AWE had the skills and knowledge to produce a 
replacement warhead to Trident if the Government made such a decision in the future.’”49 
Consistent with this theme, the AWE Educational Collection displays the results of a similar exercise 
to develop a nuclear cruise missile (named Operation Herdick), with the missile component 
reportedly tested in the US.50  
As with AWRE’s need for a new programme in the 1960s necessitating the Polaris 
Improvement Programme, the extent to which knowledge management and AWE’s capability is 
dictating current nuclear policy is also relevant; the 2013 Trident Alternatives Review suggested that 
while a replacement warhead for Trident could be delivered in “17 years” as “the missile and its 
environmental data is well-known.”51 In comparison, developing a warhead for a cruise missile 
would take a predicted “timescale of 24 years,” which “is judged to be longer than the Vanguard-
class SSBN submarines can safely be operated.”52 This could be alleviated by an “accelerated 
warhead programme… but it would come at high risk and would need to be driven as a UK national 
imperative.” As the skills and capacity of Aldermaston dictate the timeframe for warhead 
development, and producing Trident alternatives were predicted to take longer than Vanguard’s 
expected lifespan, this suggests that Britain’s nuclear deterrent is path dependant, with retaining 
Trident as now the only viable option.53 
Ongoing Organisational Changes 
 
 A consistent trend identified by this thesis has been AWE’s ongoing organisational changes. 
Reorganisations were intended by government to balance the establishment’s autonomy against the 
costly effects of the information asymmetries in the principal-agent relationship with the 
establishment. It was initially hoped that contractorisation would “provide a new and sharp tool” for 
maintaining “capability… at the lowest practicable cost.”54 However, such an arrangement depended 
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on managing the contractor effectively. The Hunting-BRAE arrangement was quickly transitioned in 
1995 from a “cost-plus contracts to Target Cost Incentivised Fee” model to incentivise economic 
efficiency in the face of possible loss from a system where profit was guaranteed regardless of 
delays in matching targets.55 Nonetheless, following two safety related prosecutions from a newly 
empowered Health and Safety Executive, Hunting-BRAE’s contract was not renewed in 1999.56 
Despite the Thatcher government’s initial hopes, this first foray into contractorisation had therefore 
failed to provide a stable basis for managing Britain’s nuclear weapons establishment. 
Management passed onto a new consortium, AWE Management Ltd., composing of 
Lockheed Martin, BNFL and Serco.57 Despite this change, safety problems remain. The site has 
experienced numerous fire and safety related incidents with varying degrees of seriousness; a 2010 
fire at the explosives manufacturing facility resulted in one worker injured, as did an electrical fault 
accident in 2017.58 Operations in the A45 uranium handling facility were temporarily halted due to 
the discovery of corrosion of structural steel in 2013.59 The replacement facilities, named Project 
Pegasus, have faced “spiralling” costs and work was placed “on hold” in 2015 and as of 2019, “no 
clarity on when work will restart” has been provided.60 Similarly, live warhead work was temporarily 
halted in 2008 at Burghfield due to age related defects discovered in warhead disassembly bays 
during safety inspections and its replacement is still overdue due to ‘over-specification,’ in turn 
stemming from poor communication between contractors, regulators and the MoD.61 AWE also 
faces the problem of preventing leaks from the accumulation of high activity radioactive waste that 
has been stored on site since 1983, when disposal at sea was halted.62 Although it is planned to 
eventually relocate this material to the planned Geological Disposal Facility, AWE has since applied 
to increase its permitted levels of radioactive discharge.63 Due to a combination of the above safety 
considerations, AWE has remained on the Office of Nuclear Regulation’s “Enhanced level of 
regulatory attention” status since 2013.64  
Although it was reportedly considered bringing the management of AWE back “in-house,” 
the MoD decided to renew AWE Management Ltd.’s contract in 2016, but insisted upon 
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“restructured and new senior management appointments.”65 Construction firm Costain has replaced 
Jacobs as the main contractor for Project Mensa.66 While some change is evident, Burt has 
repeatedly criticised the government’s ability to provide “supervision or oversight” over AWE’s for-
profit management, and the National Audit Office recently recognised in reference to work at AWE 
that “monopoly suppliers in a specialised sector make it difficult to incentivise contractors and drive 
value for money.”67 One barrier to reviewing the progress at AWE is that NWCSP efforts are exempt 
from annual reporting under the Defence Major Projects scheme.68 An effort to improve oversight 
was implemented in April 2016 with the creation of the Defence Nuclear Organisation, which now 
“manages warhead programme and contracts directly” with AWE Management Ltd.69 Whether this 
will improve the delivery of the infrastructure programme is yet to be seen. As the NWCSP relies on 
new infrastructure, ensuring its timely delivery will continue to be a priority, and regulating the 
management of Aldermaston remains a challenge for present governments due to a reliance on a 
“monopolistic supplier environment.”70 One commentator has recently warned of accidental nuclear 





 Through the analysis of archival documents, this thesis has traced how the British nuclear 
weapons establishment developed a sense of its own requirements for skills and knowledge to 
remain viable. While often expressed in terms of ‘skills’ or ‘qualified staff’ rather than in tacit 
knowledge terms, the establishment gradually developed an analogous sense of modern knowledge 
management. As demonstrated in each chapter, this manifested in a repeating cycle with the 
reoccurrence of several interlinked intervening mechanisms where concerns over knowledge 
management led to heterogeneous engineering, followed by a government response. AWRE offered 
the development of physical artefacts in attempts to solve the underlying social problem of internal 
knowledge transmission. Although this cycle occurred repeatedly, the outcome of each attempt 
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varied due to the contemporary principal-agent relationship between Whitehall and AWRE and the 
principal’s commitment and consensus over a course of nuclear weapons policy. After each cycle, 
the government often attempted to rectify the establishment’s concerns via reorganisation.  
Even if only rarely decisive, this process formed an alternate mechanism of influence over 
the British government’s nuclear weapons policy autonomous of strategic considerations of nuclear 
weapons requirements. As a result, explaining this process achieves the aims of this thesis in 
exploring how nuclear weapons establishments respond to knowledge management challenges, how 
they exert institutional interest and how this has influenced British nuclear weapons history. Given 
that this reoccurring process stems from inherent knowledge management issues relating to nuclear 
weapons, one would expect this process to have occurred within other nuclear weapons states with 
comparable institutions and therefore act as a driver of vertical proliferation within certain bounds.  
Within the British nuclear weapons establishment, the realisation of the need to effectively 
manage knowledge quickly became evident. The underlying need for HER to retain qualified staff 
was emphasised early on with its experience in competing for manpower, particularly with the ARD. 
HER’s rapid expansion and its pervasive aura of secrecy compounded staffing issues. Even by the end 
of the fission programme, transmission of an analogous conception of tacit knowledge was seen as 
necessary to continue the nuclear programme; Penney noted in 1952 that unless continuous 
recruitment and retention of staff could be maintained, then the establishment would become 
“sterile.”72 The self-identification of individuals with nuclear weapons relevant tacit knowledge was 
evident from 1954, where particular staff identified themselves as “weaponeers” with specialised 
nuclear skills that would not be easily replicated or transferred.73 The loss of ‘skilled’ staff was an 
ongoing threat to the nuclear programme between 1959 and 1962, 1966-1968 and cited repeatedly 
in justifications for the HELEN laser system, Trident and TASM. AWRE’s practice of ‘trickle’ 
production from 1970 demonstrated its belief in the need to preserve skills through practice, where 
nuclear weapons work was conducted purely to retain and transmit knowledge. 
This is not to say that AWRE’s conception of tacit knowledge was static. As highlighted in the 
framework, what constitutes tacit knowledge can encompass ineffable physical skill to information 
that can be painstakingly codified. For AWRE, both the conception of who held ‘special skills,’ what 
they were and how they could be propagated changed over time. Initially, references to skills 
shortages during the HER period were most acute for hydrodynamics.74 As MacKenzie and Spinardi 
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have detailed in the American experience, although hydrodynamics has mathematical models and 
was increasingly computerised as time progressed, judgements were largely made via personal 
“intuition.”75 This explains why disagreements over the split of HER and the ARD were so intense as 
it meant inheriting workers with this sense of judgement.76 As AWRE progressed with the 
thermonuclear programme, workers with several of these specialist skillsets began to identify as 
‘weaponeers.’ As this was during a morale crisis, it was clear that this was partially a rhetorical 
position to extract better conditions (and hence why it was disputed by other UKAEA workers), but 
sufficiently convincing to Penney and the rest of the AEX to devote considerable attention to 
alleviating their concerns.77  
AWRE’s advocates developed knowledge management-based arguments favouring 
institutional interests from 1954 onwards and especially under the threat of reductions after the 
Grapple tests. By 1962 this had matured into an institutional belief that AWRE associated officials 
would repeat throughout the decade; it would encompass notions of both personal somatic and 
establishment wide collective knowledge. AWRE, MoD and UKAEA officials stressed that the 
retention of both of these forms of knowledge was necessary for overcoming future research and 
maintenance issues. Although this formulation would remain recognisable until 1993 when the 
halting of live tests introduced a more transactional view of knowledge, a change in approach is 
apparent after the Kings Norton Inquiry. As highlighted in Chapter 6, AWRE used contemporary 
notions of tacit knowledge in the late 1960s with the same purpose as Polanyi’s original conception: 
to prevent “governmental incursions into and elimination of practitioners’ professional power of 
judgment.”78 However after the inquiry, as Schmidt identifies in the general history of use of tacit 
knowledge as a concept, the need to preserve ‘skills’ was increasingly viewed as “a problem to be 
overcome” rather than just an intractable barrier preventing inquiry.79 Attempts to overcome this 
barrier with an analogous sense of modern knowledge management included the adoption of 
‘trickle’ production and early attempts to ‘black box’ hydrodynamics via simulations. This coincided 
with a second trend identified by Schmidt; technicians rather than just scientists were increasingly 
viewed as holding tacit knowledge.80 Concerns over the loss of technical rather than scientific tacit 
knowledge were amplified by the loss of workers due to the events surrounding the Pochin inquiry 
and AWRE’s more general shift in focus from theoretical research towards preserving manufacturing 
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techniques. Although unqualified to pass judgement on the levels and types of nuclear weapons 
related tacit knowledge needed to be maintained, this thesis fully concurs with Lynch’s general 
assessment that “as long as relevant non-professionals assume that the tacit knowledge is 
legitimate, they must trust what the experts say because they have no basis for evaluating it 
themselves.”81 Whatever the favoured contemporary notion of tacit knowledge involved, claims to 
this authority and resistance to the oversight of external parties to judge the levels of skills involved 
remained consistent throughout the establishment’s history. It is therefore unsurprising that 
conceptions of tacit knowledge can aggravate principal-agent issues, either in the nuclear field or 
beyond. 
As such, while notions of analogous senses of tacit knowledge may have shifted over time 
with AWRE’s differing engineering challenges, the perceived need to preserve or attempt to encode 
them was consistent. Penney first highlighted this concern in 1952 with worries over the 
establishment’s potential sterility. This was in part due to the process of recruitment and retention 
of staff always being challenging; Cherwell had noted in 1953 that work within the UK nuclear 
weapons programme often compared unfavourably with other defence research or civil work due to 
hazardous conditions, relatively poor pay and burdensome secrecy.82 The relative attraction of 
working at Aldermaston was also effected by the intermittent ‘threat’ of nuclear disarmament, a lack 
of a main research effort or deprioritisation from government. The combination of the above factors 
produced intermittent crises of morale, noted in all the eras examined by this thesis. This in turn 
threatened recruitment and retention. In the immediate prelude to both the thermonuclear 
programme and Trident, a morale crisis immediately preceded the need to significantly expand the 
establishment to conduct the new programme. A severe drop in retention and recruitment from 
poor morale posed an existential threat to the establishment, both in terms of the immediate needs 
of the establishment to conduct work and to transfer tacit knowledge to the next generation of staff. 
With the immediate need to offset morale problems, considerable effort was made by the 
nuclear weapon establishment’s management to offer a range of incentives. As evidenced in the first 
two case study chapters, both Penney and Cook devoted considerable attention to implementing 
measures to retain staff. These included better pay when it could be negotiated, improving working 
conditions and building accommodation and facilities in the local area. To gain staff, recruitment 
campaigns were conducted nationwide, leveraging talent from the armed services and UKAEA when 
possible. While any longstanding organisation needs to continually refresh its workforce, consistent 
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recruitment was especially important as Aldermaston’s management emphasised the need to 
transmit knowledge from generation to generation. Therefore, the inability to recruit and retain staff 
appeared to pose both immediate problems to production but also a long-term threat to the 
establishment. This was demonstrated with the concerns over the organisation of the HER project in 
1952, the problems with ‘need-to-know’ secrecy and education in 1958 and most explicitly with 
concerns over the age ‘bulge’ in the late 1980s. 
As a result of the need to transmit and retain tacit knowledge through practice, AWRE 
management and MoD officials consistently expressed their belief from 1954 onwards in the need 
for research momentum to be maintained at a sufficient level so that skills could be practiced and 
passed on. The main attempt at this was the provision of diversification work, which was meant to 
provide the “long term” solution to Aldermaston’s staffing problem.83 Providing additional work was 
intended to mean that Aldermaston could better guarantee a more reliable supply of work to its 
staff in-between weapons development projects, thereby making AWRE a more attractive career 
prospect. The immediate need to deliver diversified work was lessened by the thermonuclear 
programme between 1954 and 1958 and although sufficient non-nuclear weapons work was 
promised by successive Conservative and Labour governments, diversification never provided the 
establishment with enough of a basis to believe itself secure. Military nuclear work was either 
denied to Aldermaston in the case of naval reactors for fear of delays or there was insufficient 
demand, such as with ‘package’ reactors for the army. AWRE proved too expensive as a civil 
research institute due to the onsite security making it uneconomical compared to Harwell in the 
1960s. This work had been intended to provide a sustainable resolution to knowledge management 
issues within Aldermaston, but itself had proven too expensive in the face of periodic economic 
crises.  
 With Aldermaston’s management consistently viewing its own skills base as insecure and 
fragile, the continuity of knowledge transmission could only be guaranteed if sufficient nuclear 
weapons work was provided. This was made acute by the rapid expansion of AWRE to fulfil the 
Grapple programme, wherein Cook and Penney instituted a range of measures that saw 
Aldermaston’s staffing figures expand from 3900 in 1954 to nearly 9000 by 1960.84 The cessation of 
the Grapple tests in 1958 and the adoption of American warhead designs, combined with 
Macmillan’s Future Policy abandoning the role envisaged for nuclear weapons in the Sandys’ 1957 
White Paper instigated a morale crisis at AWRE wherein management were concerned over the 
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establishment’s future. It was therefore unsurprising that between 1960 and 1962, Levin and Makins 
openly warned of the possibility that the nuclear weapons programme would not be able to 
continue unless provided further research work. 
This period marked a pivotal moment in AWRE’s history. As Spinardi notes “for most of its 
history, Aldermaston has had its hands full meeting existing weapons ‘requirements.’”85 This was 
certainly true between 1947 and 1959, but after 1960, the establishment faced reduction from its 
peak manpower levels. Premised on the need to sustain the future of the weapons establishment, 
Makins called for an ‘Advanced Warhead Development Programme’ to resolve social and managerial 
concerns, regardless of the need for the specific artefact.86 A process of heterogeneous engineering 
was therefore occurring as weapons work was being forwarded on the premise of retaining skill. 
AWRE’s demand for further work was nullified after the cancellation of Skybolt and the acquisition 
of Polaris. Nonetheless, the need had re-emerged by 1966. As demonstrated by William Cook’s 
approach to the Chiefs of Staff, the initiation of a hardening programme was again premised on 
sustaining Aldermaston. Officials again cited this argument at the end of Chevaline development, as 
further justification for Trident and in attempts to defer cancellation of TASM. Citation of potential 
skill loss leading to Britain’s nuclear arsenal was therefore cyclical, matching with the “fluctuations in 
the flow of work… [with its] peaks and troughs” – a dynamic recognised by Francis Pym’s review of 
Aldermaston’s management.87 
In repudiation of the ‘Zuckerman thesis,’ invoking the possibility of nuclear uninvention to 
justify further nuclear weapons did not mean that the weapons establishment consistently acquired 
additional programmes. Only in a few of Britain’s major nuclear decisions did the nuclear 
establishment play an influential role. This thesis has found little evidence that parochial or 
institutional interest played any significant part in Britain’s initial nuclear weapons proliferation 
decision, the thermonuclear programme, the formation of the strategy behind the 1957 Defence 
White Paper, anglicisation of American designs or the acquisition of Trident. In all the above, it 
appears that politicians were firmly in control of the principal-agent relationship between 
themselves and the establishment. Indeed, in both the case of adopting American designs in the late 
1950s and avoiding uniqueness with Trident, Aldermaston was deprived of the additional work that 
would have been required with indigenous programmes. In the cases of TASM, despite clear 
warnings of the needs for further developmental work, the end of the Cold War ensured that the 
establishment’s concerns were overruled. Nonetheless, pressure from AWRE was able to acquire 
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diversification research, initially used to justify the Polaris Improvement Programme and then 
acquire the HELEN laser facilities in the 1970s. 
 Given the variability in the success of the uninvention argument in obtaining further work, 
understanding the political context is necessary. As highlighted in Chapter 5 with the difference in 
outcomes between the Wilson and Macmillan governments, this differing success of the 
‘uninvention’ argument can be attributed to varying approaches to ‘delegation’ versus ‘mobilisation’ 
under Saunders’ model for the domestic politics of nuclear choices.88 When confronted with relative 
threat clarity such as for HER, the thermonuclear programme or replacing Polaris with Trident due to 
uniqueness, governments effectively mobilised resources in favour of the weapons establishment. 
Under such conditions, AWRE expanded; although the uninvention argument developed, pressing 
the case to government was unnecessary. However, when political will was mobilised towards 
reducing defence spending such as Heath’s or Macmillan’s second administration, these cabinets 
were willing to ignore ‘uninvention’ warnings, regardless of AWRE’s concerns.  
When political consensus on nuclear decisions was most lacking or when international arms 
control threatened the longevity of the programme, the ‘uninvention’ argument appears to have 
been most potent. Under Saunders’ framework, these conditions increased ‘uninvention’s’ “threat 
clarity.”89 The acquisition of diversification work was instigated in part due to the belief that 
international arms control for nuclear weapons may have been imminent. The Wilson government’s 
drive for diversification under the ‘white heat of technology’ and then Polaris Improvement were 
ways of providing work while retaining the commitment not to develop a new generation of nuclear 
weapons. The acquisition of the HELEN laser and the transition to a scientific based stockpile 
stewardship approach after 1993 was in response to concerns over the CTBT.  
 The success of each attempt to advance nuclear weapons work premised on knowledge 
management grounds also depended on the relative political influence the weapons establishment 
had with government. This fluctuated depending upon the individuals involved. The close 
relationships between figures such as William Penney, William Cook and Victor Macklen to senior 
government officials appear to have been influential in overcoming reluctant departments, 
especially the Treasury. While this may have been personality driven, there was also a structural 
component. The secrecy and urgency of the initial fission and then fusion programme had thrust 
Cook and Penny into regular contact with the Cabinet and successive Prime Ministers. 
Contemporaries noted this variable when observing how nuclear policy was initially confined to an 
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“exceptionally limited circle” of individuals.90 The stature of directors of Aldermaston appears to 
have progressively declined, especially after 1973 when the MoD subordinated AWRE. Whereas 
Penney directly advised the government on arms control negotiations, AWRE’s subsequent 
directors’ communications were channelled through the MoD and the chairman of the UKAEA. The 
consolidation of the Ministry of Defence in 1964 also appears to have temporarily bolstered 
Aldermaston’s influence when Cook became Assistant Chief Scientific Advisor (Projects). Macklen 
inherited this role and continued to champion Aldermaston’s cause within the MoD until 1979, and 
thereafter CERN further diluted AWRE’s influence. This once again matches Saunders’ framework: 
the expansion of the domestic circle involved in nuclear policy decisions diluted Aldermaston’s 
influence.91 When incorporated into a wider defence bureaucracy, the personal relationships 
between Aldermaston’s key advocates and political decision makers was less consequential.  
 In judging the validity of claims of nuclear ‘uninvention,’ the ability of external parties to 
determine AWRE’s requirements was deemed important, but between 1947 and 1993, never 
satisfactorily resolved. Although hindered by secrecy and attracting the ire of Henry Tizard and the 
ARD, the HER project was able to cite its priority to acquire its needs. This continued with the 
thermonuclear programme, with the Treasury frustrated with AWRE’s profligacy. When reductions 
were imposed upon the nuclear programme from the early 1960s onwards, the persistent fear was 
in “cutting blind.”92 Attempts to apply further scrutiny to the establishment to determine their 
minimum manpower requirements with the both the Kings Norton Inquiry and the 1988 Industrial 
Society review proved unproductive. Especially in the late 1960s, AWRE sometimes actively resisted 
scrutiny from external officials. As in Kampani’s study of India, government oversight of nuclear 
weapons establishments inherently suffers from principal-agent issues such as of bounded 
rationality and limited domain expertise.93 
The incorporation of tacit knowledge in ‘uninvention’ arguments further exacerbated these 
principal-agent issues. The “special skills” held by weaponeers at Aldermaston were both a fragile 
commodity that could be lost but also an unknowable factor for those on the outside.94 Guarded by 
both official secrecy and often an unofficial reluctance to cooperate with other departments, who 
were external officials to tell figures such as Cook what were the establishment’s needs? This was 
demonstrated with the long-standing contest over what figure represented the minimum manpower 
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requirement of the weapons establishment in the prelude to the Kings Norton Inquiry was. The 
inability of the Treasury to challenge the often repeated 6000 figure is telling. Nuclear weapons 
related tacit knowledge was therefore both a shield from scrutiny and a powerful tool in advocating 
their own institutional interests. 
Nonetheless, the principal’s will could prevail; if a sufficient consensus was mobilised, 
governments could proceed to make nuclear defence spending reductions. Macmillan’s government 
and successive governments in the 1970s were willing to make arbitrary reductions to staffing at 
Aldermaston, often despite warnings of the possibility of skill loss. In the case of reductions after the 
Kings Norton Inquiry, this resulted in the crisis of 1979 that required both physical and social repair 
to keep AWRE functional. The inability to conduct multiple weapons programmes at the same time 
at Aldermaston limited the Thatcher government’s nuclear weapons development options and 
ensured that WE-177 replacement was delayed beyond the end of the Cold War, resulting in its 
cancellation. There was therefore a tangible risk to the future of the UK’s nuclear capability in 
overruling what the establishment deemed was necessary.  
 To lessen principal-agent problems by accurately gauging the needs of the weapons 
establishment and broadening consensus over the formulation of nuclear weapons policy, the UK 
government has attempted to create nuclear weapons “epistemic communities” beyond the 
weapons establishment itself.95 This has included the creation of ministerial committees and 
advisory bodies such as the Nuclear Requirement for Defence Committee in the 1960s and the 
Nuclear Research Advisory Council more recently. The greatest organisational development 
intended to provide greater control and oversight over AWRE was for it to be placed under the MoD 
Procurement Executive in 1973, removing it from the ineffectual oversight arrangement under the 
UKAEA and MinTech. As argued, this had been directly spurred by the Kings Norton Inquiry and its 
failure to find grounds for staffing reductions. The recent creation of the Defence Nuclear 
Organisation appears to be an attempt at centralising nuclear relevant expertise within the MoD to 
better manage the government’s relationship with AWE. 
 While institutional development to increase scrutiny appears to have been one possible 
outcome of the process based on the inherent problems of knowledge management at the 
establishment, the alternate response was to provide the establishment with more autonomy. This 
was the logic behind the foundation of the UKAEA and shift to contractorisation, where it was hoped 
that by removing the restrictions placed upon the establishment by its inclusion within the civil 
 




service and injecting more dynamism from the private sector, the nuclear weapons establishment 
would be both more attractive to employees and more efficient in delivering results. While this may 
have been the intention, the experience of AWRE under the UKAEA in the 1960s suggests that it did 
not solve the underlying issue of the need to supply the establishment with a continuous stream of 
work. Instead, institutional autonomy exacerbated principal-agent problems by allowing for the 
weapons establishment to promote the idea of the fragility of its institutional knowledge in the 
absence of rigorous oversight, technical solutions became the means to solve knowledge 
management problems. 
 This thesis suggests that between 1947 and 1993 there was an inherent problem of 
knowledge management at Britain’s nuclear weapons establishment that drove it towards 
heterogeneous engineering. The establishment’s understanding of the need to retain skills meant 
that it developed a sense of the need for a constant flow of work. When projects lessened in the 
early 1960s, AWRE actively began to advocate for its institutional interests. Their arguments claimed 
that unless there were new nuclear weapons programmes, AWRE would lose the ability to maintain 
the arsenal in the future. An argument premised on tacit knowledge posed inherent principal-agent 
challenges. External parties were unable to scrutinise tacit knowledge-based claims, and these were 
used to justify the initiation of the Polaris Improvement Project. However, such arguments were not 
singularly influential. When governments mobilised consensus on nuclear weapons decisions, 
Aldermaston either benefited or had its objections overruled. When government delegated 
decisions, AWRE could use its institutional authority to press heterogeneous engineering attempts 
via ‘uninvention’ arguments. Successive governments then responded by either providing 
Aldermaston with greater autonomy to manage their workforce more effectively or implement 
measures to reduce officials influence over policy and provide greater oversight. Whichever path 
was chosen, the problem of maintaining skills at the establishment appears to have cyclically 
reoccurred, with maintaining skills again being used to argue for institutional interests. 
 
Implications and Further Applications 
 
 While this thesis has only examined the history of the British nuclear weapons project, its 
findings are relevant to other states. As detailed in the framework, creating and maintaining nuclear 
weapons entails a series of knowledge management challenges. Accurately assessing required levels 




unresolved issues.96 As highlighted by this thesis, Kampani’s work on India and Hymans and Braut-
Hegghammer’s studies, providing effective oversight over a nuclear weapons programme poses 
inherent principal-agent problems.97 As observed by Sims and Henke in the US and repeatedly in the 
British case, weapons establishments can further problematise this relationship by using knowledge 
management arguments from a position of experiential authority.98 Although the history of the 
British weapons effort demonstrates that governments could overrule fears of nuclear weapons 
‘uninvention,’ this required policy attention towards expanding “the domestic circle for nuclear 
policy” to mobilise a consensus for deprioritising the programme.99 When weapons decisions were 
delegated, the information asymmetries enjoyed by the establishment’s nuclear advocates allowed 
for greater assertion of their “bureaucratic independence” in influencing policy decisions.100 As 
highlighted by Schmidt, Polanyi’s original conception of tacit knowledge was intended to subvert 
government control of science and under these conditions, knowledge management arguments 
were often used successfully in this role.101 Although used to promote institutional interests, 
warnings over nuclear ‘uninvention’ cannot be routinely ignored if the intention is to keep a nuclear 
arsenal functional either. When successive administrations imposed arbitrary reductions in the 
1970s, AWRE faced serious challenges to ongoing production. 
As knowledge management and organisational requirements needed to operate a nuclear 
weapons programme are high, all nuclear weapons states or proliferants would be expected to 
confront the dilemmas documented in the British experience eventually. This is already evident by 
the US troubles with FOGBANK and the problems with scientific capture within the Iraqi programme 
explored by Hymans and Braut-Hegghammer or Kampani with India.102 While this thesis does not 
propose a solution, it does suggest that the desire to stave off the potential for nuclear weapons 
‘uninvention’ is a possible driver for vertical nuclear proliferation. While state nuclear arsenals exist, 
a high level of nuclear weapons reliability is deemed important, and unless the capability to design 
and replicate advanced nuclear weapons is completely and irreversibly ‘black boxed’ (which seems 
unlikely), there will be pressure for further nuclear weapons developments to allow for the 
transmission of knowledge regardless of other strategic considerations. Providing oversight to 
determine what level of skills are necessary for a nuclear establishment to function proved 
extremely challenging in the British case due to a combination of secrecy and the uncommunicable 
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technical authority conveyed by arguments based on tacit knowledge. Governments further 
worsened oversight when they delegated nuclear decisions to a limited nuclear defence 
bureaucracy, especially when civilian bodies meant to provide external scrutiny (such as the NRDC or 
MinTech) were left unempowered. This situation could be enhanced by strong “internal opacity” as 
Kampani observed with India, in “personalist regimes” such as Iraq, where according to Braut-
Hegghammer, states undergo a degree of “coup-proof[ing]” which “can further weaken their ability 
to monitor and intervene in the management of nuclear weapons programs” or under governments, 
such as Wilson’s, where they are unwilling to expend political capital on mobilising towards an 
affirmative policy decision.103 
 As demonstrated in the British case, knowledge management issues are exacerbated by the 
uneven flow of nuclear weapons work due to having a limited arsenal. This is especially apparent in 
the UK as it is distinct from Russia and the United States in that it maintains a singular nuclear 
system delivered “at the lowest practicable cost,” delivered by a single nuclear establishment. 104 As 
a result, Britain has more akin with other nuclear states with smaller arsenals and potential 
proliferation aspirants in the scale of its nuclear ambitions. The struggle of balancing economic 
considerations, scientific capacity and balancing nuclear defence spending with conventional 
programmes is also likely an ongoing challenge to India, China, France, Israel, North Korea and 
Pakistan. As noted in the framework, while knowledge management demands may be avoided by 
reliance on “relatively crude nuclear weapons,” none of the listed states have adopted this 
approach.105 All nuclear weapons states appear to incorporate at least tritium ‘boosting’ into their 
nuclear arsenals.106 It would therefore be expected to find institutional pressure to continue vertical 
proliferation programmes to further the transmission of perishable tacit knowledge in the states 
listed above. How these countries balance knowledge management and institutional interests is an 
area for future research but as noted, currently limited by the availability of sources.  
States with large nuclear arsenals such as Russia and the United States would be less 
affected by this process. Rotating programmes of refurbishments across different systems could 
ensure a steady flow of employment. Nevertheless, similar arguments are cited in the United States: 
a 2015 workshop conducted by the American Association for the Advancement of Science and Union 
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of Concerned Scientists with US nuclear weapons scientists, engineers and defence officials found 
that: 
“There was some discussion of what was needed to maintain such expertise at the U.S. labs, with 
some arguing that the labs would end up with second-rate people if there was not challenging work 
for designers to do—and that “make-work” would not be adequate. Some asserted that the 
downside of refurbishing existing nuclear weapons rather than designing new ones was that the labs 
would lose the best people.”107 
Given this “challenging” work was designing a new warhead, the similarity between this suggestion 
and arguments used to advance Chevaline in 1960s Britain cannot be ignored. This further suggests 
that efforts at ‘black boxing’ nuclear weapons design in the US or UK have as of yet not eliminated 
the perceived need for retaining expertise through ongoing new nuclear weapons programmes. In 
addition, when announcing Britain’s new nuclear warhead development programme in 2020, the 
SofS for Defence highlighted the linkage between “build[ing] the skilled teams and put in place the 
facilities and capabilities needed to deliver the replacement warhead; whilst also sustaining the 
current warhead until it is withdrawn from service.”108 
The apparent need for continuing vertical proliferation to sustain tacit knowledge 
transmission suggests two interlinked possible implications for disarmament policy, although both 
likely lessened by ‘black boxing’ and designs incorporating inherent reliability and minimal 
maintenance features. The first is that successive generations of nuclear weapons will still be 
periodically required to both physically repair warheads and to renew tacit knowledge. As Ritchie 
notes, the common trend of intergenerational price increases for defence systems can be observed 
for nuclear weapons; for Britain, capital spending at AWE has been a significant source of these 
rises.109 This means at the point of needing to renew a nuclear arsenal, the question of whether 
“remaining in the nuclear weapons business” is worth the price will have to be revisited and will 
likely be more difficult each time.110 Neither intergenerational price increases or nuclear tacit 
knowledge requirements are unique to Britain, so this pressure is likely to be universal to nuclear 
armed states.111 The second interlinked implication is that any disruption at a weapons 
establishment is likely self-reinforcing and has long term consequences. Without government 
prioritisation, AWRE declined in the 1970s; the loss of skilled staff due to low pay aggravated safety 
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issues. This limited the Thatcher governments nuclear ambitions and impacted the Trident 
programme into the 1990s. As seen throughout this thesis, recruiting and retaining staff, building 
and rebuilding physical infrastructure and organising the effort required considerable government 
attention and investment to implement. Therefore, even if knowledge is no longer so individually 
based, the collective and local character of the work conducted by weapons establishments still 
leaves them vulnerable to interruption and degradation. Overcoming the challenges imposed by a 
“hiatus” would therefore likely require the considerable investment that MacKenzie and Spinardi 
foresaw for nuclear weapons “reinvention” in 1995.112 If international and domestic factors exert 
pressures towards disarmament, managing and justifying such national efforts may prove 
increasingly challenging given the investments required. 
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